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This thesis presents a theo-ethical critique of the liberal metanarrative that influences 
and shapes the current moral framework of Sex and Relationship Education (SRE) 
policy, in particular, the liberal approach towards sex education espoused by David 
Archard, which advocates providing young people with the maximum amount of 
information around their sexual choices, and defends a view of sexual morality which 
holds that anything sexually goes, as long as it is in private, between consenting adults 
and harms no-one else. 
 
In highlighting a liberal approach to policy making, this thesis reveals the liberal 
principles at work in health education and moral education, two central policy 
discourses that inform and shape SRE. In analysing the ethical theories therein and their 
underlying presuppositions, specifically those evident in an ‘informed choice’ approach, 
this thesis demonstrates the incoherence and inadequacy of the current moral 
framework, pointing in particular to the falsity of a self-legislated choice and the 
inadequate foundation for moral truth within the current framework. In addition, the 
adequacy of the current moral narrative on sex and relationships, as shown by Archard’s 
position, in shaping a robust public sexual ethic, is examined and critiqued. 
 
In adopting a constructive approach to public engagement, this thesis also demonstrates 
how a theological virtue ethic can enrich moral discourse in SRE. In particular, the 
virtues of Christian love and chastity are identified as two virtues which correspond with 
a Christian vision of human flourishing, dispositions that present a more adequate and 
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Chapter 1 





1.1 Introduction: Moral Discourse in SRE 
 
In a liberal democracy like the UK, where a plurality of worldviews co-exist, it is 
unsurprising when a variety of possible policy approaches to SRE emerge, invariably 
shaped by different moral and political values and commitments. At the very least, each 
possible approach adopts a view on the appropriate level of state involvement in what is 
rightly perceived to be a sensitive subject area. SRE is arguably a subject that should 
remain the sole domain of the home, or equally one in which the state endangers 
infringing individual liberty.
2
 Indeed, it should be noted from the outset that a 
questionable level of importance and influence continues to be assigned to the place of 
school-based SRE in tackling what are judged to be the sexual and relational ‘harms’ 
evident in wider society. For the ever-present danger exists that the liberal state is 
unfairly apportioned a level of responsibility for aspects of individual and societal well-
being that it has no authority over or, indeed, ability to dictate. As Bernard Crick notes: 
‘No state has the capacity to ensure that men are happy; but all states have the capacity 
to ensure that men are unhappy. The attempt to politicize everything is the destruction of 
politics’.3 Therefore, in recognising a role for school-based SRE, while at the same time 
acknowledging its limitations, this thesis will not argue for the introduction of SRE as a 
statutory part of the national curriculum, but will present the case for a renewed 
                                                 
1
 Sex and Relationship Education (SRE) is the name used within policy discourse in England for the non-
statutory curricular subject concerned with ‘lifelong learning about physical, emotional and moral 
development’ (Department for Education and Employment, Sex and Relationship Education Guidance 
DfEE 0116/2000, London: HMSO, 2000, 5). The DfEE guidance 2000 for head teachers, teachers and 
school governors, remains the most recent comprehensive guidance for SRE in England , with 
supplementary guidance issued in 2014 by Brook, PSHE Association and Sex Education Forum (Sex and 
Relationships Education(SRE) for the 21
st
 Century: Supplementary Advice to the Sex and Relationship 
Education Guidance DfEE (0116/2000), 2014, 
(http://www.sexeducationforum.org.uk/media/17706/sreadvice.pdf; accessed 07.07.14).   
In addition to SRE, I shall refer to ‘sex and relationships education’ and ‘sex education’ 
interchangeably, influenced particularly by the specific term used within a particular document or by a 
particular author, about which or to whom I am making comment. I would echo the concern that Sex and 
Relationship (singular) Education appears to only be concerned with sexual monogamous partnerships, 
rather than acknowledging the importance of educating for all relationships, including non-sexual ones (P. 
Alldred and M.E. David, Get Real About Sex: The Politics and Practice of Sex Education, Maidenhead: 
Open University Press, 2007, 35). 
2
 This thesis raises questions, therefore, not only around a liberal approach to policy making, but a liberal 
approach to education, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
3
 B. Crick, In Defence of Politics (5
th
 ed.), London: Continuum, 2000, 151. 
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exploration of the common values and virtues within policy guidance and surrounding 
discourse.  
 
As with any issue of public policy, it is the role of public moral discourse to engage with 
and critique alternative approaches to SRE in order to establish a position on the agreed 
‘good’ of the subject, the desired outcomes, or the end to which the subject is directed. 
Paul Trowler, for example, notes that beyond the technical questions of policy 
implementation, education policy operates within a normative framework, where 
questions will include:  
What has been identified as the “problem” that needs to be addressed here and what 
other interpretations are there? Who gains and who loses from this policy? What are the 
likely consequences, intended and unintended, of this policy for the education system 
and more broadly?’4  
 
The ‘good’ policy, therefore, cannot be chosen without reflecting on and responding to 
these value-laden questions. Beyond the immediate answers that begin to uncover a 
variance in worldview perspectives,
5
 I shall suggest that the moral and value 
judgements made in policy discourse and decision-making around SRE can be more 
implicit and complex.
6
 Not only do they engage with philosophical questions and 
debates relevant to education, they are made within a cultural context experiencing 
rapid moral change. In particular, sex education has emerged within a Western culture 
in which, it is suggested, sexual values, attitudes and behaviours have changed more in 
the second half of the twentieth century than they have done in the previous five 
hundred years.
7
 Consequently, a seismic shift in society’s attitudes and values towards 
sex and relationships will result in significant changes to relevant legal and policy 
                                                 
4
 P. Trowler, Education Policy (2
nd
 ed.), London: Routledge, 2003, 173. 
5
 See James Sire’s discussion on worldview in The Universe Next Door (5th ed.), Nottingham: IVP, 2009, 
in particular, his 8 basic questions for exposing the foundations of a worldview (22, 23). Recognising the 
complexity of worldview categories, I acknowledge with him that ‘within any given worldview, core 
commitments may vary widely’ (23). 
6
 Robert Leach, for example, suggests that public policy ‘proceeds on the basis of ideological 
assumptions, even though these may not be clearly articulated, or even consciously recognised’ (R. 
Leach, ‘Political Ideas’, M. Mullard (ed.), Policy-making in Britain: An Introduction, London: Routledge, 
1995, 14). In addition, decisions take place within the complexity of the current societal structures and 
policy-making framework. As a consequence, Simon James points out that, within British central 
government,  policy-making is an ‘untidy business’, highlighting six stages of the policy process, and the 
‘dynamic forces’ which drive and shape this process (S. James, British Government: A Reader in Policy 
Making, London: Routledge, 1997, 3, 6). Distinguishing policy from  the philosophical ideas and values 
of a particular government, he defines it simply as ‘a course of action which the government has taken a 
deliberate decision to adopt’ (2).  
7
 J.M. Halstead and M.J. Reiss, Values in Sex Education: From Principles to Practice, London: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2003, 17. 
 3 





The implications for education policy discourse should not be underestimated, nor the 
challenge of reaching any kind of ideological consensus. As Clyde Chitty points out, 
‘no one can pretend that the relationship between education and society is 
straightforward or uncontroversial’.9 For example, Maurice Kogan points to ‘four 
crudely defined sets of values’ which he suggest interchangeably shape education policy 
- educational, social, economic and institutional; such values are indicative of, and help 
to shape the publicly defined account of, an educated person.
10
 For while raising 
educational standards plays a central role in any political manifesto, as Chitty suggests, 
it is not always so clear what is meant by this and therefore how exactly it should be 
achieved.
11
 This invariably presents particular challenges for the creation and 
implementation of education policy, for policy statements may reflect multiple 
meanings and agendas, not least the political and educational ideologies at work.
12
 In 
addition, when it comes to young people’s sexual behaviour, controversies are not 
limited to discourse within education. In view of changes to the social and moral 
landscape, Leon Eisenberg, for example, suggests that significant changes in work 
patterns and in lifestyle choices invariably have consequences for health.
13
 These 




Although there are numerous names given to programmes concerned with young 
people’s sexual health, behaviour and well-being, both in the UK and internationally, 
                                                 
8
 See Chapter 4 for a fuller exploration of these cultural shifts in attitudes and values, shifts which are, as 
Halstead and Reiss suggest, at least reflected across the Western world. 
9
 C. Chitty, Education Policy in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, 15. 
10
 M. Kogan, ‘Education Policy and Values’, I. McNay and J. Ozga (eds.), Policy-making in Education: 
The Breakdown in Consensus, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985, 11-23, 19. Such value assumptions are 
positioned within a wider discussion on the purpose of education, which, while beyond the remit of this 
thesis, are reflected within discussions on the meaning and purpose of moral education, and, in particular, 
SRE, and the values imbued within policy discourse. 
11
 Chitty, Education, 3. 
12
 See Chapter 3 of Trowler’s, Education Policy (2nd ed.) for an outline of identified political and 
educational ideologies at work in the making of education policy. While recognising that SRE policy has 
developed within the dynamic outworking of both of these fields, it is the purpose of this thesis to identify 
the overarching principles and values that currently shape SRE policy discourse. Policy is further 
influenced by a wider discourse around the philosophical questions concerning sex, which I will discuss 
in Chapter 4 (See J.A. Diorio, ‘Sex Education’, A. Soble (ed.), Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical 
Encyclopedia, Vol. 2: M-Z, London: Greenwood Press, 2006, 986-997). 
13
 L. Eisenberg, ‘Value Conflicts in Social Policies for Promoting Health’, S. Doxiadis (ed.), Ethical 
Dilemmas in Health Promotion, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1987, 99-116, 104. 
14
 See 2.1. 
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and various contexts and modes of delivery,
15
 I am particularly concerned with 
exploring the moral principles and resulting normative framework, evident in policy 
guidance, legislation, and the surrounding discourse, that shapes school-based SRE in 
England. While drawing on the key pieces of government policy guidance and 
legislation currently in place concerning SRE, alongside, and in dialogue with, 
academic discourse around the subject, the use of public policy examples is to draw 
attention to what I will argue are the ethical principles that are shaping the moral and 
political landscape of school-based SRE in England.
16
 Therefore, this thesis will 
extrapolate more fully and critique the explicit and implicit moral values evident in SRE 
policy, and the moral vision towards which policy and practice is directed. This will 
involve identifying philosophical positions and value judgments, in particular those 
embedded in the public moral frameworks shaping health education and moral 
education,
17
 and the ontological presuppositions concerned with human nature and 
sexuality evident therein. In light of a comparative analysis of these discourses, and a 
critique of the emerging values and moral narrative shaping a public sexual ethic, I will 
re-imagine and reconstruct an alternative moral framework within which to re-position 
SRE shaped by a theological virtue ethic. 
 
Many of the philosophical and ethical questions raised in this thesis emerged in my own 
thinking during an intensive five-year period working within a Christian Relationships 
and Sexuality Education (RSE) project in Northern Ireland. This work encompassed 
programme delivery in primary and post-primary schools, at a Northern Ireland and 
international level, delivering training to parents and school leaders, and partnering with 
government agencies at a local and central level in policy development and 
implementation. 
 
In particular, questions emerged around the nature and purpose of sex education, how it 
should be taught, what moral vison should be presented within public moral discourse, 
how such agreement could be reached, and what was distinctive about a Christian 
approach to this subject as compared to other worldview perspectives.  It became 
                                                 
15
 See examples in R. Ingham and N. Stone, ‘Young People and Sex and Relationships Education’, P. 
Aggleton and R. Ingham (eds.), Promoting Young People’s Sexual Health: International Perspectives, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, 192-208. 
16
 The political and legal status of SRE under the Coalition Government in England is set out in the Sex 
Education Forum (SEF) briefing paper: http://www.ncb.org.uk/media/385195/current_status_of_sre.pdf, 
accessed 13.02.13. 
17
 I will evidence in Chapter 3 why and how health promotion and moral education, two leading policy 
discourses concerned with young people’s sexual behaviour, have shaped the moral content of SRE 
policy. 
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apparent to me that the moral and spiritual content of public moral discourse was poorly 
scrutinised, not least, the underlying presuppositions concerning sexuality.  
 
The completion of an MA course in Bioethics allowed me to examine more closely the 
current public policy approach in England directed towards addressing young people’s 
sexual behaviour, including critically scrutinising the ethical principles at work within 
public moral discourse. Concern emerged over the dominance of the principle of 
autonomy in public health discourse, and the narrow definition of ‘harm’ employed; in 
addition, the potential for an approach shaped by a virtue ethic was identified. The 
completion of a Diploma in Theology allowed me to locate this ethical framework 
within wider public theological discourse.  
 
Therefore, my public theological engagement in this thesis will be ultimately framed by 
a theological ethic.
18
 However, it will at the same time heavily engage with 
philosophical discourse, affirming James Gustafson’s position on the inevitable 
relationship between the two: ‘Theological ethics, if done with any effort to be 
comprehensive and coherent, cannot avoid being philosophical’.19 Ethics, in particular, 
as a subdivision of philosophy, is primarily concerned with the study of goodness and 
the study of right action: ‘What ends we ought, as fully rational human beings, to 
choose and pursue and what moral principles should govern our choices and pursuits’.20 
These philosophical questions, John Deigh notes, correspond with, among other things, 
issues concerning human well-being and flourishing, intrinsic value, and principles of 
right and wrong,
21
 and normative ethical theories emerge which seek to provide a 
coherent framework in which to answer  these questions.  
 
Engaging, in particular, with a theological virtue ethic, I shall explore an understanding 
of the young person as moral agent, how their moral character is informed and shaped 
not only by their moral decisions, but by the moral narrative of their community. In so 
                                                 
18
 Unlike other ethical theories, a theological ethic draws on different sources of authority to shape its 
normative framework. William Spohn suggests that ‘whereas philosophical ethics depends upon the 
interaction between moral theory and empirical data, Christian ethics adds two additional sources: 
Scripture and tradition (the historical process in which the gospel has been understood and applied)’ 
(W.C. Spohn, ‘Scripture’, G. Meilaender and W. Werpehowski (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Theological Ethics, Oxford: OUP, 2005, 93-111, 95).  
19
 J.M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Volume Two: Ethics and Theology, London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1984, 97. 
20
 See J. Deigh, ‘Ethics’, R. Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge: CUP, 
1995, 244-249, 244. 
21
 Deigh, ‘Ethics’, 244. 
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doing, I will critique what I perceive to be the dominant metanarrative,
22
 reflected in a 
so-called liberal approach to sex education, which is shaping the normative ethical 
framework of SRE discourse. I will argue a case for why the existing framework, in 
which a vision of human flourishing, intrinsic value and right and wrong are presented, 
is being shaped by an anthropological vision of the young person and a moral 
epistemology that is fundamentally flawed. David Gushee and Glen Stassen highlight 
the importance of understanding the ‘causative forces’ that shape a society and the 
individuals within it, in order to enable Christians to effectively correct secular 




1.2 Shaping the Moral Framework of SRE 
 
In noting that SRE policy in England is situated within an overarching metanarrative 
that is shaped by the political philosophy of liberalism,
24
 it is the values emerging from 
enlightenment rationalism, and the underlying presuppositions evident therein, that I 
will critique.
25
 In the face of the complexity of the social context, I recognise, in 
particular, that policy discourse must be understood against the moral commitments of 
                                                 
22
 In identifying enlightenment liberalism as the grand narrative of SRE discourse, I acknowledge that 
Jean-Françoise Lyotard defined postmodernism as ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, G. Bennington and B. Massumi (trs.), Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984, xxiv). However, J.K.A. Smith  points to his use of ‘metanarrative’ in terms of 
‘false appeals to universal, rational, scientific criteria – as though they were divorced from any particular 
myth or narrative’ (Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church, 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006, 68). As such, I echo Lyotard’s critique, affirming the reality that 
‘all knowledge is rooted in some narrative or myth’ and cannot be derived from an appeal to universal 
reason (69). 
23
 D.P. Gushee and G.H. Stassen, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context, Downers 
Grove: IVP, 2003, 76. 
24
 For an introduction to the origin, content and central thesis of liberalism see, for example, J. Rawls, 
Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, S. Freeman (ed.), London: Belknap Press of HUP, 2007.  
See also W. Nelson, ‘Liberal Theories and their Critics’, R.L. Simon (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Social 
and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, 197-217, for a discussion on significant contributors 
to liberal theory and political liberalism since the mid-20
th
 century. Of course, I do not presuppose that 
liberalism is a unitary, monolithic tradition, nor, indeed, that there is only one understanding of its 
ontological foundations (see, for example, C.J. Insole, ‘Two Conceptions of Liberalism: Theology, 
Creation and Politics in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke’, Journal of Religious Ethics, 
Vol. 36, No. 3, 2008, 447-489).  
25
 See W. Donner, A.M. Schmitter and N. Tarcov, ‘Enlightenment Liberalism’, R. Curren (ed.), A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Education, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 73-93 for an introduction to key 
enlightenment thinkers and their insights on education. Mark Halstead explores an understanding of 
liberal education as one that advocates the core values of freedom, equality and rationality, the later 
needed, he suggests, to resolve the tension between the first two (J.M. Halstead, ‘Liberal Values and 
Liberal Education’, W. Carr (ed.), The RoutledgeFalmer Reader in Philosophy of Education, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2005, 111-123, 112). He limits his discussion of liberalism to the strand which can be traced 
from Kant to liberal education philosophers such as R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst, the strand which, for him, 
appears to be ‘the most influential one in contemporary liberal thought’ (Halstead, ‘Liberal’, 111).  
In Chapter 3, I will explore how liberal educational ideals are outworked in a Utilitarian 
approach to health education, and a Kantian approach to moral education, in particular, the development 
of the rational mind and the pursuit of personal autonomy and freedom.  
 7 
any culture, including its political structures, at any given time. In turn, liberal political 
theory influences the aims, structure and content of education, with education playing a 
central role in upholding the ideals of liberalism.
26
 It is moral philosophy, however, that 
‘sets the background for, and boundaries of, political philosophy’.27 As Mark Halstead 
reminds us, an understanding of the educational values of any society is best achieved 




This broader framework of values has particular implications for moral education. 
James D. Hunter notes that we should recognise moral education as ‘an exercise in the 
transmission of culture’, suggesting it is ‘always more a reflection of the social order 
than a mechanism by which the social order is transformed’.29 Therefore, where Nel 
Noddings and Michael Slote point out that moral education will inevitably be impacted 
by changes in moral customs and moral philosophy,
30
 we cannot overlook the 
implications for SRE. Mark Halstead and Michael Reiss claim that, unlike other subjects 





In his ‘philosophical theology of culture’,32 James K. A. Smith argues that a Christian 
philosophical anthropology points to the fact that our intentional, desiring and 
imagining nature takes precedent over our cognitive faculties, recognising that our 
desires are constantly being shaped and directed by the dominant ‘cultural liturgies’.33 
In particular, he critiques the reductionist picture of the human person as purely a 
rationalist, thinking, believing being, a picture which he suggests has been 
accommodated within Christian education.
34
 This, indeed, echoes Nicholas 
Wolterstorff’s critique of a Christian education which fails to appreciate the embodied, 
                                                 
26
 See M. Levinson, The Demands of Liberal Education, Oxford: OUP, 1999. 
27
 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, 6. 
28
 Halstead, ‘Liberal’, 111. 
29
 J.D. Hunter, The Death of Character, New York: Basic Books, 2000, 27. 
30
 N. Noddings and M. Slote, ‘Changing Notions of the Moral and of Moral Education’, N. Blake, P. 
Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003, 341-355, 341. 
31
 Halstead and Reiss, Values, 3. 
32
 J.K.A.Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation, Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2009, 14. 
33
 Smith, Desiring, 71. By ‘cultural liturgies’, Smith explores the idea of liturgies as ritual practices that 
are formational in that they are directed towards ultimate ends or ideals of human flourishing, ‘ritual 
practices that function as pedagogies of ultimate desire’ (Smith, Desiring, 87). 
34
 Smith, Desiring, 41-46. 
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‘praxis-orientated’, nature of the learner; he calls for the development of a ‘new 
anthropology’ which gives meaning to our reality as ‘interactive creatures’.35  
 
It is the narrative context in which education takes place, one that shapes the practices 
and habits of the moral agent, which reflects a key feature of a virtue ethic approach to 
moral theory and moral education.
36
 The moral agent cannot be understood apart from 
their social reality: ‘The solitary, thinking individual posited by Descartes finds no place 
in Christian theological anthropology. To be human is to be-in-relation’.37 Primarily 
concerned with critiquing and re-imagining Christian practices in education that are re-
oriented as much towards the affective as the cognitive nature, Smith rightly recognises 
that ‘education as formation’ is not confined to the school or classroom context,38 but 
carries out a ‘cultural exegesis’ of the secular liturgies39 which, in light of a Christian 
view of human flourishing, he believes are shaping the loves and desires of students 
towards misdirected ends, ‘aiming our heart away from the Creator to some aspect of 
the creation as if it were God’.40 This re-iterates the positive yet limited role that schools 
are believed to play in character formation, in particular, a role that at the very least 
‘only complements the influence of the home’.41  
 
It should be noted that Smith’s ‘cultural exegesis’ uses case studies that are nuanced 
towards an American cultural context. In addition, although Smith is particularly 
concerned with a critique directed at Christian education and worship, unlike the 
direction of my own, I would suggest that his anthropological presuppositions can 
equally be used to critique the policy and practice of education in wider culture. Indeed, 
                                                 
35
 N.P. Wolterstorff, Educating for Life: Reflections on Christian Teaching and Learning, G.G. Stronks 
and C.W. Joldersma (eds.), Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002, 82. 
36
 See 5.2.1 (b).  Indeed, the counter claim is also true in that practices shape character.  
37
 F.W. Bridger, ‘Humanity’, D.J. Atkinson and D.H. Field (eds.), New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and 
Pastoral Theology, Leicester: IVP, 1995, 21-27, 25. 
38
 Smith, Desiring, 19. 
39
 In exploring a few case studies, he investigates in more depth the practices evident in ‘the mall, the 
stadium and the university’ (Smith, Desiring, 93).  
40
 Smith, Desiring, 88. 
41
 James Arthur et al. point to ‘the mass media, religious communities, youth culture, peer groups, 
voluntary organisations and above all parents and siblings as carrying more weight in character 
development’ (J. Arthur, R. Deakin Crick, B. McGettrick, E. Samuel and K. Wilson, Character 
Education: The Formation of Virtues and Dispositions in 16-19 Year Olds with Particular Reference to 
the Religious and Spiritual, 2006, ( http://www.learningforlife.org.uk/wplife/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/Character-Education_FULL.pdf; accessed 20.06.14).  
It is also noted that the family and parent-child relationships ‘appear to be the greatest factor 
influencing the level of sexual behaviour among young people’ (P. Boydell and C.MacKellar, Informing 
Choice: New Approaches and Ethics for Sex and Relationships Education in Scotland, Edinburgh: 
Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, 2004, 41). 
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he affirms the application of his ‘liturgical anthropology’ within the secular context in 




In addition, a critique of the cultural telos of moral and character formation should not 
overlook the active role and responsibility of the moral agent in acquiring, embodying, 
or indeed, rejecting the societal descriptor.
43
 For in understanding the human learner in 
relational terms, Brian Hill points out, we should not overlook their capacity for reason 
and self-determination.
44
 Richard Harries points to the firm grounding that the principle 
of liberty has in the Christian faith, in particular, the capacity and freedom to make 
choices.
45
 Nevertheless, the attention Smith gives to the influences of dominant cultural 
practices and institutions in shaping the learner echoes what, for Gushee and Stassen, is 
the importance for the character ethicist in understanding the ‘master narrative’ of 
society. Critically assessing the conclusions of social sciences involves uncovering the 
power relationships concealed in ‘power structures and organizational functions’.46 
Indeed, in recognising the dynamic of the culture and community in shaping moral 
identity, there are calls within moral development discourse for research that examines 
this intersection between ‘community influences and norms with evolving notions of 
self, identity, and morality’.47  
 
Therefore, in re-engaging with the moral framework of SRE, it is important to scrutinize 
the metanarrative that is shaping our moral ideas and practices in this policy area. In 
acknowledging the embodied nature of the moral agent in community, I will recognise, 
in particular, the normative influence of public policy in shaping the social context and 
ultimately informing sexual practice. In his exploration of the complexity of culture and 
cultural change, Hunter notes how ideas that define reality are diffused and translated 
from the top down.
48
 In light of this, I am particularly concerned with the moral norms 
and truth claims diffused in SRE policy discourse, which inform practice: ‘Just what 
                                                 
42
 J.K.A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works, Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013, 
110. 
43
 S. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics, San Antonio: Trinity 
University Press, 1975, 116. 
44
 B.V. Hill, That They May Learn: Towards a Christian View of Education, Exeter: Paternoster, 1990, 
41. 
45
 R. Harries, Faith in Politics: Rediscovering the Christian Roots of our Political Values, London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2010, 71. 
46
 Gushee and Stassen, Kingdom, 76. 
47
 D. Hart, M.K. Matsuba and T. Murzyn, ‘Moral Identity Development and Community’, M. Killen and 
J.G. Smetana (eds.), Handbook of Moral Development (2
nd
 ed.), Hove: Psychology Press, 2014, 520-537, 
537. 
48
 J.D. Hunter, To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late 
Modern World, Oxford: OUP, 2010, 41. 
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kind of person is this habit or practice trying to produce, and to what end is such a 
practice aimed?’49  
 
A Christian vision of sexuality suggests that ‘practices shape character powerfully’.50 
This is experienced not only at an individual, but a communal level. As Gushee and 
Stassen assert: ‘If a society relates sexually in contexts of self-seeking, manipulation, 
distrust and betrayal, it tends to become a society of self-seeking, manipulation, distrust 
and betrayal. This is simply the reality of human nature’.51 As such, in their call for 
‘holistic character ethics’, they uphold the role of critical social theory and ‘assert the 
importance of the way of seeing the social context as crucial for an ethics of character’.52 
However, in focussing my discussion primarily on policy rather than practice, it should 
be noted that I depart from the heart of Smith’s ‘cultural exegesis’ which advocates that 
we should not simply explore the ideas and values evident in policy, but instead identify 
the visions of human flourishing implicit in cultural practices.
53
 In doing so, however, 
he does not call for an abandonment of worldview talk, but simply that our reflections 




In exploring the public policy contours of a liberal metanarrative in the light of a 
theological understanding of the embodied learner, this thesis shall critique, in 
particular, the ideas and values embedded in a so-called liberal approach to SRE which 
seeks to shape policy and practice in the classroom. This is a moral narrative that 
ultimately exalts the vision of self-authenticated choice as the end of moral education 
and human flourishing, as exemplified in the rhetoric of ‘informed choice’. As I shall 
evidence, the philosophical values and principles that shape SRE are reflective of the 
dominant discourse surrounding moral education. Of course, the case can be made for 
viewing all education as moral education; on the other hand, while recognising that 
other subjects can and do raise moral issues, Philip Meredith, for example, suggests that 
                                                 
49
 Smith, Desiring, 83. 
50
 Gushee and Stassen, Kingdom, 304. This accords with an understanding of the moral agent within a 
virtue ethic (see 5.2.1 (a)). As such, within Stanley Hauerwas’s sexual ethic, for example, preceding 
questions over the moral legitimacy of sexual behaviours is a question concerning character: ‘What kind 
of people do you want to encourage?’ (S. Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive 
Christian Social Ethic, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 180). 
51
 Gushee and Stassen, Kingdom, 292. 
52
 Gushee and Stassen, Kingdom, 75. 
53
 Smith, Desiring, 89.  
54
 ‘The argument of Desiring the Kingdom is not that we need less than worldview, but more: Christian 
education will only be fully an education to the extent that it is also a formation of our habits. And such 
formation happens not only, or even primarily, by equipping the intellect but through the repetitive 
formation of embodied, communal practices’ (Smith, Imagining, 10). See, for example, D.I. Smith and 
J.K.A. Smith, Teaching and Practices: Reshaping Faith and Learning, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2011 for a 
reflection on the impact of Christian practices on pedagogical approaches.  
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it is a ‘matter of degree’ whether the value of a subject lies in acquiring knowledge 
rather than on personal development.
55
 This distinction, as Graham Haydon points out, 




It is a post-Enlightenment account of education, one in which the aim of moral 
education is the ‘deliberate development of rational moral autonomy’,57 which I will 
evidence and critique as the dominant metanarrative in SRE discourse and one that 
presents a flawed anthropological and epistemological understanding of moral education 
and formation. Haydon points to the naivety of this rationalist account on at least two 
accounts: first, it fails to engage with the expectation that a person should conform to 
public norms, and, secondly, it fails to account for an individual’s sources of value.58 
Absent from a rationalist account is an adequate consideration of motivation and 




1.3 Critiquing the Liberal Metanarrative in SRE 
 
In identifying the liberal metanarrative in which SRE policy is currently positioned, and 
the many ways that ‘liberal’ could be understood and interpreted, my critique will centre 
on the philosophical position espoused by David Archard in his discussion on how we 
should teach sex. Promoting a liberal approach to sex education, Archard argues, will 
involve providing young people with the maximum amount of information around their 
sexual choices,
60
 with choice accorded a central role in the legitimation of sexual 
conduct, and defending a view of sexual morality which holds that ‘anything sexually 
goes so long as it is in private, between consenting adults, and harms no-one else’.61 
Indeed, in line with his view of the liberal end of education, that of producing 
independent, autonomous citizens, he suggests that teaching about sex is no different 
from teaching about other subjects: ‘We should be as free in our sexual lives as it is 
alleged we should be in every other part of our life. And we should teach sex in a way 
                                                 
55
 P. Meredith, Sex Education: Political Issues in Britain and Europe, London: Routledge, 1989, 42. 
56
 G. Haydon, ‘Moral Education’, R. Curran (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Education, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003, 320-331, 321. 
57
 Haydon, ‘Moral’, 322. 
58
 Haydon, ‘Moral’, 324. 
59
 Haydon, ‘Moral’, 323, 324. 
60
 D. Archard, ‘How Should We Teach Sex?’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1998, 
437-449, 447. 
61
 Archard, ‘How’, 448. 
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that is consistent with that ideal. The onus is on the critic to show why it should not be 
thus’.62 
 
Bridging educational and political philosophy, an attempt at achieving a value-neutral 
position on SRE is one that equates with a liberal approach to policy making more 
broadly. As such, Archard affirms that a neutral position is achieved when beneficial 
consequences are aimed at and recognised harms are avoided, i.e. the justification for 
the policy is neutral.
63
 Nevertheless, he acknowledges the difficulty with this position in 
that every approach to sex education will argue that their position will prove maximally 
beneficial and the other approaches will result in harm, leaving the dilemma for policy 
makers as to whether they should take account of all views on sexual morality.
64
 In 
response, he suggests that the liberal may adopt the approach that only accepts those 
views that are deemed ‘reasonable’; however, as he points out, this does not resolve 
questions over behaviours which may be rationally defensible yet remain morally 
questionable.
65
 Nor, indeed, does it answer the question of who, or what, determines the 
criteria on which a particular behaviour might be deemed reasonable.
66
 While sexual 
autonomy is the desired moral end, fundamental questions over the ontological 
foundations of moral knowledge remain unanswered.  
 
Alan Harris, in the first of edition of the Journal of Moral Education, echoed this liberal 
ideal by suggesting that, while sex education cannot impose a ‘particular attitude 
towards “sexual morality”’, it must maximise freedom for the individual by providing 
‘the maximum possible degree of knowledge and understanding concerning sexual 
behaviour’.67 It is at least recognised within SRE policy that this information should 
include knowledge of the law on sexual behaviour
68
 for, at the very least, unconstrained 
freedom is neither desirable nor possible and moral autonomy must at least be 
                                                 
62
 Archard, ‘How’, 448. 
63
 D. Archard, Impact (No.7): Sex Education, John White (ed.), Philosophy of Education of Great Britain, 
2000, 22. 
64
 Archard, ‘How’, 440. 
65
 Archard, ‘How’, 440. 
66
 Julian Rivers warns of public moral discourse reverting to a position of ‘liberal agnosticism’; when 
achieving equality of outcome is coupled with uncertainty about the desired outcomes, the danger of 
moral neutrality emerges within legal and policy decision-making with regards to the good of various 
lifestyle choices. In short, when equality becomes an ultimate value, yet divorced from its essential 
nature, the danger exists that ‘the language of equality relieves us of the responsibility of making positive 
arguments for this new conception of the good, merely legitimising arbitrary shifts of moral sentiment 
and silencing their opponents’ (J. Rivers, ‘The Abuse of Equality’, Ethics in Brief, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
Summer 2006, (http://klice.co.uk/uploads/Ethics%20in%20Brief/Rivers%20v11.1%20pub.pdf; accessed 
15.08.14). 
67A. Harris, ‘What does ‘Sex Education’ mean?’,  Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1971, 7-11, 
7. 
68
 DfEE, ‘Sex’, 21. 
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constrained by socially agreed norms of behaviour.
69
 However, within the moral 
boundaries defined by the law of consent, it would appear that that the moral imperative 
of SRE is one that places the onus on the young person to clarify their own moral 
values. As already noted, to presume that a young person can shape their own moral 
identity, independent of an over-arching metanarrative and the social values therein, is 
one of the central critiques of this thesis. As Denis Hollinger points out, ‘all ethical 
reflection and action occurs in the context of a larger worldview’.70 In addition, in light 
of Smith’s argument, this reflection and understanding is arguably not purely, or even 
primarily cognitive, but affective and driven by what we ultimately love. 
 
1.3.1 Incoherent and Inadequate Public Vision of Moral Education 
 
The liberal position espoused by Archard and Harris is currently reflected in policy 
discourse. For example, in its 2010 Schools White Pater, the Coalition Government 
defined the ‘good’ of sex education as follows: 
Children need high-quality sex and relationships education so they can make wise and 
informed choices. We will work with teachers, parents, faith groups and campaign 
groups, such as Stonewall to make sure sex and relationships education encompasses an 
understanding of the ways in which humans love each other and stresses the importance 




In view of this statement, and alongside an analysis of the current moral framework of 
SRE as evidenced in policy guidance documents and policy discourse, I shall argue, 
from a theologically informed position, that the current policy approach in England, 
which informs practice, is shaped by a moral framework that yields an incoherent and 
inadequate vision of moral education and human flourishing.
 
This is a result of the 
public moral framework being shaped by an anthropological vision of the young person 
and a moral epistemology that is fundamentally flawed. 
 
First, it is shaped by a moral discourse that is explicitly and often exclusively directed 
towards the maximisation of individual autonomy, often through the mantra of 
‘informed choice’ and a purely cognitive understanding of moral discernment and 
formation. In so doing, it presents an inaccurate conception of moral identity formation, 
assuming the possibility that this can take place aloof from any concept of the good, in 
                                                 
69
 Indeed, I shall explore in Chapter 4 how the law exists as the final arbiter of public sexual morality. 
70
 D.P. Hollinger, The Meaning of Sex: Christian Ethics and the Moral Life, Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2009, 43. Hollinger offers a helpful distinction between ‘Ethical Theories and Sex’ and 
‘Worldviews and Sex’ in identifying the ‘Frameworks’ within which the meaning of sex is understood.  
71
 Department for Education, The Importance of Teaching: The Schools White Paper, Norwich: TSO, 
2010, 46, (https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/CM-7980.pdf; accessed 
14.02.13). 
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particular, any relational norms or expectations which are invariably shaped by 
particular cultural norms, values and ‘liturgies’.  As such, I shall argue that what results 
is a moral order that fails to provide an adequate vision of the ‘relational’ nature of 





Secondly, the ‘epistemological agnosticism’73 that is evident in liberal approaches to 




 fails to provide a moral 
defence for the existence of objective moral principles to guide sexual behaviour. For in 
exploring the nature of moral education, David Carr points to what, for him, are a few 
fundamental assumptions:  
that the very possibility of moral education depends upon making sense of the idea of 
moral enquiry; that moral enquiry depends on making sense of moral knowledge; that 
moral knowledge is dependent upon the possibility of moral truth; and that this, in turn, 




Thus, in critiquing what he regards as the dominant theory of moral education, that has 
emerged from enlightenment rationalism, it is an account of objectivity which is 
ultimately being seriously contended.
77
 Concerning the nature of moral knowledge, 
Robert Audi notes that, unlike scientific knowledge, ‘there is a widespread inclination 
to take moral judgements to be at best culturally conditioned assertions with no claim to 
                                                 
72
 Perry L. Glanzer and Todd C. Ream explore a ‘less than human approach’ to moral education in their 
critique of moral identity formation in Higher Education, in particular, American Higher Education (P.L. 
Glanzer and T.C. Ream, Christianity and Moral Identity in Higher Education, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
73
This is a phrase used by Professor David Carr in his articulation of the problems with values education 
(D. Carr, ‘Problems of Values Education’, J. Haldane (ed.), Values Education and the Human World: 
Essays on Education, Culture, Politics, Religion and Science, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004, 14-30, 
27). 
74
 This is to understand the nature and grounds of values from a position of moral subjectivism, i.e. one 
where ethics has no objective truth, but where moral judgements are expressions of one’s own attitudes, 
beliefs and emotions (Deigh, ‘Ethics’, 248; R. Foley, ‘Subjectivism’, The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, Cambridge: CUP, 1995, 773). 
75
 In exploring the relativism of moral knowledge, Robert Audi notes at least two ways in which this is 
understood: moral judgements are true relative to a particular culture, or there are simply no universally 
valid  moral truths to be known (R. Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of 
Knowledge (2
nd
 ed.), Abingdon: Routledge, 2003, 268). As Simon Blackburn points out, relativism is ‘an 
expression of the idea that there is no one true body of doctrine in ethics’ (S. Blackburn, ‘Relativism’, H. 
LaFollette (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, 38-52, 38). 
76
 D. Carr, ‘Moral Education and the Objectivity of Values’, D. Carr (ed.), Education, Knowledge and 
Truth: Beyond the Postmodern Impasse, London: Routledge, 1998, 114-128, 114. 
77
As an advocate of a virtue approach to moral education, I shall explore and echo a number of insights 
from Carr throughout this thesis, in particular, his philosophical insights concerning moral and spiritual 
education and sex education. I shall do so through the lens of a theological ethic.  
 15 
genuine truth’.78 This contrasts with the view of moral realism expressed by Carr, a 




In light of these concerns over the objectivity of moral values in education, fundamental 
questions for this thesis emerge: Where the moral end of SRE is the rationally 
determined, ‘informed’, yet subjective conclusions of the young person, as espoused by 
Archard, does this present a sufficient vision of moral education? In addition, does 
enlightenment rationalism provide a coherent account of moral knowledge and moral 
truth, grounded in objective moral principles, with which to shape a robust moral 
framework for SRE?  
 
It is important to reiterate that while I focus my discussion on the subject of SRE as 
framed within PSHE, I do not presume that school-based moral education is confined to 
these subject areas, but instead recognise that moral principles and outlook can infuse 
and frame the whole of the curriculum. C.S. Lewis, in his critique of the subjective 
values emerging in the teaching of English, warned against abandoning ‘the doctrine of 
objective value’, or, as he re-framed it, ‘the Tao’.80 I acknowledge, therefore, that the 
agnosticism evident in the moral content of SRE may well be evident elsewhere across 
the curriculum.  
 
Thirdly, in view of moral education reflecting the norms and values of culture, it is 
important to extrapolate and critically reflect on the current moral norms concerning sex 
evident in policy discourse. In particular, what is the underlying worldview and 
corresponding vision of human flourishing presented in SRE policy discourse, and do 
the ontological presuppositions offer an adequate foundation on which to build a robust 
public sexual ethic? As such, does it give shape to an adequate and coherent moral 
framework in which the meaning and purpose of young people’s sexual behaviour can 
be understood? I shall argue that, where sexual morality becomes a matter of social 
construction and consensus, shaped by the definition of ‘harm’ that is culturally 
adopted, there is no longer a basis on which to contend for the existence of universally 
held, objective moral truth with regards to sexual practices as taught within SRE. 
Consequentially, the current moral narrative on sex, informed by a naturalistic 
                                                 
78
 Audi, Epistemology, 267. 
79
 Moral realism, notes Deigh, views ethics as ‘an objective discipline, a discipline that promises 
discovery and confirmation of objective truths’ (Deigh, ‘Ethics’, 248). 
80
 C.S. Lewis, ‘The Abolition if Man’, The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, New York: 
HarperCollins, 2002 [1947], 689-738, 701. 
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worldview, provides an inadequate public sexual ethic from which the norms of SRE are 
derived.    
 
Before exploring in more detail the public policy contours of this liberal metanarrative, 
presenting a brief outline of its evolution in public policy discourse, and extrapolating 
on the nexus of my critique, it is important to establish the theological groundwork for 
the public engagement presented in this thesis.  
 
1.4 Setting the Groundwork for Public Theological Engagement  
 
Critiquing liberalism through the lens of narrative theology, theologian and ethicist 
Stanley Hauerwas suggests that the perceived absence of a narrative is, for the Christian 
and the church, ‘the most coercive aspect of the liberal account of the world’.81 He 
states: ‘The story that liberalism teaches us is that we have no story, and as a result we 
fail to notice how deeply that story determines our lives’.82 However, concern is 
expressed that Hauerwas’s anti-liberal rhetoric endangers Christian association with 
political culture.
83
 Indeed, the achievements of liberal political thought in securing 
freedom, equality and justice, and the Christian foundations of its classical tradition, 
should not be overlooked.
84
 More recently, Hauerwas has been critiqued for failing to be 
inclusive in his thinking, for failing to see the good in ideas that are different from his 
own.
85
 In light of this, while engaging in particular with Hauerwas’s virtue ethic, the 
purpose of this thesis is not to echo or engender his separatist approach to civic 
engagement,
86
 but to present a case for the moral reconstruction of SRE policy discourse 
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 Hauerwas, Community, 84. 
82
 Hauerwas, Community, 84. 
83
 For example, while acknowledging the influence of Hauerwas’s theological credentials, Jeffrey Stout 
delivers a stark judgement on his political rhetoric by suggesting that ‘no theologian has done more to 
inflame Christian resentment of secular political culture’ (J. Stout, Democracy and Tradition, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004, 140).  
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Vol. 14, No. 1, 2013, 32-57, 41).  
87
 For a discussion on a theological understanding of democracy see ‘What Makes Us Think God Wants 
Democracy’ in R. Harries, Faith in Politics: Rediscovering the Christian Roots of our Political Values, 
London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2010, 51-70. 
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In affirming the theological commitment to accountable, representative and limited 
government, which exists for the good of all,
88
 it is important to note that I will proceed 
on the basis of two assumptions: first, that a Christian engagement with public policy, 
seeking in particular to present a vision of moral education and human flourishing that 
will contribute to the common good, is a theologically defensible means of public 
engagement; and, secondly, that the current moral discourse around SRE policy is itself 
open, not only to receiving and reflecting on a Christian moral vision, but also to 
tolerating and engaging with a critique that may challenge the moral vision and norms 
currently embodied within policy content.  
 
1.4.1 Public and Political Theology: A Constructive Approach  
 
In addressing the first assumption, there is an ever-growing wealth of resources which 
expound the tradition of both public theology
89
 and political theology
90
 and, as such, fall 
within a wider discussion concerned with developing and critiquing various models of 
cultural engagement.
91
 A detailed exploration of these approaches and disciplines is 
beyond the remit of this thesis. However, I affirm the view that there is no one ideal 
model of cultural engagement that is relevant for all time across all cultural contexts,
92
 
nor does the Church provide a ‘systematic political ethic’.93 In response to the biblical 
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that it does provide two related conditions: ‘a prohibition against imagining any individual or group 
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mandate to love God and love neighbour, I uphold a vision of public hope which 
projects Christ’s love into society and the public square.94 I also stand in a rich 




Despite the political nature of my subject matter, I propose nevertheless that my 
engagement falls more within the remit of public rather than political theology, 
acknowledging the distinction that E.H. Breitenberg Jr. offers between the two:  
In contrast to political theology, public theology, especially in its constructive, 
descriptive, and normative forms, is concerned with a variety of other publics, including 




In exploring their difference, Max Stackhouse emphasises that the public heart of civil 
society plays a more decisive role in shaping the political institutions than the other way 
around.
97
 Therefore, in expounding a theological ethic that moves from a public critique 
of the current moral framework of SRE to a constructive account of a sexually and 
relationally educated young person,
98
 a number of ‘publics’ will come into play, in 
particular, academic discourse concerning health and education, spheres that are not 
confined to politics, political institutions, or the Christian’s relation to them. In this 
inter-disciplinary discourse, I affirm Stackhouse’s assertion that: 
theology, in dialogue with other fields of thought, carries indispensable resources for 
forming, ethically ordering and morally guiding the institutions of religion and civil 
society as well as the vocations of the persons in their various spheres of life.
99
   
 
In presenting a case for the moral reconstruction of SRE, my approach to public 
theology will accord with what Breitenberg identifies as a third type of public theology, 
one that is akin to theological ethics and is focussed on ‘constructive efforts, descriptive 
accounts, and normative proposals, with respect to the issues, institutions, interactions, 
and processes of public life’.100 In addition, in exploring the place of virtue in 
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theological ethics, I shall primarily identify with the second of Samuel Wells’ three 
broad approaches to the subject, concerned with initiating dialogue with secular culture: 
‘By using philosophical and social scientific approaches, as well as the prominent place 
of virtue in Christian tradition, they can critique the types of character and world-view 
of contemporary society’.101 
 
The purpose of this particular public engagement is to present a critique of the current 
moral framework of SRE, making a theo-ethical case for the moral reconstruction of 
SRE policy in England. In his discourse with Nicholas Wolterstorff on the place of 
religion in the public square, Robert Audi advocates for the principle of ‘theo-ethical 
equilibrium’:  
where religious considerations appropriately bear on matters of public morality or of 
political choice, religious people have a prima facie obligation - at least insofar as they 
have civic virtue - to seek an equilibrium between those considerations and relevant 




However, in affirming Wolterstorff’s response to Audi, which notes that there is no 
independent source from which to derive moral truths in the public square, I 
acknowledge that finding common ground through ethical reasoning, which includes an 
honest acknowledgement of our starting presuppositions, contributes to the common 
good. Therefore, while the vision of moral education and human flourishing presented 
in this thesis will be implicitly and explicitly shaped by a Christian theistic worldview, 
it is important to note that some of the arguments used to challenge the philosophical 
commitments currently shaping SRE policy will not explicitly appeal to a theological 
ethic, but instead critique the inadequacy of philosophical reasoning and the emerging 
moral conclusions. For example, in exploring the development of educational theory, 
Carr warns against what he perceives to be the development of ‘bad or corrupt ethical 
deliberation’ when it comes to educational thinking, where moral philosophy and 
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In addition, I affirm that pursuit of the common good requires a consensus on public 
truth.
104
 Julian Rivers suggests that, in committing to the biblically mandated principle 
of democratic equality, we accept that laws should be grounded on moral beliefs that are 
shared by all citizens, rather than on the creation of two levels of morality. 
Notwithstanding the biblical justification for the ‘institutional independence’ of the 
church, and the ‘conscientious witness’ of the Christian under the submission of Christ, 
Rivers defends a commitment to the ‘common good’ in which it is possible for 
Christians and non-Christians, in principle, to agree on the moral content of the law.
105
 
In particular, I will argue that the ‘moral orientation’ of the Christian faith has 
something to contribute to the public good as expressed within policy discourse.
106
 Jean 
Porter asserts that finding common ground in moral arguments and securing moral 
consensus should be viewed as a ‘social good’ in public life:   
A sustainable consensus must be secured, social roles must be agreed upon, rewards 
meted out, and sanctions imposed, children must be born and nurtured and educated, if a 
society is to function for any length of time. All of this presupposes a high degree of 
consensus; otherwise, common life could be sustained only at the cost of an 




Therefore, while acknowledging the rich tapestry of moral thought that has shaped an 
understanding of the common good within the Christian tradition,
108
 I will affirm 
Miroslav Volf’s position that ‘a vision of human flourishing - and resources to realize it 
- is the most important contribution of the Christian faith to the common good’.109 From 
his observations of contemporary Western culture, Volf concludes that ‘experiential 
satisfaction’, whatever the source, is the common understanding of flourishing.110 
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However, if an experience does not have an infinite meaning, he suggests, we remain 
unsatisfied: ‘We feel melancholy because our pleasure is truly human only if it is 
meaningful beyond itself’.111  
 
Volf presents the love of God and love of neighbour as central to a Christian 
understanding of human flourishing.
112
 Such is the truth claim of Christianity, which 
gives meaning and definition to being human and to loving: ‘The overarching 
perspectives on life, with their metaphysical and moral claims to truth, are what give 
concrete content to what we think “love” or “being human” means’.113 It is with this 
distinctive ‘religious voice’, he suggests, that we speak in the public square,114 
recognising though that religious voices can together create a climate in which ‘the love 
of pleasure, a dominant driving force on our culture, gives way to the pleasure of 
love’.115  
 
1.4.2 The Place of Moral Philosophy in SRE Discourse 
 
In offering a critique of the current moral framework that informs SRE policy in a 
‘religious voice’ and presenting a normative alternative grounded in a Christian vision 
of human flourishing, I must proceed on the second assumption: that current moral 
discourse around this policy issue, as, indeed, with any other issue of public policy, is 
open to such a critique. Framed within the liberal democratic policy process, should it 
not be safe to assume that every expressed view is shown the same degree of tolerance 
in that it undergoes the same level of intellectual and moral scrutiny?
116
 If, as I shall 
argue, a morally neutral public position is an impossibility, engaging in political 
discourse will involve grappling with and seeking resolution to difficult moral 
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questions, questions that inevitably raise different understandings of the nature of reality 
and human flourishing. For moral questions and propositions are not just the preserve of 
religious discourse. As Oliver O’Donovan points out, while it may be possible for a 
humanist to understand the nature of reality in ‘natural’ rather than ‘supernatural’ terms, 
it is not possible for them to leave unanswered the question, ‘What is the chief and 
highest end of man?’117  
 
It is worth noting that J.S. Mill’s vision of a liberal state, in particular his view on the 
limits of the state’s legislative authority, did not correspond with a view that society 
itself should not actively engage in expressing opinions and judgement on the other’s 
good.
118
 Mill pointed to a freedom that should exist within liberal society to address the 
apparent ‘folly’ or ‘depravation of taste’ of the other without the need for, or threat of, 
any legal sanction.
119
 According to Mill’s vision of liberalism, as Alan Ryan suggests, 
the only thing that is unacceptable is coercion: ‘We may cajole, entreat, exhort and 
otherwise try to persuade another person to act as we propose, and this does not reduce 
their liberty; it is coercion and coercion alone that we may not engage in’.120  
 
In a pluralistic context, sources of morality are inevitably disputed and, as such, Carr 
suggests that an account of morality grounded in anything other than social agreement 
‘is for most citizens of contemporary secular-liberal societies almost beyond 
comprehension’.121 However, the assumption that a ‘religious voice’ is any less rational 
or any less constructive than the other voices in this process, and might therefore be 
more readily dismissed, is contestable.
122
 As Nick Spencer notes: ‘All public 
engagement is, in a sense, faith-based engagement in as far as it is premised on 
conceptions of the good that are not necessarily shared or provable’.123 He continues: ‘If 
we are to hope to reach any resolution or, less ambitiously, some satisfactory modus 
vivendi in our politics, we all need to be prepared, as it were, to show our moral 
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workings’.124 It is in the spirit of engagement that the authors and signatories of An 





Nigel Biggar suggests that a reasonable theological contribution to public discourse will 
‘not invoke divine commandments without taking care to explain these in terms of their 
service of human flourishing and the goods that comprise it’.126 This involves, he 
asserts, articulating an argument ‘all the way from the top to the bottom, all the way 
from theological premise through moral principle to the careful analysis of cases’.127 At 
the very least, civic life is strengthened, suggests acclaimed political philosopher 
Michael Sandel, when moral engagement allows the expression of differing moral and 
religious convictions: ‘A politics of moral engagement is not only a more inspiring ideal 
than a politics of avoidance. It is also a more promising basis for a just society’.128 
Proceeding on such an assumption, however, directly challenges two important and 
influential positions in contemporary policy discourse on education: first, the expressed 
view that religion, outside of the R.E. classroom, has nothing constructive to contribute 
to the moral framework of education policy; secondly, the inference within SRE policy 
circles that engaging in moral discourse around the meaning and purpose of the subject 
is no longer a necessary precondition of policy formation.   
 
In response to the first misconceived position, I shall echo the case presented by Trevor 
Cooling, who argues that theological insight and education are not incompatible within a 
secular educational context and, indeed, that religious beliefs, rather than being viewed 
within education as an unwelcome problem, should be seen as a ‘potential resource that 
contributes social capital through promoting the common good’.129 In so doing, he 
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draws the important distinction between a secular and a secularist society: while the first 
welcomes the contribution made by religions in contributing towards a community 
framework of values, the second seeks to eradicate religious influence from the public 
square.
130
 In effect, he argues for a ‘transformationalist strategy’ within education, 
which seeks to expound Christian belief within, and not apart from, a secular, pluralistic 
context, in a spirit of genuine partnership and in way that ‘honours both the needs of the 
context and our beliefs’.131 In doing so, he states: ‘The theological rationale for the 
position that I have been putting forward is usually expressed in terms of “natural law”, 
“common grace”, or “the way of wisdom”’.132  
 
In pursuing the common good, David Hollenbach reiterates the case that a respect for 
diversity does not inevitably result in the abandonment of shared goods. Instead, a 
vision of the common good in a pluralistic society presents the challenge of reaching ‘an 
understanding of the goods that we can and must pursue together even though we do not 
agree about what is good in every aspect of life’.133 This inevitably involves the 
adoption of some concepts and the rejection of others, which may appear to compromise 
the guarantee of individual rights and liberties. However, in exploring the relation 
between community and rights, John Finnis notes:  
The pursuit of any form of human community in which human rights are protected by 
the imposition of duties will necessarily involve both selection of some and rejection of 





There will inevitably be controversial issues on which it is not possible to achieve a 
unanimously agreed policy position, yet value judgments must still be made. For 
example, a significant value judgement within the 1987 Circular (No 11/87) on ‘Sex 
Education at School’ was the expressed objection to any acceptance or promotion of 
homosexual behaviour: ‘There is no place in any school in any circumstances for 
teaching which advocates homosexual behaviour, which presents it as the “norm”, or 
which encourages homosexual experimentation by pupils’.135 Yet the Circular 
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recognised that schools cannot avoid tackling controversial issues, and, therefore, should 
be prepared to give balanced and factual information, taking into account their own 
ethical and religious contexts. Similarly, in light of the introduction of the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, the Equality and Human Rights Commission note: ‘No 
school, or individual teacher, is under a duty to support, promote or endorse marriage of 
same sex couples. Teaching should be based on facts and should enable pupils to 
develop an understanding of how the law applies to different relationships’.136 
 
Recognising the inevitability of different value judgements dependent on different 
visions of human nature and flourishing, I will critique in particular the default position 
within policy discourse of liberal ‘neutrality’. In addition, in critiquing the current vision 
of moral education and formation evident within policy discourse, I will make a case for 
the moral reconstruction of SRE policy, presenting a Christian vision shaped by a 
theological virtue ethic. I affirm Porter’s definition of a virtue as ‘a trait of character or 
intellect that is in some way praise-worthy, admirable or desirable’.137 As Stassen and 
Gushee suggest, nurturing such qualities of character is not only beneficial for the 
individual but for the community: ‘Virtues are defined as qualities of a person that 
make that person a good person in community, and that contribute to the good of the 
community, or to the good that humans are designed for’.138  
 
In presenting a theological defence for the outworking of a theological virtue ethic in the 
public square, I shall highlight the ‘common grace’ approach developed in the work of 
public theologian Abraham Kuyper, who recognised that, while the church has a 
responsibility to maintain its own distinct character, it also has a responsibility towards 
the society in which it exists.139 Richard Mouw suggests that discussions around the idea 
of common grace present an ‘important resource for addressing the contemporary issues 
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of commonness and difference’.140  Indeed, when it comes to education, pursuing a 
‘common morality’, as Hill points out, ‘owes a great deal to the Christian legacy’.141 
However, while pursuing a common morality, I will at the same time assert that moral 
consensus should not and, indeed, cannot be achieved within public policy discourse at 
the expense of rigorous debate over the validity of the philosophical commitments on 
the table. For when it comes to reasoning in a democracy, Roger Trigg asserts, 
‘rationality should above all be concerned with what is true’.142 This should be done in a 
spirit of persuasion rather than coercion. As such, discourse within education policy 
discourse should nurture respectful tolerance for the diversity of worldviews 
represented, fostering a ‘deliberative’ model of democracy, concerned with justice and 
the common good.
143
 In seeking to pursue a shared vision, concerns over teenage sexual 
behaviour and relationships and the emerging social problems may indeed prove to be 




This approach directly challenges the second inference within SRE discourse 
concerning the redundant place of moral discourse in SRE policy, as exemplified by 
Rachel Thomson, who argues that consensus around a moral framework for sex 
education is achieved by moving the discussion away from the ‘abstract territory’ of 
moral and religious philosophy and into consideration of the realities of young people’s 
lives.
145
  She suggests that we should simply face the future with optimism and trust that 
young people will emerge from this world of constant moral innovation unscathed: ‘To 
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turn our faces from the past to the future will require an admission of uncertainty and 
the expression of trust’.146 This includes, suggests the sexual rights campaigner, Peter 
Tatchell, entrusting young people with the full range of information on sex and 
relationships: ‘Most will respond to such candour by making sensible, responsible 
decisions. Those who do not would be reckless anyway, regardless of what they were 
taught or not taught’.147  
 
It is at least apparent that on matters of sexuality, a religious voice, in particular a 
Christian voice, is expressly devalued by some. A.C. Grayling, for example, suggests 
that our confusion and pre-occupation with sex is on account of the ‘absurdly inflated’ 
position that sex occupies on society’s moral landscape,148 and this, for him, is evidence 
of the prevalence in our cultural make-up of ancient law and customs, particularly 
associated with Christianity, with ‘prohibitions, anxieties and what amounts to social 
rationing’ exaggerating its importance.149 In a post-religious civilisation, Richard 
Dawkins envisions constructing a ‘consensual ethic’ to reflect the ‘Moral Zeitgeist’, a 
list of possible new Ten Commandments.
150
 His hope of doing so rests on the 
assumption that ‘any ordinary, decent person’ would come up with a similar list.151 
Concerning sexual behaviour, Dawkins would choose the following ‘Commandment’, 
conceding though that there is no perceived moral obligation or necessity for others to 
share his view: ‘Enjoy your own sex life (so long as it damages nobody else) and leave 
others to enjoy theirs in private whatever their inclinations, which are none of your 
business’.152 According to the contemporary ‘Moral Zeitgeist’, self-reflection, self-
realization and individual choice is the moral order of the day.  
 
In effect, moral judgement is not being abandoned; moral engagement concerning a 
common morality around sexual behaviour is simply being subverted in favour of a 
‘neutral’ discourse which seeks to promote rational, autonomous decision-making. In 
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light of this, and in a similar tone to Thomson, Simon Blake
153
 and Gill Frances
154
 
suggest that if we regard SRE as an ‘educational entitlement, not a social engineering 
initiative’, then our responsibility and obligation is to ensure that we provide this 
entitlement and, by doing so, take a ‘leap of faith’ in believing that young people will be 
enabled to make informed decisions according to their own moral code.
155
 The only 
prerequisite to programme effectiveness, they suggest, is that they are able to enjoy their 




In considering why a morally neutral discourse within sex education policy might be 
viewed as preferable, Halstead and Reiss suggest two possible reasons: first, ‘the 
diversity that exists in contemporary society makes a consensus on values impossible, 
especially in a controversial domain like sexuality’; secondly, ‘anything that gets in the 
way of the “safer-sex” message (such as moral guidance or advice) should be discarded 
as more of hindrance than a help’.157 However, as I shall evidence in Chapter 3, 
achieving moral neutrality in practice is an impossibility, and attempting it is itself an 
expressed philosophical approach to moral education. For while seeking to move 
beyond philosophical discourse in the formulation of SRE policy may prove attractive in 
that it seemingly avoids conflict in decision making,
158
 abandoning the philosophical 
roots of different approaches to SRE is not only to judge each one to be as morally 
tenable as the other, which itself is a philosophical commitment, but is to undermine the 
necessity of having a reason or defence for your policy position in the first place. As 
Carr points out, ‘it is one thing to know quite well (in our bones) what is morally right, 
and another to understand why or how it is right’.159   
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Moreover, seeking to move beyond the ‘abstract territory’ of philosophy in policy 
making not only abandons the constructive and necessary task of philosophical inquiry, 
it also denies, as Terence McLaughlin rightly observes, the philosophical 
presuppositions that are already implicitly embedded in education policy: ‘Many 
educational policies contain (to a greater or lesser extent) assumptions, concepts, beliefs, 
values and commitments which, if not themselves of a directly philosophical kind, are 
apt for philosophical attention’.160 As such, when it comes to moral education, David 
Carr and Jan Steutel note that different conceptual approaches are ‘nothing if not 
philosophical’, for they implicitly and explicitly express different normative 
assumptions and commitments.
161
 This is true not only of moral education per se but, as 
I shall explore, evident in the normative framework of health education.
162
 Therefore, 
while it is beyond the remit of this thesis to offer a detailed exploration of the history of 
philosophical thought on education,
163
 I will identify and critique the normative 
principles that are shaping the moral framework of SRE.  
 
1.5 Conclusion: Re-Engaging in Moral Philosophical Discourse 
 
In exploring, in particular, the important role of moral philosophy in moral education, 
John Elias offers a strong defence:  
Moral philosophy is valuable in making educators aware that programs of moral 
education must be founded on some theory of justification or criteria of right or wrong. 
Unless such a theory is present in the system, what takes place is not education but 




Even for those who advocate a rights-based approach to SRE,
165
 such philosophical 
judgements cannot be avoided. In addition, while recognising that philosophy occupies a 
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necessary and inevitable place within education policy formulation, McLaughlin also 
points to the importance of the philosophical and educational judgments being of a 
practical nature.
166
 In describing morality as an educational institution, Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty highlights the fact that practical morality is ‘designed to produce 
certain types of persons, with specific virtues, mentalities, habits and skills directed to 
affect the world in a certain way’.167 
 
Therefore, when it comes to exploring the nature, role and outworking of values in the 
moral framework of SRE, Halstead and Reiss rightly observe that disagreement over the 
aims and practices of sex education emerges when values come into conflict with one 
another.
168
 Dismissing any suggestion of neutrality, they affirm that ‘values permeate 
every aspect of sex education’.169 This is in and of itself inevitable for, as they point out, 
‘sex education must in some way be educational, and education is an inescapably value-
laden activity’.170 There can be little disagreement over the biological facts of sex 
instruction, which in themselves are ‘value-neutral’. As Jean Collyer suggests, these are 
the easiest aspect of any sex education programme to learn.
171
 However, it is in the 
presentation of the facts that an implicit moral framework emerges, presenting a 
particular vision of the moral self and human flourishing. Thus, it is possible to observe 





In light of this, what the expressed philosophical commitment of Blake and Frances, as 
demonstrated in their views on programme effectiveness, highlights is both a 
predisposed moral position on teenage sexuality and a determined value judgement on 
the desired nature, aim and value of SRE. In addition, their expressed views are wrongly 
dismissive of the inevitable reality that every educational enterprise is an initiative in 
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social engineering as it encourages or discourages certain choices or behaviours. As 
educational philosopher John Wilson states: ‘Our private metaphysics and emotional 
prejudices remain private only so long as we are private citizens; once we take on the 
role of the educators, they come out into the open’.173 This is true for the individual 
educator, as it is true for the state; the state, arguably, does not, and cannot, remain 
morally neutral. One of the earliest critics of political liberalism, James Fitzjames 
Stephen, affirmed this to be the case:  
How is it possible for society to accept the position of an educator unless it has moral 
principles on which to educate? How, having accepted that position and having 
educated people up to a certain point, can it draw a line at which education ends and 




As such, Valerie Riches points out that ‘school sex education is intended, for good or 
ill, to influence attitudes and behaviour’.175 Faced with the diversity of moral values that 
are vying for attention within SRE policy discourse, it would appear at least consistent 
with democratic aspirations to echo Haydon’s sentiment that engaging in philosophical 
discourse can lay the groundwork for ‘more reasonable and informed discussion’ on 
these values, giving public legitimacy to the process of moral inquiry.
176
 This involves, 
he suggests, a positive approach to the richness and diversity within the ethical 
environment.
177
 At the very least, therefore, actively engaging in philosophical 
discourse within SRE policy formation will, in particular, explore and articulate the 
nature, aims and value of SRE and enable adequate scrutiny of the different 
philosophical propositions and moral visions presented.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, despite Government assertions that a strong moral framework 
is in place for SRE,
178
 this thesis presents a theo-ethical case for why we currently have 
an incoherent and inadequate public vision within which to shape SRE policy. First, it 
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shapes a moral discourse which is overtly focussed on promoting individual autonomy 
through the maximisation of information and rational enquiry, presenting a flawed 
anthropological understanding of the moral agent. I shall echo Smith’s pedagogical 
belief that ‘education is not primarily a heady project concerned with providing 
information; rather, education is most fundamentally a matter of formation, a task of 
shaping and creating a certain kind of people’.179 He continues: ‘What makes them a 
distinctive kind of people is what they love or desire-what they envision as “the good 
life” or the ideal picture of human flourishing’.180 Similarly, when it comes to education, 
in particular, character education, Terence McLaughlin and Mark Halstead state:  
An education in character and virtue is concerned with the formation and shaping of 
persons in a wide wide-ranging way, and is based on the realisation that what is 
important in education (and specifically moral education) is the sort of person one is or 




As they point out, ‘such an education gives rise to matters both of complexity and 
controversiality’.182 Indeed, neglecting the concept of virtue more widely in moral 
theory, suggests Hauerwas, is due a ‘tacit fear that we lack the kind of community 
necessary to sustain development of people of virtue and character’.183 A plurality of 
worldviews and the uncertainty over the philosophical foundations of a virtue ethics 
present unresolved issues for moral education.
184
 However, without a shared vision of 
the common good, a rationalist account of SRE presents an incoherent and inadequate 
vision of moral education.  
 
Secondly, as I will explore in more detail in Chapter 4, the ontological basis of our 
current liberal metanarrative on sex and the ethical theories engaged therein provide a 
flawed foundation on which to build a robust public sexual ethic. The worldview 
perspective that we will critique, in particular, is that of naturalism. Of course, it should 
be noted that naturalism is not the only worldview commitment evident in 
contemporary discourse on SRE. However, it is within a naturalist worldview 
perspective that moral principles are reduced to human constructs, the ontological 
position which shapes the heart of this critique. For, while many of the values expressed 
within humanist ideas may still reflect Christian ideals,
185
 and indeed carry through into 
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SRE discourse, the epistemological problem arises in trying to derive moral knowledge 
from observations of nature and the material world, which inevitably leads us down a 
road of ethical nihilism.
186
 As such, I will ultimately engage with what Robin Barrow 
identifies as a debate of ‘fundamental importance’ within the philosophy of education: 
that which concerns moral truth and knowledge. This involves seeking for the truth by 
dismissing beliefs which appear to be unfounded.
187
 Arguing for the place for, and the 
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Chapter 2 
The Moral and Spiritual in SRE Policy Discourse: A 
Case for Reconstruction 
 
2.1 Introduction: A Shifting Moral Landscape  
 
It is important to recognise that the aim of SRE has not always been narrowed to the 
pursuit of rational autonomy and self-authenticated choice. It is possible to evidence, 
through policy development and surrounding discourse, a shift away from an identified 
common morality and an approach to SRE discourse that explicitly engaged in the 
‘abstract territory’ of moral and religious thought and a corresponding vision of human 
flourishing. Thus, in this chapter, in charting the moral and spiritual discourse that has 
emerged in policy discourse, I will more precisely locate my critique against this 
backdrop. In addition, in offering a brief literature review of the scholarly voices 
concerned with the current moral and spiritual content of SRE policy and practice, I will 
locate a liberal approach amongst the other identified philosophical positions. In 
highlighting the inadequacy of a liberal approach in policy making, in particular, within 
education, I will begin to present a case for the moral reconstruction of SRE discourse, 
setting out my method for doing so.   
 
Early commentators on sex education acknowledged sex as something to be revered and 
‘most holy in the plan of life’, and thus children should be educated accordingly.188  The 
essential purpose and meaning of sex was understood within a particular view of human 
nature and an understanding of the public good, requiring a specific public morality to 
be taught: 
That we should leave our children to pick up their sexual information haphazard seems 
almost incredible. Can we allow them to learn about the most powerful, the most sacred, 




While adopting a clear moral and spiritual position, it was at the same time recognised 
that society fell into the trap of adopting extreme views on the meaning and purpose of 
sex:  
If, a hundred years ago, the pendulum swung towards repression, punishment and taboo, 
it has now swung violently in the opposite direction – towards enjoyment and freedom 
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Educationalists argued that no sex education should be given unless it was related to 
emotional and spiritual well-being: ‘To develop man’s intellectual abilities at the 
expense of the spiritual or the emotional is as misguided as to develop the emotions at 
the expense of the intellect’.191 This understanding of sex education led to a distinction 
between ‘sex instruction’ and ‘sex education’, where the former is concerned solely with 




These moral aims were evident in the content of earliest policy documents. The 
Education Pamphlet of 1943, Sex Education in Schools and Youth Organisations: 
Education Pamphlet No. 119, the first official document from the Board of Education on 
the subject, stated that the purpose of information and advice within sex education was 
to ensure that young people ‘are not left in dangerous ignorance’, nor left to ‘acquire 
knowledge in ways which are likely to distort or degrade their outlook upon sex, and 
their sense of responsibility in regard to it’.193 In addition, the task of delivering wise 
instruction to young people was identified from the outset of sex education policy to be 
the corporate responsibility of ‘all who enjoy the confidence of young people’.194 
Information was to be presented within a moral framework that attached a specific 
understanding to the nature of sex. The inference for sex education was that, beyond the 
physiological instruction, advice was to be: 
directed to the understanding and control of sexual impulse and emotion, leading on to 
the establishment of mutual understanding and respect between the sexes, and, as young 




These moral directives within policy were further reiterated by the Ministry for 
Education in the Newsom Report: ‘For our part we are agreed that boys and girls should 
be offered firm guidance on sexual morality based on chastity before marriage and 
fidelity within it’.196 Young people’s sexual behaviour was to be instructed towards a 
certain end, in particular, recognising and upholding the social institution of marriage. In 
addition, the nature of sex was regarded as being intimately connected to one’s spiritual 
self: ‘Sex activity, whilst embracing our emotions and physical being, our instincts and 
our minds, can only fulfil its rightful purpose if its activity is acceptable to our spiritual 
                                                 
191
 Griffith, ‘Road’, 15. 
192
 E.F. Griffith, ‘Towards Maturity’, E.F., Griffith (ed.), The Road to Maturity, London: Methuen & Co., 
1947, 200-227, 224. 
193
 Board of Education, Sex Education in Schools and Youth Organisations: Education Pamphlet No. 119, 
London: HMSO, 1943, 4. 
194
 Board of Education, Sex, 4. 
195
 Board of Education, Sex, 4. 
196
 Ministry of Education, Half our Future: A Report of the Central Advisory Council for Education 
(England), London: HMSO, 1963, 54. 
 36 
nature’.197 Accordingly, in approaching health education, the Department of Education 
and Science focussed on much more than simply the prevention of disease or the 
reduction of harm:  
Our task is rather to make sure that bodily health plays its proper part in the whole 
education of responsible citizens. To discharge it successfully we need a clear 
understanding of the nature of our civilisation and its principles. We must also have 
regard for realities which go beyond the merely physical. Our roots lie deep in the 





Evidencing a teleological approach to a public sexual ethic, schools had direction in 
terms of the norms and behaviours they were directing young people towards, and not 
just the ones they were instructing them against. It was acknowledged from the outset 
that the challenge for educators would be to ‘make such self-control and discrimination 
seem rational and inspiring’.199  
 
Advice to schools in approaching the issue was clear; while parents were affirmed as the 
primary educators, questions arising within school from young children concerning the 
body and development were to be wisely and sensitively dealt with. At the same time, 
adolescents were to be prepared for future life in community, another recognised end of 
sex education:  
In learning to live a full life as an adult the adolescent must understand something of 
both personal development and social responsibility. It is the capacity for reconciling 
personal interests with social demands that leads to stability in relationships, to the 
appreciation of the other person’s point of view and to the sacrifice of one’s own 




Further policy guidance on health education made it clear that schools could no longer 
avoid their responsibilities in the area of sex education, particularly in view the 
demands of a rapidly changing culture and the nature of the information being ‘thrust’ at 
children from outside of school.
201
 While not everyone agrees with the judgement that 
the so-called ‘sexual revolution’ instigated a dramatic shift in sexual behaviour, 
deeming it a revolution of openness rather than behaviour,
202
 the challenge of equipping 
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In addition to moral concerns, there were clear health implications that were driving 
policy objectives. Reiss points in particular to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the late 
1980s as reigniting the fear around the impact of sexual behaviour on the health of the 
nation. As HIV and AIDS were emerging as a public health concern, he notes, sex 
education was becoming a ‘political football’.204 According to Thomson, changes in the 
legal status of sex education, and fundamental reforms surrounding its content and 
provision in the 1980s, were ‘driven by a clear moral and political agenda’, 
demonstrating once again the vulnerability of sex education to the social and political 
climate.
205
 As a result of this politicization, it was increasingly acknowledged that ‘a 
value-less sex education programme cannot exist’.206 
 
Sex education first appeared on the statute books in England and Wales in Section 46 of 
the Education (No 2) Act 1986, making clear that where sex education was given, it was 
to be ‘given in such a manner as  to  encourage  those  pupils  to  have  due  regard  to  
moral considerations and the value of family life’.207 However, when compared to 
earlier documents, it is evident that the moral language had softened; rather than being 
given ‘firm guidance’, the pupils were instead to be encouraged to have ‘due regard’ for 
moral considerations. Thus, it could be argued that from the outset of government 
legislation, it was unclear to what degree moral instruction was a matter of public 
concern, and to what extent there was an acknowledgement of the underlying moral 
direction of legislative and policy content. As Douglas Adeney explores, it is important 
to identify the liberal principles that govern policies concerning sexual behaviour: 
‘While our policies may be subject of various contingencies…..what grounds could 
prima facie justify the prohibition or restriction of any given sexual behaviour?’208  
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The following year, the Department of Education and Science published guidance for 
Local Education Authorities in Sex Education at School: Circular No 11/87, setting out 
in more detail the moral issues that required consideration. Young people were 
encouraged to adopt an objective and balanced approach to the diversity of attitudes and 
values in society. Alongside an understanding of the physical aspects of sexual 
behaviour, they were to be ‘encouraged to consider the importance of self-restraint, 
dignity and respect for themselves and others and helped to recognise the physical, 
emotional and moral risks of casual and promiscuous sexual behaviour’.209 Recognising 
the responsibility that both sexes have for sexual matters, an appreciation of the benefits 





Similar moral ideals and values were carried through in the Sex and Relationship 
Education Guidance, published by the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE) in 2000. The guidance was produced for Head Teachers, Teachers and School 
Governors, taking into account the revised National Curriculum published in September 
1999, the newly established Personal, Social, Health and Economic Education (PSHE) 
framework,
211
 and the 1999 Social Exclusion Report on teenage pregnancy. The 
objective of SRE was clearly stated:  
The objective of sex and relationship education is to help and support young people 
through their physical, emotional and moral development. A successful programme, 
firmly embedded in PSHE, will help young people learn to respect themselves and 




According to the guidance, the three main elements of SRE are concerned with attitudes 
and values, personal and social skills and knowledge and understanding. Concerning 
attitudes and values, the following priorities were listed:   
learning the importance of values and individual conscience and moral considerations; 
learning the value of family life, marriage, and stable and loving relationships for the 
nurture of children; learning the value of respect, love and care; exploring, considering 
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It is important to note for my own discussion that the SRE Guidance 2000, including the 
incorporated attitudes and values, is not just deemed relevant within a school context, 
but its importance and relevance is also emphasised within current policy guidance on 
Sexual Health Improvement, including an adapted wording of the above attitudes and 
values, where teaching ‘ensures that pupils are taught about the benefits of loving, 
healthy relationships and delaying sex, and also provides that pupils are aware of how to 
access confidential sexual health advice and support’.214  
 
Echoing a number of points that run to the heart of my own critique, the moral and 
spiritual content of the SRE Guidance 2000, which remains the most recent policy 
guidance has, from the outset, raised voices of concern. For example, Adrian Thatcher 
notes that the guidance fails to recognise spiritual and moral development as a learning 
outcome of SRE set within the framework of PSHE.
215
 This would appear to be 
indicative of an on-going, widespread concern about the neglect of the spiritual in 
education.
216
 In addition, along with a number of apparent ‘contradictions and silences’, 
Thatcher highlights what he calls the ‘empty generalizations’ of many terms within the 
document, for example, ‘moral framework’,217 terms which he believes remain abstract 
concepts without content. A further example of the perceived moral deficiency of the 
document, he argues, is its failure to give a moral reason, over and above prudential 
ones, why ‘delaying sexual activity’ might be a good thing.218 Such a judgment, 
however, presupposes that a moral reason is required. For, as Carr points out, there are 
various reasons that may or may not be given for engaging in or abstaining from a 
particular activity; alongside prudential and moral reasons he notes the possibility of 
aesthetic and religious ones.
219
 If, however, as Halstead and Reiss suggest, a 
characteristic of a sexually educated young person is someone who acquires certain 
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skills, e.g. the skill of responsible decision-making, then such skills are inherently 
relational and ‘firmly grounded’, they argue, in moral values.220  
 
It is at least apparent from young people’s current experience of SRE that it is the moral 
and spiritual content and guidance that they currently judge as inadequate. Indeed, the 
SRE Guidance 2000 acknowledged that young people often complain that there is a 
‘lack of any meaningful discussion about feelings, relationships and values’.221 In a 
survey carried out by the Sex Education Forum (SEF) in 2008, results revealed that 
school-based SRE most frequently covered topics concerning puberty, and the biology 
of sex and reproduction. The topic least frequently taught concerned skills for coping 
with relationships. As one young person commented: ‘I understand the science side 
pretty well but it seems a bit like a pencil – I know it’s made from wood and soft 
graphite that gets broken off, but does that tell me how to write?’222 In addition, Brook, 
the UK’s largest young people’s sexual health charity, published similar findings in 
October 2011. In a study on SRE carried out amongst 2000 14-18 year olds, only 6% 




PSHE is expected to ‘equip pupils with a sound understanding of risk and with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to make safe and informed decisions’.224 However, the 
Ofsted Report on PSHE in English school in 2012 suggested that inadequacy in SRE in 
secondary schools was on account of the fact that ‘too much emphasis was placed on 
“the mechanics” of reproduction and too little on relationships, sexuality, the influence 
of pornography on students’ understanding of healthy sexual relationships, dealing with 
emotions and staying safe’.225 The Department of Education Consultation on PSHE in 
2013 re-iterated the importance of relationships education:  
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It was suggested that pupils were being taught about the mechanics of sex without an 
understanding of relationship management, and that the latter was vital to ensure 
children and young people appreciated and respected themselves and their peers.
226
    
 
Evidence would suggest that the current moral framework is not providing young people 
with the moral guidance that they judge to be necessary in helping them navigate their 
relationships and the moral complexity of the current cultural environment, if indeed, 
this were a reasonable ask of any school-based subject. In exploring whether a 
‘spiritual’ dimension to sex education is a necessary component, McLaughlin argues 
that a programme that fails to give sufficient attention to the ethical and moral values 
inherent in sexual attitudes, beliefs, feelings and behaviour, would be ‘at best 
incomplete and at worst miseducative’.227 Having due regard for a spiritual dimension 
within sex education will involve, he suggests, giving attention to the following: first, an 
exploration of the overall framework that gives meaning and purpose to sexuality; 
secondly, the cultivation of interior reflection with regards to sexual matters; thirdly, the 
‘manifestations’ of the spiritual life when it comes to sexuality, e.g. self-control, love, 
and other virtues; fourthly, the promotion of awe and wonder in response to the natural 
and human world.
228
 He points to the fact that often these aspects of spirituality are 
linked to a religious tradition (‘religiously tethered’), but not always (‘religiously 
untethered’).229 In engaging with a theological virtue ethic, I will, in particular, give 
attention to the third dimension concerned with the ‘manifestations’ of the spiritual life, 





2.2 Emerging Philosophical Positions on SRE 
 
Those engaged in the philosophical discourse surrounding the development of SRE have 
sought to develop categories and frameworks within which to understand the nature and 
scope of the subject and its moral aims. For example, Halstead identifies three key value 
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debates within sex education: ‘(1) the liberal values of a “responsible sexual behaviour” 
approach versus the conservative values of the “pro-abstinence” approach; (2) health-
based values versus education-based values; and (3) determinate cultural or religious 
values versus personal freedom and choice’.231 While the categories offer a helpful 
breakdown, it is at least clear that they are not in themselves self-contained. For 
example, religious values are often associated with the ‘pro-abstinence’ approach, but 
this does not dismiss within programme content the encouragement of responsible 
sexual behaviour nor a recognition and respect for the dignity and freedom of the young 
person to choose their own course of action. Halstead further points to the outworking of 
six groups of values – socio-economic values, health-related values, values related to 
liberal education, children’s values, cultural values and religious values.232 In view of 
the diversity and complexity of the values at stake, Reiss observes that when it comes to 
the aims of sex education, the objectives are rarely analysed in any great detail. Instead, 





According to Reiss, principled positions on school-based sex education are often 
classified simply according to the ‘conservative/liberal’ or ‘religious/secular’ divide;234 
again, this is to simplify what is often a more complex and interchangeable picture. He 
expands on these categories, identifying five mutually inclusive philosophical 
frameworks for sex education: ‘school sex education should not occur’; ‘school sex 
education should promote physical health’; ‘school sex education should promote 
personal autonomy’; ‘school sex education should promote responsible sexual 
behaviour’; ‘school sex education should take place within a religious framework’.235 
 
The interchangeability and limits of these philosophical positions can be seen in the 
three reasons which Archard points out have been offered for why we should teach sex 
in school. The third reason he gives is for ‘evaluative reasons’; young people should be 
enabled to ‘make their own fully informed and reasoned choices in sexual matters, to 
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understand the proper place of sex in their lives’.236 This accords with Reiss’s third 
philosophical framework concerned with promoting the personal autonomy of the young 
person. The second reason given for teaching sex in schools is for ‘social reasons’, with 
the aim of reducing the numbers of unwanted pregnancies and cases of Sexually 
Transmitted Infections (STIs).
237
 This, as we shall see, is a significant motivating factor 
behind sex education in Britain today and corresponds with the justifying principles of 
promoting physical health and responsible sexual behaviour. Finally, it is proposed that 
we should teach sex firstly for ‘prudential reasons’ in order that young people are free 
from guilt or embarrassment and enjoy pleasurable sexual experiences.
238
 Reiss points 
out that in teaching sex for this purpose, a necessary distinction would need to be made 
with the concept of modesty, and adopting this approach may, in effect, appear to 
condone certain behaviour.
239
 However, while justification for this reason cannot be 
found in the promotion of physical health, nor is it related directly to the promotion of 
autonomy or responsible sexual behaviour, as we shall note, what the recommendation 
exposes is an underlying worldview commitment about the fundamental nature of 
sexuality that doesn’t fit neatly into Reiss’s five philosophical categories. Perhaps it 
most easily accords with a religious framework, due its explicit belief around the 
meaning and purpose of sexual activity. Indeed, Archard recognises the challenge of 
finding agreement on the form that sex education should take, and notes the 





Recent attempts at categorising philosophical discourses within sex education have been 
much more expansive. For example, in conducting a detailed literature review, Tiffany 
Jones identifies 27 possible discourses that could be used to categorise approaches to 
sex education, highlighting the fact that different approaches to sex education ‘reflect 
differing underlying premises, views of human nature and assumptions about 
pedagogical processes’.241 In particular, she notes that policies are mostly informed by 
one of two constructs of the child: ‘the “romantic child” whose innocence must be 
protected, or the “knowing child” whose innocence is not tainted by the information 
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seen as necessary for development’.242 As an outcome of her deliberations, she presents 
a ‘sexuality education discourse exemplar’ to aid in this process of policy analysis, 
categorizing the ‘orientation’ of sex education approaches into the following four 
categories: ‘conservative, liberal, critical or postmodern’.243  
 
What Jones’ detailed exemplar at least demonstrates for us is that even identifying and 
clarifying the various discourses is complex and therefore the ability to meet the 
demands of every underlying premise or pedagogical approach presents a significant 
challenge for SRE policy. As McLaughlin points out, in forming a public sexual ethic, 
‘what is at stake are different fundamental evaluations of the meaning and purpose not 
only of sexuality in human life but of human life itself’.244 In light of this complexity, 
Ann Blair and Daniel Monk simplify the emerging tensions over sex education as 
primarily concerning ‘conflicting images of childhood and sexuality’.245 They observe 





2.2.1 Childhood and Sexuality 
 
In identifying key philosophical positions that have shaped SRE norms and values in the 
UK and beyond, it would be short-sighted to overlook the formative impact of changing 





 which have been informed by, and shaped, philosophical discourse and 
an emerging moral narrative on sex.
249
 Indeed, the changing perceptions within the 
intellectual community around the concepts of childhood and sexuality, particularly 
evident at the turn of the twentieth century, have been credited with significantly 
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 and Albert Moll recognised as critical contributors 
to this new knowledge base.
252
 Hollinger adds to this list Margaret Sanger, the founder 
of Planned Parenthood, and notes: ‘Each not only wanted to provide information for a 
society that was largely ignorant of sexuality, but wished to push the populace in new 
directions in sexual attitudes and behaviour, based on naturalistic assumptions’.253 In 
addition, the secular humanistic worldview of sexology rallied for an expansion in the 





This revolutionary understanding of child sexuality was defined largely by the psycho-
analytic concept that a child’s sexual feelings are to be seen as an integral part of their 
overall development, with Freud’s theories of infantile sexuality playing a critical role in 
shaping these ideas.
255
 In addition, American psychologist, G. Stanley Hall, in his 
pioneering work on adolescent psychology, stated that the ‘development of the sex 
function is normally perhaps the greatest of all stimuli to mental growth’.256 Bertrand 
Russell, in his own philosophical musing, and writing at a time when it was illegal to 
share knowledge about sex with children, argued that allowing children to remain 
ignorant about sexual matters was both intellectually damaging and caused ‘very grave 
moral damage’.257 This was based on the assumption that parents lied to their children 
on sexual matters. However, as is evident in his writing, his views are in large part 
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shaped by the emerging presuppositions about childhood development and sexuality, in 
addition to a self-confessed ‘attempt to build up a new sexual morality’.258  
  
As such, Roger Davidson and Lutz Sauerteig, in charting the history of sex education in 
Europe, highlight a shift in the moral overtone of discussions around sexual behaviour 
as an outcome of these intellectual endeavours: ‘Thus, what had formerly been 
perceived as a function of immorality and/or pathological behaviour, was, in the 
twentieth century, explained as phases in a child’s “normal” development’.259 This, as I 
shall evidence in Chapter 3, has significantly shaped an understanding of ‘healthy’ 
behaviour. Another marked outcome of this emerging psychology of child sexuality, 
they suggest, was an increased recognition of the expertise of the professional over the 
competence of the parents in addressing issues of sex education. In addition, they note 
that while the moral influence of the church in many countries across Europe in the late 





However, it should not be presumed that this emerging psychological discourse 
advocated a dismantling of moral boundaries. For example, Armand M. Nicholi, Jr. 
notes: ‘Freud believed in the freedom to speak about sex, not the freedom to act’.261 He 
notes Freud’s assertion in Civilization and Its Discontents: ‘A cultural community is 
perfectly justified, psychologically, in starting by proscribing manifestations of the 
sexual life of children, for there would be no prospect of curbing the sexual lusts of 
adults if the ground had not been prepared for it in childhood’.262 Indeed, he noted that 
‘the principal task of civilization, its actual raison d’être, is to defend us against 
nature’.263 There remains within public discourse an uneasiness with what is noted to be 
the commercialisation and sexualisation of children,
264
 with political voices calling for a 
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‘revolution in sex education’ in order to address a culture which is ‘increasingly 
pornified’.265 At the same time, concern is expressed at how ‘sexualisation’ is being 
understood and interpreted.
266
 Nevertheless, add to this the recent high-profile child 




In accepting that the state has a protectionist role to play in the lives of children, 
resolving questions over the nature of the information needed by children can only be 
answered by appealing to a corresponding vision of the ‘good’ and human flourishing 
which will inevitably define the purpose, aims and objectives of SRE. Such a vision will 
be fundamentally shaped by an understanding of the meaning and purpose of human 
sexuality understood within a wider vision of personhood. I shall return to discuss the 
cultural moral narrative of sex in Chapter 4. However, in acknowledging the attempt to 
categorise different philosophical approaches to SRE, and identifying the challenges for 
policy, it is the principles evidenced in the overarching liberal metanarrative of SRE 
policy, and the limits of this approach, to which I must return, in particular, the 
understanding and implications of an ‘informed choice’ approach. 
 
2.3 The Limits of the Liberal Metanarrative in Policy Making 
 
As evidenced in the shift in the moral and spiritual content of policy and discourse, there 
has been a move away from a clear articulation and understanding of shared goods and a 
common morality in SRE to one which increasingly promotes a self-authenticated moral 
position, as exemplified in the Coalition government’s statement on SRE,268 and the 
current guidance for PSHE.
269
 As Alasdair MacIntyre notes, in his acclaimed 
philosophical critique of the ‘Enlightenment Project’: ‘Liberal political societies are 
characteristically committed to denying any place for a determinate conception of the 
human good in their public discourse, let alone allowing that their common life should 
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be grounded in such a conception’.270 At the heart of what he judges to be the failure of 
liberalism is the disconnection between concepts of morality on the one hand and shared 




In view of my theo-ethical critique, it is interesting to note that in his discussion on the 
shift in the authoritative source, content and purpose of moral education in America, 
Hunter highlights that an ambivalence from within faith communities was contrasted 
with a ‘backlash’ from the neoclassicalists and communitarians. In particular, he 
highlights that this came ‘not in educational theory but in political rhetoric’.272 As such, 
my critique of SRE policy will engage with and, indeed, echo many of the concerns 
expressed by political and educational philosophers who have developed, in particular, a 
communitarian critique of liberalism,
273
 and, in Chapter 5, those who have called for 
moral education to focus on character development and a virtuous account of moral 
behaviour.  
 
It is certainly beyond the purpose and remit of this thesis to provide a detailed critique 
of liberalism or communitarianism per se, either within educational or political 
philosophy, or to critique in detail any particular advocate from either tradition, either 
self-confessed or popularly labelled. The purpose of engaging with the ideas of 
communitarianism is to critique the extent to which the ideals of liberal political and 
moral theory dominate SRE policy in England. In particular, in emphasising the social 
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nature of morality and moral decision making, leading communitarian thinkers, such as 
Sandel, critique the inadequacy of a government’s ‘aspiration to neutrality’ in policy 
decisions.
274
 Sandel highlights three moral principles which he suggests are effectively 
adopted when seeking to choose the ‘just’ policy approach: welfare, freedom and 
virtue.
275
 The first approach, he points out, seeks to apply the ‘greatest happiness’ 
principle which underlies a utilitarian moral philosophy, seeking to maximise welfare 
for the greatest number. The second approach argues that a just policy is one which 
supports a libertarian position, respecting freedom of choice and individual rights. The 
third approach, which he himself advocates, appeals to the cultivation of civic virtue 




In what would appear to echo Sandel’s third approach, the theological ethicist, Richard 
Niebuhr, observes that the values which a society seeks to represent and realise at any 
one time are invariably divergent and varied. As a result, it is always engaged in holding 
together in ‘tolerable conflict’ any number of goods.277 This thesis, nevertheless, will 
challenge the view that government policy has successfully secured a satisfactory 
position of ‘tolerable conflict’. Despite assertions to the contrary, it is clear that the 
moral aims and objectives of SRE are far from resolved within public discourse, with 
disagreement centred on what is appropriate moral content. For example, in light of her 
assessment of the moral aims of sex education in primary schools, Collyer suggests that 
a sexually educated adult is one who understands the matrix of important relationships, 
including family relationships, and lives according to identified moral codes, the roots 
of which are laid down in childhood.
278
 However, on matters of personal and social 
education, John White questions the necessity of talking about morality at all as he is 
doubtful as to whether young people will commit to an ‘external’ moral code, ‘an alien 
set of rules, principles, precepts or duties’, one that is detached from their desires which, 
he argues, gives reasons for action.
279
 Both of these perspectives point to a wider 
discussion of the meaning and purpose of moral education and moral enquiry: 
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Is morality a matter of conforming to certain externally imposed rules, or a matter of 
autonomous decision-making, learning how to apply moral principles to particular 




Such questions probe at the political limits of individual autonomy and the role of 
community in shaping moral character. At the very least, Collyer points out that a 
sexually educated young person must understand and behave in line with the moral 
codes of their society.
281
 In noting the socially constructed understanding of sexuality, 
Catherine Ingram Fogel suggests that religious and legal systems are the ‘two aspects of 
culture that attempt to control sexuality’.282 Therefore, if we are to deliberate within 
liberal democracy on the nature of the good life, as Sandel suggests, and foster a vision 
of the common good, the inevitable result for SRE policy is that we make judgements 
which move us beyond a position of liberal neutrality to ask fundamental questions 
about the nature of and purpose of moral education, and the nature and meaning of sex 
and relationships, and how they correspond with human flourishing.  
 
The aspirations of a communitarian agenda have particular implications for the 
foundations of education as outworked in theory, policy and practice. James Arthur 
notes that the communitarian agenda has not been thought through or articulated into a 
comprehensive theory of education, but points out the two distinct schools of thought 
emerging within this philosophical approach:  
one which believes that communitarianism simply offers liberalism some assistance in 
reforming itself, and the other which believes that communitarianism is a distinctive 




In seeking to strengthen the role of community and a vision of the common good with 
regards to young people and sexual behaviour, I shall echo what Arthur refers to as a 
‘communitarian liberal position’, which ‘values both individual choice and action, but 
places it within the context of a rich and worthwhile common culture’.284 As such, a 
communitarian approach to education as a means of forging and nurturing this common 
culture is particularly outworked in character and citizenship education, seeking to 
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foster common civic values and build moral character.
285
 The common good in 
education is perceived to consist of two ‘essential’ and ‘inseparable’ aspects: ‘the 
development of the capacities and powers of unique and irreplaceable human beings and 
the development of cooperative, fraternal, and mutually helpful ways of associating’.286 
My discussion, in engaging with a theological virtue ethic, will focus on the former. 
 
2.3.1  Reconstructing the Moral Framework 
 
In using the framework presented by Sandel to describe the liberal moral theories at 
work in contemporary political discourse, I shall critique in Chapter 3 the dominance of 
the ‘welfare’ principle as applied to public health and health education, and the 
‘freedom of choice’ principle as applied to moral education. In identifying the values 
presented in policy discourse, I will evidence their dominance in the philosophical 
positions adopted in surrounding academic discourse within the fields. It is important to 
note that it is beyond the remit and purpose of this thesis to offer a detailed review of all 
philosophical positions evident within literature pertaining to health education and 
moral education, but the purpose of the engagement with key texts and contributors is to 
evidence and critique the liberal principles that are shaping the policy metanarrative for 
SRE, alongside the underlying norms on sex and relationships, both of which are 
evident in Archard’s philosophical approach.287 
 
The dominance of the ‘harm’ principle, as evidenced within a public health response to 
teenage sexual behaviour, and in Archard’s reasoning for sex education, shall lead us to 
identify with Elizabeth Anscombe’s expressed concern that the ‘huge gap’ left by the 
failure of consequentialist thinking to offer a definitive appeal to a moral ought, ‘needs 
to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a 
virtue is, and above all of human “flourishing”’.288 Indeed, her call for a re-engagement 
with a virtue ethic in her paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ is credited with re-igniting a 
contemporary turn towards positioning virtue ethics as a serious alternative to the ethical 
theories that have dominated the moral landscape, namely consequentialism and 
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 In addition, in identifying the epistemological claims evident in moral 
education discourse, I will critique the popular position, also reflected in Archard’s 
moral approach to sex education, that is predominantly disposed to maximising the 
amount of information young people receive in order that they can make rational, free, 
autonomous choices. As Sandel suggests, based on this Kantian liberalism, ‘what 
matters above all is not the ends we chose but our capacity to choose them’.290   
 
In critiquing the liberal metanarrative within education, it is important to note that this 
critique is not directed against the capacity or freedom of the young person to make 
autonomous decisions. As Carr states: ‘Moral behaviour is hardly deserving of the name 
if it is not in some sense autonomous rather than heteronomous; principled rather than 
unprincipled’.291 Indeed, the capacity to choose is regarded as a central goal of a 
Christian approach to education. Aside from all the other things that education might 
entail, Hill notes that ‘if we have not equipped them with the tools of critical thought, 
and if we have not given them practice in making informed choices and accepting 
personal responsibility for them, then we will not have educated them’.292   
 
Instead, this critique is directed against the perceived agnosticism that currently exists 
concerning the ends of young people’s choices and the flawed presuppositions on which 
moral knowledge is founded. In particular, in responding to this atmosphere of 
agnosticism, Halstead and Reiss point to certain qualities of character that are highly 
valued in our society, and, indeed, attitudes and behaviours which are deemed 
unacceptable. In addition, they identify with the fact that many people believe children 
need help and moral guidance to make choices on their journey to maturity, particularly 
in the sexual domain.
293
 Therefore, in re-iterating the extent to which ethical and moral 
goals explicitly and implicitly shape and give value to sex education, McLaughlin notes:  
Sex educators want their students not only to know and to understand but also to feel, to 
care and to act (or not act) in various ways. Thus the influence of sex education extends 




Halstead and Reiss call for the development of a larger set of values, which they refer to 
as ‘common values’, offering a means through which satisfactory agreement can be 
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reached: ‘A working framework of justifiable and defensible common values must be 
identified and articulated if effective programmes of sex education are to be produced in 
a multicultural society’.295 However, despite the opportunities to date for discussion and 
reflection on this wider set of ‘common values’, it is clear that dialogue has emerged 
largely out of, and thus, in support of a narrow liberal values framework. As such, 
McLaughlin suggests that, despite effort to reach consensus on values, there is a lack of 





The challenge of reconstructing a moral framework for SRE which reflects Sandel’s 
appeal for civic virtue and a shared understanding of the common good should not be 
understated. Notwithstanding the myriad of challenges within the existing ‘master 
narrative’, McLaughlin identifies the crux of the difficulty in developing a shared 
approach to moral education in a pluralist society - its members do not share ‘“thick” or 
substantial views of human good’.297 Instead, shaped by the principles of liberalism, 
consensus is sought over ‘basic or “public” values’.298 He suggests that such principles, 
including freedom of speech, justice and personal autonomy, are ‘thin’ because they ‘do 
not presuppose some particular metaphysical theory of the self, or of the nature of 
human destiny’.299 Consequentially, as Sandel points out, our deontological ethic 
constitutes that ‘while we may be thickly-constituted selves in private, we must be 
wholly unencumbered selves in public, and it is there that the primacy of justice 
prevails’.300 
 
McLaughlin rightly recognises the challenges of moving beyond a ‘thin’ view of the 
good within a common school context to a more ‘holistic’ view of education which 
embraces the complexity of moral and spiritual development.
301
 In a society where there 
is little moral consensus, Carr indicates that the conceptual and practical challenges in 
drawing up a necessary list of common values are ‘legion’.302 As Charles Taylor 
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observes, ‘the spiritual as such is no longer intrinsically related to society’.303  This, he 
suggests, is a consequence of unlimited pluralism and the pursuit of individual spiritual 
enlightenment. Nevertheless, based on the presumption that public education is at least 
to some extent concerned with the moral education of its citizens, and sex education is 
itself a moral-laden subject, I shall re-examine the current vision from the assumption 
that any re-examination is a worthwhile and necessary part of ensuring the robustness of 
the moral framework currently in place.  
 
Additionally, beyond ethical theories of education policy, Reynold Jones points out that 
we lack a language in which to speak easily about sex in schools.
304
 From such a 
statement, however, we should not easily presuppose that it is possible to find a cultural 
language that is agreeable and accessible to all. In view of the plurality of worldviews in 
contemporary culture, it may be somewhat naïve to imagine that a single and unified 
language can be found to accommodate divergent understandings of the meaning and 
significance of human sexuality. While for Jones there might be nothing peculiar about 
sexual morality per se,
305
 for others sexual acts hold a particular significance.
306
 Faced 
with such moral diversity and complexity, what is nevertheless inevitable is that in 
reasoning together within public moral discourse about the meaning and purpose of 
SRE, we cannot avoid engaging in the broader moral consideration of our overriding 
public policy commitments concerning the meaning and purpose of human sexuality. 
For as Hollinger suggests: ‘It is in the meaning of sex that we find a framework by 
which we make sense of our sexuality as human beings’.307 In his theological account of 
the nature of human sexuality, Helmut Thielicke asserts that the biological is ‘given 
character by the personhood of the human being’.308 As such, meaning is apportioned to 
the totality of the person, not just their sexual functions, to the ‘thinking, feeling, and 
willing’ aspects of their personhood.309 As such, from a theologically informed position, 
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2.4 Conclusion: Enriching Moral Discourse - The Language of 
Virtue 
 
In presenting a case for the moral reconstruction of SRE policy discourse in England, 
the challenge for this thesis, in line with the constructive focus of my public theological 
engagement, will be to identify and sketch a moral language which moves beyond the 
increasingly popular position of liberal neutrality and ‘epistemological agnosticism’ in 
contemporary SRE discourse and instead shapes and presents a counter narrative within 
which young people can understand their sexual and relational nature, presenting a 
vision towards which their behaviour can be directed. As Smith suggests, in 
understanding the practices that form our loves, Christian witness should present 
practices that act as ‘counter-formation’.310 
 
Since the foundations of Western civilisation, moral philosophy has had a longstanding 
interest in the place of virtues in the moral life, and this tradition of rational engagement 
has significantly influenced and shaped the Christian tradition of virtue ethics and 
Christian character formation.
311
 In understanding virtues as qualities of character that 
are acquired, Hauerwas suggests that character is not equivalent to temperament or 
natural trait, but that it is something that an individual chooses.
312
 In exploring the 
interest of character in moral education, R.S. Peters noted: ‘A craving for a beef-steak, a 
lust for a pretty girl reveal a man’s nature, not his character. His character is revealed in 
what he does about them, in the manner in which he regulates, or fails to regulate 
them’.313 Additionally, in identifying the difference between character and virtue, 
Hauerwas draws a helpful association: ‘The various virtues receive their particular form 
through the agent’s character’.314 
 
However, despite the long-standing tradition, the ‘project of acquiring virtue’, as 
Jennifer Herdt points out, is also accompanied by a long-standing critique within both 
philosophy and theology, viewed on the one hand as a threat to moral autonomy by the 
perceived external imposition of virtues and, on the other, as presenting a false vision of 
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 In addition, MacIntyre warns against the ‘indeterminacy of 
meaning’316 when it comes to educating in the virtues, leading to discrepancy both in 
their understanding and application.
317
 As he points out, ‘there is no theory-neutral, 
prephilosophical, yet adequately determinate account of the virtues to be given’.318 This 
raises a particular challenge for character education in a pluralist, secular context. As 
James Arthur points out: 
How is it possible in a heterogeneous society, composed of people who sharply disagree 
about basic values, to achieve a consensus about what constitutes character education 
for citizens in democracy? Can we agree on what constitutes character education, on 




As noted earlier, Haydon highlights similar concerns regarding a virtue approach to 
moral education and its legitimation.
320
 Nevertheless, in responding to such concerns, I 
will engage with and present a Christian virtue ethic as a means of enriching current 
SRE policy content. In light of MacIntyre’s cautionary note, questions will invariably 
arise over how a Christian virtue ethic might manifest itself in secular polity in a way 
that both coheres with, and is faithful to, a biblical understanding of human nature and 
human flourishing, and yet might be embraced as a moral narrative by those outside of 
the Christian community. This shall be explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
In engaging with a Christian virtue ethic in SRE policy, therefore, it is important to 
clarify a number of points concerning the aims and purpose of this engagement as set 
against the wider discussion of the place of character in value and moral education in 
British education policy,
321
 and the place of virtue in the Christian moral life. First, 
while recognising that the discipline of psychology has an interest in moral growth and 
the development of moral character as outworked within moral education, my interest in 
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character and virtue is of a philosophical and theological kind.
322
 However, the interplay 
between the disciplines cannot go unnoted, particularly in view of what Carr notes to be 
the analytical ‘revolution’ in the philosophy of education, and the integration of the 
empirical theories of social science with philosophical discourse, including the focus on 
rationality in deriving moral norms.
323
 Secondly, the arguments presented in this thesis 
will not in any way seek to diminish the distinctive nature and calling of the Christian 
community in developing Christian character, nor indeed the distinctive nature of 
practices when it comes to sex and relationships.  
 
In his exploration of the New Testament vision of Christian character, and answering 
the question of how Christians should behave, Tom Wright asserts: ‘Once Christian 
faith is in place, you need to develop Christian character by practicing the specifically 
Christian “virtues”’.324 In addition, at a societal level, and in recognition of the liberal 
democratic framework in which the church is positioned, Hauerwas suggests that the 
most important social task is for the church to be truthful to itself, to operate its own 
‘school of virtue’.325 In doing so, he suggests: ‘The challenge is always for the church to 
be a “contrast model” for all polities that know not God’.326 As such, he points out that 
the church must critique its own commitment to virtuous living as much as it critiques 
that of secular society for, as he suggests, the moral education of the young in church is 
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often limited to ‘conventional pieties coupled with a few unintelligible “don’ts.”’.327 
Indeed, the argument offered by Smith on how secular ‘cultural liturgies’ are shaping 
our practices of learning echoes the necessity of this internal critique.  
 
As an outworking of this internal critique and practice, Walter Brueggemann suggests 
that when it comes to the church’s engagement with society, ‘the church has gifts to 
give when it acts out of its own peculiarity, out of its “new self”, when it comes to “the 
other” out of its own being loved and forgiven’.328 As such, the exhibition of a 
distinctive virtuous character that arises out of a renewed life in Christ, and the practices 
that flow from it, have implications for the common good of wider society. As Gushee 
and Stassen suggest: ‘The biblical virtues are keys to community well-being: 
peacemaking, hungering for justice, doing mercy, integrity, humility and caring for the 
poor and the mourning. And they are the way of participation in community with 
God’.329 Living within and according to this distinctive Christian narrative, Hauerwas 
suggests, offers ‘a beacon to others illuminating how life should be lived well’.330 
However, the purpose of this thesis is not to seek to comment on or critique the 
Church’s own commitment to its specific Christ-reflecting and Holy Spirit-inspired 
character and practices, though this is an important and necessary task. In adopting a 
constructive approach to public theological engagement, I will advance instead a 
position of ‘holiness as relational engagement’ rather than ‘holiness as separation’.331  
 
2.4.1 Defending a Theological Virtue Ethic in Public Moral Education  
 
In applying a theological virtue ethic outside of the context of Christian community, I 
open myself up, nevertheless, to accusations of moving outside of a coherent 
understanding of a theological ethic.
332
 As Robert C. Roberts points out: ‘What it is to 
be a person in the fullest and deepest sense is a matter of controversy between different 
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moral traditions’.333As a result, understandings of human nature and human flourishing 
are fundamentally different, as are, accordingly, the individual virtues that constitute the 
moral life.
334
 Wright suggests that ‘the “virtues” are the different strengths of character 
which together contribute to someone becoming a fully flourishing human being’.335 In 
light of this, I affirm the dynamic reality of the church’s dual citizenship.336 As such, I 
will present a vision of human flourishing within SRE policy discourse that attempts to 
avoid what Herdt identifies as the very real temptation of contemporary Christian virtue 
ethics: ‘on the one hand, that of falsely idealizing the church and its practices, and, on 
the other, that of denouncing secular modernity rather than discerning God at work 
within it’.337  
 
In reflecting on the place of an ethic of character within the biblical narrative, Benjamin 
F. Farley points out that central to any biblical understanding is the affirmation of 
humanity created in the image of God. This, he suggest, has two implications: ‘(1) the 
high human potential for intellectual development and moral sensitivity, (2) the 
uniquely human capacity for fellowship and cooperation with God and neighbor’.338 I 
concur with Farley’s assessment that the Fall did not completely destroy God’s image in 
us, but ‘men and women alike are capable of impressive moral and intellectual 
achievement’.339 Of course, this touches on one of the fundamental internal critiques of 
a Christian virtue ethic within theological discourse: that of recognising and reconciling 




As such, in his assessment of the role of an ethic of character within an evangelical 
ethic, O’Donovan acknowledges the soteriological discrepancy between a Catholic and 
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Protestant understanding of character formation within the respective moral traditions; 
yet this does not deem either one redundant, nor indeed the outcome of the moral 
deliberation: ‘We shall not learn how to save our souls by talking about the formation of 
virtuous characters. Nevertheless, such talk may teach us better than anything else what 
it is for a soul to be lost or saved, and so teach us to care about it for ourselves and 
others’.341 As Farley points out, the gospel truth behind a biblical virtue ethic is clear: 
‘no one is saved by exercising virtue; nor is anyone damned for the lack of it. God and 
God’s grace come first’.342  
 
However, as a result of this discrepancy, Arthur claims that there are few ethicists and 
moral philosophers from the Protestant tradition engaged in thinking around character 
education and virtue ethics.
343
 Those whom he does identify, he suggests, fit into one of 
two communities: ‘the neo-orthodox who lean towards separatism and isolationism in 
their view of character within their own Christian communities, and another liberal 
group who have been too open to non-Christian accounts of character’.344 
 
It is important to note that this thesis is specifically concerned with a theological ethic of 
character in the context of moral education. Thus, Gilbert C. Meilaender identifies the 
challenge faced by Protestant educators in giving credence to both their belief that 
virtues can be shaped by habit and yet the assertion that the virtuous life is only possible 
on account of divine initiative.
345
 In light of this tension, Herdt, in addressing in 
particular the fundamental objection posed by a Lutheran position, i.e. that of seeking to 
foster virtuous habits and communities before firstly exhibiting a total reliance on God’s 
gift of grace,
346
 points out: ‘Luther is forced to concede that children must be 
transformed from outside in, at least in the sense that the beauty of external practices 
can render them receptive hearers of the Word’.347  
 
This is echoed in Gerald Strauss’ account of the pedagogical principles that defined 
Luther’s approach to education and learning. Despite the apparent ‘internal 
contradiction’ of Luther’s theological position on human nature, on Luther’s 
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understanding of educating the young Strauss concludes: ‘Still, one may find in his 
assertions enough encouragement to support the conclusion that educational efforts are 
by no means wasted or without object and direction’.348 In particular, and interesting for 
my own discussion, were the efforts made to prolong the perceived innocence of 
childhood when it came to a young person’s acknowledgement and understanding of 





Therefore, presenting a Christian vision of personhood, and the virtues that correspond 
to it, can be viewed as a central part of moral education, while at the same time readily 
recognising the theological tensions therein.
350
 Meilaender suggests that this tension 
evidences the practical outworking of the now but not yet of the Christian story: ‘These 
virtues do at least foster human life together and fashion human behaviour – if not 
character in the fullest sense – in a way which more closely approximates God’s will for 
human life’.351 In addition, a focus on the examined life provided by virtue discourse 
can be seen as an apologetic opportunity. Presenting God in his full attractiveness, 
Alister McGrath suggests, includes presenting the morality which the Christian faith 
offers: ‘Christianity offers a world-view, which leads to the generation of moral values 
and ideals which are able to give moral meaning and dignity to our existence’.352 As 
such, he views our perception of moral obligation as a ‘point of contact for the 
gospel’.353  
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Finally, in focussing on Christian virtues as a means of shaping an ethical framework for 
sexual and relational behaviour as understood within the Christian narrative, I note 
Hollinger’s conclusion that this is best done alongside an understanding of the 
commands and principles that shape a theological ethic: ‘An ethic that focuses on both 
character and decisions, the internal (who we are) and the external (what we do), is far 
more holistic and representative of biblical guidance’.354 Therefore, while 
acknowledging that virtue, commands and principles each have a place in the Christian 
moral narrative, the focus of this thesis will be on the place of virtue within that 
narrative. In particular, the purpose of our engagement with the language of virtue will 
be to sketch the rich philosophical and theological landscape within which an 
understanding of an ethic of character has developed and nurtured an approach to moral 
education.
355
 In so doing, the moral framework of SRE policy will be informed by an 
ethical theory that seeks to move the moral content of SRE beyond the acquisition of 
cognitive and reasoning capacities, resolving, in addition, to value and advocate specific 
qualities of character. This will address the ‘impoverished’ nature of moral education in 
our schools, which, Richard Pring notes, has emerged on account of the emphasis on the 




In effect, re-imaging a virtue ethic within the context of SRE policy may simply re-
awaken a moral language, the remnant of which remains within contemporary moral 
discourse. For, as Wright suggests, Western culture has already been shaped for 
centuries by elements of Christian teaching on what constitutes good character. As a 
consequence, what we explore in terms of Christian character, he claims, ‘will overlap 
considerably with wider questions about the “character” that our whole society urgently 
needs to rediscover and develop’.357 Surely, in responding to Archard’s liberal approach 
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to sex education, it is for the critic to argue why this would not or could not offer a 
worthwhile, enriching and, arguably, much needed contribution to the current moral 



































The Moral Imperative of SRE Policy Discourse: 
‘Informed Choice’ 
 
3.1       Introduction: Teaching Morality 
 
In developing a critique of the liberal position adopted by Archard in the teaching of sex 
education, and re-affirming a vision of the embodied learner in community, I shall echo 
in this chapter Sandel’s conclusion that a government’s ‘aspiration to neutrality’ on 
moral and religious questions denies the fact that a position on questions of justice and 
the good life must be taken. Pursuing moral consensus and reaching moral conclusions 
on underlying, value-laden questions concerning the content of SRE and the vision of 
human flourishing therein is unavoidable in policy decisions and imbued in the 
normative ethical framework that emerges. In particular, I shall reveal how the liberal 
ethical principles within political philosophical discourse of ‘maximising welfare’ and 
‘respecting freedom’ are at work in SRE policy. I will present a case for why the liberal 
ethical theories that give rise to these principles, and the implicit value judgments 
concerning human sexuality therein, provide an incoherent and inadequate public vision 
of moral education. 
 
In acknowledging the inherently moral nature of SRE as a subject, wider issues 
pertaining to a public defence for its teaching and for the teaching of morality more 
broadly cannot be overlooked. On closer examination, a variety of moral positions are 
adopted. Colin Wringe, for example, presents two kinds of moral motivation for 
engaging in moral education; firstly, a ‘social utility view’ responds to what society 
identifies as delinquent or irresponsible behaviour, employing various methods to deter 
young people from engaging in such behaviours. This view can act, he suggests, as a 
response to young people’s licentious sexual behaviour.358 In contrast, a ‘“group values 
view” identifies and educates young people according to a system of beliefs, practices 
and relationships’.359  
 
He suggests that in a pluralist, liberal society, a social utility approach may be deemed 
preferable as it does not necessarily seek to impose prescriptive values or beliefs on the 
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 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that a ‘social utility view’ is yet shaped 
by the preferences of the ‘adult world’. In contrast, he suggests, the group values view 
develops qualities that are judged valuable to the young person themselves.
361
 However, 
he notes that within the modern world ‘neither approach is entirely satisfactory’,362 
acknowledging thus the challenge for educating in moral literacy:  
Learning to live morally in a world without absolutes, as perhaps our children must, is 
more difficult to conceive, and may require a measure of intellectual flexibility, which 




In light of this, he advances an alternative approach to moral education that appeals to 
the rationality of the young person and seeks to esteem the rewards of good behaviour, 
in order to empower the young person to act well. Moral education, he argues, should 
help the young person gain an understanding of the moral complexities of an ever-
changing world, in order to cope with these and, in turn, ‘forge their own version of a 
satisfactory way of living together after our generation’s practices and preconceptions 
have become inapplicable and passed into oblivion’.364 This accords with what he 
regards as the ‘master-virtue’ of moral education: ‘independence and self-
sufficiency’.365 
 
This approach echoes what Eamonn Callan and John White identify as the extrinsic goal 
of a liberal philosophy of education: presenting the young person with options for 
living, helping them to gain an understanding of themselves, and equipping them with 
the qualities of character and independence of thought to stand up for what they believe 
in.
366
 The purpose of this educational approach is to uphold the liberal values of 
individual freedom and equality, grounded in the moral outworking of practical reason. 
For as Halstead suggests, ‘forcing young people to do what they are told without 
understanding why and without choosing it for themselves is anti-educational’.367 This 
ideal functions as a critique to what Carr points out to be the paternalistic nature of 
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‘educational traditionalism’, which promotes the reception of knowledge and 




However, a liberal philosophy of education should not infer a ‘neutral’ account of moral 
behaviour, nor an account that is independent of the normative influence of society. For 
Brian Wakeman at least notes the impossibility of avoiding value judgements on good 
and bad behaviour when it comes to functioning within school community; implicit 
values are inevitably embedded into the philosophy of the school, its teaching practice, 
and what is expected of its pupils.
369
  In addition, the moral overtone and subsequent 
direction of policy discourse around the nature and content of moral and spiritual 
education continues to be impacted by the prevailing moral and socio-political climate, 
as reflected by discussion emanating within public policy circles.
370
 Therefore, in 
exploring its philosophical moorings, Thomas Wren suggests that moral education has 
the dual function of benefitting society and the individual, ‘at once a necessary 
condition for social control and an indispensable means of self-realization’.371  
 
In addition, within a liberal democracy, the normative role of parents as primary 
educators is defended, including the right to pass on beliefs and values to their 
children.
372
 Recognised as a critical building block of society, not least in terms of 
establishing boundaries between the moral responsibility of the state and the freedom of 
the individual, it is also a necessary prerequisite to protecting the institution of the 
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 Even those who advocate for the moral autonomy of the child, like Archard, 
must yet concede that when it comes to the appropriate context for raising children, the 
family remains, on balance, ‘the most feasible and desirable’.374 For, as he 
acknowledges, while the political and moral status of the child is enshrined in 
international law, in particular the UNCRC (United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child),
375
 the Convention equally protects the rights and duties of parents to 
provide direction and guidance, in line with the evolving capacity of the child. He 
expresses the hope, nevertheless, that a parent within liberal society would, at the very 
least, wish to educate their child in accordance with the ‘virtues of tolerance and 
equality of respect’.376 
 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the values and virtues taught in the home, Carr suggests 
that it may yet be ‘reasonable’ to suggest that schools teach ‘a common “core” of values 
and virtues for the purposes of moral, social and civic education and as a basis of moral 
sensibility and order for the common school’.377 In so doing, Archard acknowledges the 
interest of society at large in providing a basic education for its children, in order to 
ensure its own future stability and security.
378
 Therefore, Halstead suggests that it is not 
the existence of a relationship between citizenship and moral education that is ‘seriously 
questioned’, but, in effect, what is up for discussion is the ‘nature and limits of this 
relationship’.379 Indeed, there has been a long-standing recognition within British 
society of the contribution that education makes to the spiritual and moral development 
of children and young people.
380
 The Education Reform Act (1988) extended these 
duties to the statutory framework of the National Curriculum, which was required to 
promote the ‘spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the 
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school and of society’.381 Due to these statutory requirements, a necessary and on-going 
policy discourse ensued into the nature and content of moral and spiritual education. For 
example, The National Curriculum Council, in their discussion paper on moral and 
spiritual development, noted that children needed to be taught concepts of right and 
wrong from an early age; in addition, a failure to focus on pupils’ spiritual development, 
it was argued, would impair their intellectual and social development.
382
 According to 
the current National Curriculum in England for primary and secondary schools, all state 
funded schools must offer a curriculum which ‘promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, 
mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society, and prepares 
pupils at the school for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of later 
life’.383 
 
Attempts have been made to achieve a shared consensus on values to be taught; for 
example, the outcome of deliberations by the so-called ‘millennial moralists’384 resulted 
in the establishment of the National Forum for Values in Education and the 
Community.
385
 The preceding SCAA (School Curriculum and Assessment Authority) 
conference, out of which the Forum was established, recognised that preparing young 
people for adult life and life in community was linked with spiritual and moral 
development, confirming the school’s role in promoting the values and behaviours that 
are valued within society.
386
 The conference report suggested that confusion over the 
appropriate values and behaviours to be promoted was due in part to ‘a 
misunderstanding of the philosophical debate’.387 As such, they stated: ‘The fact that 
some values or behaviours cannot be defined as “absolutes” does not prevent them from 
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being promoted as the general rule’.388 In addition, the Forum’s value statement 
recognised that drawing up a list of shared values did not require an agreement on their 




Evidently, when it comes to the content and telos of moral education, a variety of moral 
conclusions can be drawn. Johannes van der Ven, for example, notes that while moral 
communication may be viewed as a ‘common denominator’ to different approaches, he 
identifies seven modes by which moral education is pursued: ‘discipline, socialization, 
transmission, cognitive development, clarification, emotional formation, and education 
for character’.390 The first two he identifies as part of ‘informal moral education’, the 
next five as part of ‘formal moral education’, and education for character, he regards as 
the ‘highest objective of moral education’.391 My discussion, while identifying the 
preferred modes of moral education evident within policy discourse, shall argue that it 
is this highest objective of which there is a dearth of debate, in particular, within SRE 
policy discourse. Instead, in exploring the current approach to moral education and the 
underlying complexity of its aims, I will identify with what Halstead clarifies are three 
characteristics which he suggests commonly define a ‘“morally educated person”: being 
informed, being committed to acting morally, and being critically reflective’.392 
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As such, I will firstly explore the explicit and implicit values evident in public health 
discourse concerning young people’s sexual behaviour, embodied in sexual health 
promotion policy, and outworked in health education.
393
 For sexual health policy 
recognises the key role SRE plays, not only in preventing teenage pregnancy, a priority 
area of sexual health improvement,
394
 but in building knowledge and resilience amongst 
young people up to the age of 16.
395
 As the developing argument will indicate, SRE 
discourse inevitably moves beyond a medical account of ‘sexual health’, and involves 
the articulation of values that define and shape an understanding of personhood and 
human sexuality.  
 
3.2 A Public Vision of ‘Sexual Health’ 
 
Public policy norms concerning the value of ‘health’ have been shaped by international 
policy principles as set down by the WHO.
396
 Sylvia Tilford and Keith Tones note that 
the WHO Ottawa Charter, and associated publications on health promotion, unveiled 
the ideological belief that ‘health should be viewed holistically as a positive state; it is 
an essential commodity which people need in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a 
socially and economically productive life’.397 In addition, it is also viewed as having 
laid the cornerstone of a health promotion ethic,
398
 where empowerment is the moral 
touchstone:  ‘Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control 
over, and to improve, their health’.399 It should also be noted that a political defence for 
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sex education is presented within this international public health framework: ‘Since it is 
the interest to every society that its members are secure, have self-respect and take a 
responsible attitude to their sexual life, it is in the interest of every society to prepare its 
members for future sexual activity’.400  
 
Therefore, from its inception, as my brief account of the development of SRE policy in 
England denotes, sex education fell within the remit of health promotion, in particular, 
health education, with earliest policy accounts recognising the intrinsic moral and 
spiritual questions at stake in educating young people on sexual matters.
401
 Early 
international policy discussion on health education and, in particular, sex education, 
recognised that creating a desire for health was the ‘major task of the health educator, 
and its absence the major obstacle for the sex educator’.402 The priority of promoting 
health, therefore, was viewed as essential to fulfilling the role of sex education and vice 
versa.
403
 Different theoretical models and approaches have emerged within health 
promotion for translating policy into practice.
404
 In spite of this, David McQueen 
suggests that health promotion still lacks a strong theoretical base and, as such, ‘practice 
has been and remains difficult to define’.405 This, he suggests, has particular 
implications for measuring effectiveness of practice.
406
 In addition, it is argued that its 
promotion should not be left to the medical profession or solely in the hands of the 
individual, but the environmental conditions in which we live and work must nurture 
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However, the potential for initiatives towards this end are innumerable, not least for 
public policy and education, thus highlighting the importance of clarifying the logical 
remit and scope of health promotion.
408
 This invariably raises distinct ethical challenges 
for health promotion,
409
 not least on account of the fact that judgements are being made 
about what constitutes ‘better health’ and about ‘whether and how to intervene to 
promote it’.410 In addition, Blair and Monk suggest that the ‘pre-eminent status’ given to 
health in sex education discourse ‘can outweigh other important values including 
important ethical and moral concerns’.411 Linda Ewles and Ina Simnett warn against the 
danger of ‘healthism’, where health is given an ultimate value, and the value that 




In the face of ambiguity over whether evidence or values drives the health promotion 
agenda, David Seedhouse suggests that, until this is resolved, the political nature of 
health promotion will be ‘partially hidden’: ‘All health promotion - even the most 
routine and mundane – is based on one political philosophy or another’.413 Bruce 
Jennings suggests that, in view of the Western political tradition of liberalism, it is 
unsurprising that ‘public health ethics should show itself to be predominantly a child of 
liberalism’.414 Standing in the light of this moral and political tradition, Keith Tones 
recognises that an empowerment model of health promotion offers a resolution to the 
ethical dilemma of, on the one hand, the need to safeguard and protect the public’s 
health while, on the other, respect the freedom of the individual, including the freedom 
to choose an ‘unhealthy’ lifestyle.415 As such, a number of Reiss’s principled positions 
for sex education come into play, where sex education is seen to be responsible for 
synonymously promoting physical health, promoting personal autonomy, and 
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promoting responsible sexual behaviour.
416
 As Tilford and Tones suggest, ‘the concept 
of health promotion is rather like virtue: it means all things to all people – who are 
united only in their agreement that it is rather desirable’.417   
 
In formulating policy concerning the promotion of health, Andrew Tannahill warns that 
a liberal approach, centred on ‘informed’ and ‘evidence-based’ decision-making on its 
own, will fail to give sufficient attention to the exploration of ethical principles in 
deciding the appropriate action.
418
  For when it comes to a vision of public health, it is 
impossible for the state to remain morally neutral on policy direction and practice; there 
are invariably certain behaviours that, at least on medical grounds, will be discouraged 
and, equally, those which will be promoted. As Tones suggests, it would be ‘either 
extremely cynical or extraordinarily naïve’ to suggest that health education should 




As such, it is essential to critique more closely the ethical recommendations that are 
explicitly and implicitly evident within the normative frameworks of health promotion 
and health education, in particular as they relate to young people’s sexual health, not 
least how the concepts of ‘health’ and ‘sexuality’ are shaping the moral narrative of 
policy discourse. Alan Cribb and Peter Duncan point out that health promotion is 
‘complicated enormously’ when defined beyond the parameters of disease prevention, 
raising an ethical question over whether what is being exercised is in fact empowerment 
or control.
420
 In addressing the issue of teenage pregnancy, they suggest that the ethical 
dilemma for health promotion centres on whether policy and practice should be shaped 
solely to promote ‘informed choice’ and personal autonomy, or whether it should be 
directed towards the specific goal of reducing identified ‘harm’.421 While the former 
may serve a liberal vision of ‘professional neutrality’, they point out that, in practice, 
this is impossible in the realms of public policy and health promotion: ‘Health 
promoters may take on the guise of neutrality, but this will only have the effect of 
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obscuring the values they serve’.422 In effect, R.S. Downie, Carol Tannahill and Andrew 
Tannahill admit that health promoters are ‘committed by their profession’ to promoting 




In expounding a public vision of sexual health promotion, it is important to note the 
implicit value judgements that have shaped a political vision of sexual health. For 
example, Eli Coleman charts the infiltration of public health discourse with the ideas 
developed within the field of sexology, which not only drew normative conclusions on 
human sexuality from behavioural observations, but translated those conclusions into 
policy recommendations.
424
 With the moral imperative centred on promoting the self-
actualisation of sexual preference, the proponents of the scientific study of sexuality 
identified a danger in associating any one normative understanding of sex as ‘healthy’ 
and, instead, through international policy strategies for sexual health promotion, 
‘reaffirmed the concept of wellbeing and the absence of disease, dysfunction and 
infirmity’.425  
 
In view of this influence, a socially constructed normative framework for sexual health 
policy is evident within the current WHO working definition of sexual health
426
 for, as I 
will explore in Chapter 4, policy discourse on sexual health has been informed by a 
normative understanding of sex, shaped by the ontological commitments of a select 
group of physicians, in the disguise of ‘neutral’ empirical observations. In addition, a 
socially constructed notion of ‘sexual health’ at national policy level adds to the moral 
complexity of policy discourse. For alongside sexual health services, ‘relationships’ is 
viewed as part of the Government’s advice and services, as expressed in the Framework 
document: ‘Sexual health covers the provision of advice and services around 
contraception, relationships, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (including HIV) and 
abortion’.427  
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Invariably, there can be no morally neutral, evidenced-based, understanding of 
‘relationships’. The importance of an existing public ethic emerges, in giving shape to 
the content of a sexual relationship. For example, beyond the ‘absence of unintended 
physical outcomes’, Roger Ingham and Nicole Stone suggest the characteristics of 
‘sexually healthy society’ include: 
positive psychological outcomes of sexual activity, high levels of mutuality and respect 
both in relation to partners and to the variety of sexual preferences and, although this 
seldom discussed in policy and programmatic (or even academic) deliberations, some 




It is evident, therefore, that sexual health policy outcomes are not simply defined or 
driven by physical health outcomes, i.e. the absence of unwanted pregnancy or disease, 
but by a vision of well-being and human flourishing.
429
 This highlights the complexity 
of evaluating public health interventions.
430
 For example, according to the vision of 
‘relationships’ envisioned in the Government’s Framework policy, they note that 
‘sexual relationships are essentially a private matter’.431 As a consequence, ‘people 
should have the freedom to make their own decisions about the types of relationships 
they want’.432 This echoes Archard’s moral position on sex education, with the moral 
pre-requisite being that the choice doesn’t harm anyone else. 
 
Such a position highlights, however, what for O’Donovan is the ‘paradox’ in the liberal 
goal of freedom of action: ‘It follows that we conceive our freedom passively, as a 
freedom not to suffer, not to be imposed upon. It is the freedom of consumers, rather 
than participants’.433 Nevertheless, the Government sees it as their duty to promote this 
relational ‘freedom’ within sexual health, impacting on and shaping the moral 
framework within which SRE is understood. As I have noted already, this is a flawed 
premise from which to shape the moral framework of policy, for it not only wrongly 
presupposes that it is possible to make autonomous choices independent from the 
inevitable shaping of a particular moral context, it is also based on the false premise that 
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Government can remain morally neutral on all sexual choices, even if only for the 
reasons of reducing ‘unhealthy’ outcomes of sexual behaviour.  
 
Therefore, Seedhouse points to a false dichotomy, which is created within health 
promotion, between evidence and values, for ‘a judgement about a person’s health 
necessarily depends upon evidence and the interpretation of that evidence’.434 As such, 
‘the evidence is not mute – but it never speaks entirely for itself’.435 Accordingly, where 
a government may wish to appear neutral in their approach to sexual health promotion, I 
affirm Seedhouse’s observation that ‘in all cases it is political philosophy (however 
implicit) which fires health promotion’.436 In addition, as noted already, it is moral 
philosophy that shapes the contours of political philosophy.  
 
3.2.1 Promoting Teenage Sexual Health 
 
In charting the historical development of SRE, it is clear that a significant motivating 
factor behind the introduction of policy and practice has been a public response to the 
‘negative’ social consequences of young people’s sexual behaviour, in particular the 
occurrence of unplanned teenage pregnancy
437
 and a year-on-year rise in cases of 
STIs.
438
 Indeed, it is suggested that we should be concerned about young people 
exploring their sexuality on public health grounds, rather than necessarily on moral or 
religious ones.
439
 This is reflected in the current indicators for improved outcomes 
within A Framework for Sexual Health Improvement in England, where two of the three 
prioritized indicators are concerned directly with teenage sexual health: ‘under-18 
conceptions’ and ‘chlamydia diagnoses (15-24-year-olds)’.440 These are the identified 
‘harms’ of teenage sexual behaviour, the costs of which are taken into account in any 
utilitarian calculus
441
 of the right policy approach towards teenage sexual behaviour, 
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where the moral prerogative is one of maximising welfare. As such, a public-health-
directed SRE programme will measure effectiveness by a fall in so-called ‘risky’ 
behaviours and negative physical health outcomes.
442
 Utilitarianism, suggests Will 
Kymlicka, is attractive as a theory of political morality, as it ‘conforms to our intuition 
that human well-being matters, and to our intuition that moral rules must be tested for 
their consequences on human well-being’.443 
 
While teenage pregnancy and childbirth are an age-old phenomenon, they have 
increasingly been constructed as an issue of public concern in the West.
444
  As such, 
when it comes to addressing the ‘problem’ of teenage pregnancy, Britain, it is claimed, 
has ‘one of the more advanced and long-running initiatives of its kind in the developed 
world’.445 In light of this public concern, education is seen to play a central role in 
public policy approaches to addressing behaviours considered ‘unhealthy’. This accords 
with Archard’s ‘social reasons’ for teaching sex in school.446 Where ignorance was 
viewed within New Labour’s Teenage Pregnancy: Report by the Social Exclusion Unit 
as one of the root causes of the ‘problem’ of teenage pregnancy,447 improved education 
was judged to be a key mode of prevention or damage limitation. Stopping teenage girls 
getting pregnant, Reiss points out, was, in fact, one of the earliest aims of sex 
education.
448
 As such, sexual health promotion has become a central justification for the 
provision of SRE, where New Labour believed their policy agenda was moving away 
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 However, the justification for societal interference in individual pursuits is 
defensible solely on the basis that an individual’s conduct is harmful to others. This is echoed in 
Archard’s position on sexual morality. 
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from one of moral judgment to one of evidence-based practice.
449
 As Helen Stapleton 
observes, ‘what had been portrayed as a moral problem was now (re)presented as a 
technical, or scientific, problem’.450  
 
As already noted, an evidenced-based approach to policy making falsely pre-supposes 
the possibility of achieving a value-neutral stance on sexual behaviour within policy 
discourse. For while it might be assumed that matters of health are devoid of value 
judgements, that the subject matter of health promotion ‘just is a problem’,451 health 
‘problems’ like teenage pregnancy are only problematic to the extent that they do not 
correspond with a vision of well-being, human flourishing and societal ‘good’.452 For 
example, Janet Shucksmith argues that constructing young people’s sexual behaviour 
within policy as problematic is itself problematic, for experimenting in various 
behaviours is a normal part of the  transition to adulthood from which the majority of 
young people emerge ‘no worse for wear’.453  
 
Therefore, where young people engaging in sexual behaviour might be presumed a 
natural part of their overall development,
454
 or, indeed, the inevitable result of a 
changing socio-cultural reality,
455
 and where the combination of SRE programmes and 
the provision of contraceptive services is judged as ‘essential to enable the young to 
reach adulthood without the burden of early pregnancy’,456 therein lie implicit value 
judgements which are not justified solely on physical health outcomes, nor are they 
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determined by a social utility calculus. Of course, policy objectives also depend on the 
definition of health that any given culture chooses to adopt at any given time, reflecting 




A continued reduction of under-16 and under-18 conception rates remains a key priority 
in the current Government’s ambitions for sexual health improvement, where social, 
economic and health reasons are given to justify why teenage pregnancy remains 
problematic.
458
 It is clear that policy discourse and value judgements concerning teenage 
sexual behaviour extend beyond the parameters of disease prevention. Faced with the 
economic and social fall-outs from teenage parenthood, identified as both a cause and a 
consequence of teenage pregnancy,
459
 it would appear that socio-economic values have 
dominated political discourse in recent years, with the prevention of social exclusion 
becoming the focal point for government intervention.
460
 Although not wanting to 
‘condone’461 young people engaging in underage sex, the ‘clear and consistent 
message’,462 which was to flow from New Labour’s policy, was the emphasis on the 
socio-economic ‘cost’ of pregnancy and parenthood for teenagers.463 Lisa Arai points 
out that New Labour reframed the problem by defining teenage mothers as ‘dependents’ 
rather than ‘deviants’.464  
 
At the heart of the ‘problem’ of teenage pregnancy, suggest Cribb and Duncan, is an ill-
defined moral judgement: ‘There is nothing wrong with teenage pregnancy per se. It is 
an indirect label for a whole cluster of issues which require separate consideration’.465 
This appears to reflect an ill-defined and incoherent public moral judgement on teenage 
sexual behaviour more broadly. Indeed, it is particularly noteworthy that many of the 
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issues that define teenage pregnancy as problematic are judged equally problematic for 
women of other ages.
466
 Stapleton suggests that many teenage mothers are not only 
biologically in their prime, in terms of their reproductive capacity, but many are ‘better 
supported by kinship networks than their older, more affluent, contemporaries’.467 In 
light of this, she suggests that concerns over young motherhood ‘may have less to do 
with qualms about their welfare and more to do with sexual double standards’.468 Such 
an observation highlights the dominance of the moral narrative in shaping policy 
outcomes.  
 
3.3 Educating for Health: ‘Maximizing Welfare’ 
 
In response to teenage sexual behaviour and its implications for sexual health, a core 
educative role for the state has emerged, dismissing any remaining ambiguity about 
state neutrality. Tilford and Tones suggest that the concept of health promotion can be 
distilled into an ‘essential “formula”’ – ‘Health Promotion = Health Education x 
Healthy Public Policy’.469 Katherine Weare notes that the processes of health education 
and health promotion are perceived to be forever ‘intertwined’, with the moral requisite 
that empowerment remains the central goal, primarily achieved by securing the 
autonomy of the individual.
470 As such, the ‘symbiotic relationship’,471 observed by 
Tilford and Tones between health education and health promotion policy, serves 
towards achieving this end.  
 
However, while complementary in their nature, Richard Farmer and Ross Lawrenson 
suggest that the concepts of health education and health promotion are ‘not 
synonymous’.472 Downie et al. note the fact that ‘several currents of thought and 
concern flow into health promotion’, in which they recognise that ‘medical values of 
public health, and the educational values of traditional health education, mingle with 
newer values of consumerism and “getting the message across”’.473 It is clear, at least, 
that an increased emphasis has been placed on the role of schools in promoting health. 
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Although school-based health education is not a new phenomenon, recent decades have 
witnessed a broadening of the scope of health education and the growing influence of 
the school as a setting for health promotion, with the developing concept of the ‘health 
promoting school’.474 While it is recognised that school provides a ‘captive audience’ 
for preventative health messages, Tones points out that teachers and educationalists 
express concern over schools being used for medical rather educational endeavours.
475
 
As such, in assessing the school as a setting for health promotion, Colin Noble and 
Marilyn Toft note that one of the challenges evident in policy discourse is that ‘there is 
no clear agreement about what schools are for’.476 
 
As a consequence of the fact that health education in the UK has evolved in close 
association with public health objectives, Jennifer Harrison suggests that it lacks the 
roots of a distinct pedagogy and is, therefore, vulnerable to the winds of moral and 
political change.
477
 She notes three common approaches to health and sex education in 
UK schools: a disease-orientated approach, a focus on risk factors, and a health–
orientated approach. She observes that many programmes are often a combination of the 
first two, while neglecting the third, in which a positive view of health in terms of the 
physical, social and mental well-being of the individual is promoted.
478
 These 
approaches are consistent, she points out, with a medical model of health that is largely 
preventative in nature, but does not reflect the models of health education that have 
historically shaped programme content in which the themes of morality and citizenship 
have remained dominant.
479
 A ‘medical model’, agrees Tones, is criticized for its 
‘relatively narrow and partial interpretation of human health and illness’.480 In reality, 
however, although self-determination is the perceived moral ideal, governments seek to 
empower individuals towards a vision of public health, where health education, working 
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in partnership with policy development, creates a health public policy in which, 
according to Tone, ‘the healthy choice is the easy choice’.481 The implication, in terms 
of meeting policy objectives, is that success can only be assessed when a clearer 





In observing the evolution of ‘health education’, Pring notes with concern how the 
subject had uncritically embraced moral content.
483
 A conceptual understanding of 
health education had widened beyond the initial scientific remit accorded to an 
understanding of physical health, to include concerns which were ‘increasingly of a 
social, “life-enhancing” and moral kind’.484 In view of this shift, it is noted that sex 
education, in particular, is a topic of health education that is particularly value-laden.
485
 
However, as I have noted, these are subjects that are inevitably value-laden, due to the 
very nature of education and the corresponding vision of human flourishing that is 
embedded in policy and practice. It is evident that Pring’s critique of health education is 
directed against, in particular, what he regarded as the ‘false and dangerous’ position of 
moral autonomy.
486
 Likewise, while emphasising the place of autonomy in health 
education, Alastair Campbell does not deny the place of persuasion in education, and 
the ‘dangerous naiveté’ in putting faith in ‘purely rationalistic and individualist methods 
of health education’.487  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, from its inception, the spirit of a liberal 
education was one which fostered the pursuit of individual moral inquiry and respected 
the freedom of the individual to determine and follow their own moral path, where 
freedom was to be curtailed only on account of preventing harm to self and others.
488
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However, as Richard Barrow and Ronald Woods point out, while this spirit of self-
determination is restricted, ‘the real question is what one regards as constituting harm to 
the child, and what one regards as interference with the freedom of others’.489 This can 
only be determined, they suggest, by pointing to ‘one’s overall view of what education 
is and what it is for’.490 
 
Current health-related issues of social and political concern are embedded within the 
guidance framework of PSHE,
491
 shaped by the liberal moral narrative evident in SRE 
policy discourse: ‘Good PSHE supports individual young people to make safe and 
informed choices’.492 Current SRE Guidance states: ‘The new PSHE framework will 
help pupils develop the skills and understanding they need to live confident, healthy and 
independent lives’.493 As such, when it comes to the norms that continue to shape health 
education, it is evident that individual empowerment, through the maximisation of 
autonomy, is the ethical goal to which public health policy and, in particular, health 
promotion has been directed. Ronald Dworkin makes a distinction between liberty and 
the ‘richer notion’ of autonomy. Whereas liberty is ‘conceived either as mere absence of 
interference or as the presence of alternatives’, autonomy, he suggests, ‘is tied up with 
the idea of being a subject, of being more than a passive spectator of one’s desires and 
feelings’.494  
 
Consequently, in observing the dominance of issues such as teenage pregnancy and 
substance misuse over broader issues pertaining to personal and social education, 
Haydon notes the reluctance of teachers to pronounce moral judgements on young 
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people’s behaviour.495 This is reflected in the 2010 Ofsted report on PSHE in schools, 
which noted that while students’ knowledge on contraception and the biology of sex was 
good, they were less able to discuss issues pertaining to relationships, inhibited by 
teachers’ lack of engagement and knowledge on the issues.496  In addition, where 
Haydon observes a strong association being drawn between personal and social 
education and moral education on the one hand, he also points to calls for the ‘removal 
of explicit moral content’ on the other.497 This invariably creates a climate of confusion 
for the educator. Traditionally, teachers might have been regarded as failing to execute 
their jobs properly if they had not acted in a way that promoted and transmitted certain 
moral norms and values; Carr points out that this conception of teaching has largely 
changed.
498
 For some, such an approach may be regarded as ‘unprofessional’, breaching 





However, as Halstead and Reiss point out, while the core values of freedom and 
rationality may be dependent on state impartiality, they are also dependent at the very 
least on the individual exercising tolerance and respect, securing the equal rights of 
all.
500
 For example, the Health Development Agency issued guidance for professionals 
on effective interventions around teenage pregnancy which majored on securing 
personal values. It was acknowledged that young people come from a diversity of social 
and cultural backgrounds, and, therefore, prescribe to different sets of attitudes, values 
and beliefs. In line with equal opportunities, effective health and education interventions 
should be tailored to meet this infinite range of needs.
501
 In addition, improved health 
service provision for young people, it was proposed, includes an acceptance of young 
people’s choices; practitioners are encouraged to adopt a ‘non-judgemental, friendly and 
supportive’ approach.502 The ultimate aim of the intervention is to ensure that the young 
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person has the self-awareness and self-confidence to both ‘take responsibility for their 
own health and share responsibility for other people’s health’.503 
 
Therefore, while Downie et al. may promote the ‘individual and personal values’ which 
they associate with the concept of autonomy and its role in human flourishing,
504
 they 
also point to the ‘necessary social values’, which they consider ‘must be widely shared 
for the continuance of society’.505 These they equate with the characteristics that define 
our human nature and our environment and, as such, identify four basic principles that 
derive from reaching a consensus of values: non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and 
utility.
506
 As such, the state inevitably makes judgements in line with their vision of 
health and well-being, in particular what is judged to achieve the greatest social utility, 
invariably shaped by the current cultural metanarrative. For in seeking to promote the 
autonomy of the individual through a liberal policy approach, the government is not just 
concerned with empowering individuals, but with the welfare of the wider population. 
  
As the current policy position states: ‘Good sexual health is important to individuals, 
but it is a key public health issue as well’.507 This necessitates a public value judgment 
on the place of sexual health in a vision of the common good. As such, Beauchamp 
argues that ‘highly important’ collective goods involve shared or common beliefs and 
values.
508
 However, Seedhouse warns that beyond ‘medical health’ and ‘social health’, 
‘good life promotion’, which, he suggests, is evident in the vision of Downie et al., ‘is 
an illegitimate extension of health promotion’.509 This, he suggests, is a matter of 
opinion, not one of objectivity.
510
 However, I would affirm that ‘good life promotion’ is 
an inevitable outcome of policy discourse. 
 
For example, the Health Development Agency, in seeking to communicate a ‘clear and 
consistent value message’ with regards to young people and sexual relationships, went 
as far as judging certain messages to be ‘wrong’, for example, ‘do not have sex’.511 
Such a message could be viewed as promoting a prescriptive rather than an enabling 
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value, a negative rather than a positive message. Indeed, the Health Development 
Agency defended their partial position by claiming that such a message ‘excludes young 
people who are, or who have been, sexually active, has a limited life-span and could 
conflict with other interventions aiming to promote safer sexual behaviours’.512  
 
This ‘health’ position, however, presupposes an inevitability around young people 
engaging in sexual relationships, and thus makes a corresponding value judgement on 
the appropriate message. In general, critics of an abstinence approach to sex education 
claim that it is not informed by the expressed needs of children and young people, and 
therefore has as its starting point a particular values framework.
513
 In contrast, it is 
suggested that health discourse does not view sex as ‘intrinsically unhealthy’, only 
potentially ‘unsafe’, and recognizes young people as embodied sexual agents.514 As 
such, the provision of medical and legal information on how to avoid unplanned 
pregnancy, which young people have a ‘right to know’, is ‘morally neutral’,515 while 
abstinence-only education has been deemed discriminatory against children, amounting 
to ‘childism’.516  
 
What this discourse wrongly presupposes is that it is possible to start from a position of 
moral neutrality on sexual behaviour; it also presupposes that all young people are, or 
wish to be, sexually active, or indeed, that not having sex is an undesirable, unnecessary 
or impossible goal. What is clear is that this value position inadvertently reflects a 
certain attitude towards child sexuality, where a young person engaging in sexual 
activity is regarded as a normal and inevitable stage in their development;
517
 the 
promotion of abstinence, as a consequence, is viewed as an obstacle rather than an 
option in the promotion of ‘safer’ sexual behaviours. Indeed, it is viewed by some as 
unfair, if not impossible to promote such behaviour change in young people who are 
already sexually active.
518
 Such a value judgement has clearly moved well beyond an 
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intervention focussed on disease prevention and, indeed, the aspiration of maintaining 
professional neutrality. 
 
In seeking to secure the promotion of liberal values, the Health Development Agency 
suggested that an inclusive message may be one such as ‘it’s OK to say no’, reflecting 
the values of self-determination and respect for others. While such a message will be 
viewed as commendable in the measure to which it upholds the universal principles of 
freedom and respect, it highlights the weakness of a purely liberal approach, in that it 
gives no guidance on when or under what circumstances it would be right, or at least 
prudent, to say no; it simply affirms that the young person has the freedom to do so. 
Conversely, when and under what circumstances is it morally prudent to say yes? As 
Taylor notes, within our contemporary ethic, ‘choice’ has become ‘a prime value, 
irrespective of what it is a choice between, or in what domain’.519 Nevertheless, while it 
appears that the state remains largely impartial on when and in what context young 
people have sex, taking into account, of course, parameters set down by the law
520
 and 
the ethical recommendations of liberalism, it does not remain impartial on how. 
Regarding the perceived health risks young people take in having sex and the ‘harm’ 
that arises as a consequence, public concern and intervention is justified on the grounds 
of health protection.
521
 As such, particular focus within sexual health promotional 
messages is given to the promotion of ‘safer’ sex.  
 
However, on the basis of earlier reasoning around the need for an ‘inclusive’ value 
message, it could equally be argued that ‘wear a condom’ might be understood as a 
negative, exclusive value message and equally ‘wrong’. While conflicting directly with, 
for example, Catholic moral teaching, it also presumes the inevitability of sexual 
experimentation, and therefore excludes those young people who are not, or who have 
not been, sexually active. It may also be seen to conflict with interventions that 
encourage young people to delay sexual activity for a future, monogamous relationship. 
Hauerwas suggests that it’s the ‘realist’ that adopts the view that young people having 
sex is an inevitability. Believing that they are adopting an amoral position, or at the very 
least a non-moralistic position, he points out, however, that their position ‘presupposes 
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an ethical recommendation’, that the individual’s sexual behaviour is a matter of 




Naturally, within liberal society, such an ethical recommendation comes with the caveat 
that it is a freely informed choice, insofar as the choice of the other is respected and it 
contributes to social utility. However, as Sandel suggests, by adopting a value position 
that seeks to maximize utility, the state is, in effect, making a moral judgement on the 
common good,
523
 in this case, by granting recognition and value to a certain definition 
of young people’s sexual behaviour over and above another and, indeed, over and above 
the achievement of social policy goals. For if, as Haydon suggests, sex education is 
instrumental to achieving the social goals of a healthy lifestyle, judged by Archard to be 
a ‘neutral’ justification for policy,524 then the effectiveness of the chosen policy position 
should dictate policy direction, i.e. if an approach which promotes ‘informed choice’ 
proves ineffective in reducing teenage pregnancy and the transmission of STIs, and an 
approach which enforces abstinence proves more effective, the measurement of 
consequences ought to dictate a change in policy direction.
525
 However, by rejecting this 
logic in policy discourse, the underlying normative judgement on young people’s sexual 
behaviour comes to the fore, as well as the metanarrative in which it is positioned.  
 
It is interesting to note, however, that where health promotional messages might 
masquerade as largely impartial on sexual lifestyle choices, it is possible to point to 
other areas of public health policy in which governments have adopted a much 
narrower, more paternalistic approach to lifestyle choices. Based on a calculation of 
‘harm’ to the health of the individual and public at large, governments have introduced  
legislation around cigarette smoking and alcohol use, often by means of commercial 
regulation,
526
 or regulating behaviour in the public space.
527
 There are increasing calls 
from the medical profession for the Government to ban junk food adverts before the 
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watershed and tax fizzy drinks, in order to tackle the national obesity crisis.
528
  Such 
action, Beauchamp would suggest, encourages concern for the good of the wider 
population.
529
 However, in contrast to discouraging tobacco use, where it is argued that 
the value that guides public policy is the uncontroversial and universal value of 
health,
530
 the reasons that determine, for example, why teenage pregnancy is 
problematic, extend beyond the remit of physical health, both for the mother and the 
child, and are therefore much more complex. 
 
An added ethical consideration relates to the content of the messages targeted 
specifically at young people, taking into account the particular impact of societal shifts 
in sexual behaviour on young people, on account of their ‘unique vulnerabilities’.531 
Age-specific concerns are taken seriously by the Government when it comes to the 
dangers of underage alcohol consumption.
532
 However, in contrast, targeted sexual 
health messages focus on a population-wide message of harm reduction. As the Social 
Exclusion Unit’s report acknowledged: ‘The fact is that unprotected sex at any age is 
dangerous’.533 Therefore, where the policy emphasis is placed on responsible sexual 
practice, Dianne Pearce suggests, the concern is not for children engaging in adult 
behaviour, but on the need to ‘reinforce responsible adult sexual behavior’.534 However, 
without at least an understanding of the psychological and emotional aspects of 
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Therefore, where health promotion is shaped by the moral principle of promoting social 
utility,
536
 a reduction in unplanned pregnancies and cases of STIs, the identified ‘harms’ 
of teenage sexual behaviour, accords with what Meredith notes to be the ‘direct return’ 
that most governments would expect from providing school-based sex education.
537
 The 
‘harm principle’ also accords a central role in Archard’s moral account of sexual 
behaviour.
538
 However, underlying this liberal metanarrative, an oft implicit moral 
judgment is made in policy discourse concerning a vision of health and human 
flourishing, which in turn influences the utilitarian calculus used within public health to 
maximise the welfare of the population; this is reflected in the moral content of the 
approach to health education adopted. Informing a cost-benefit analysis is a socially 
constructed understanding of welfare, arising from a vision of human flourishing, a 




3.3.1 Promoting ‘Safer’ Sex: An Inadequate Moral Vision 
 
It is evident that when it comes to policy decisions concerned with promoting health, 
the philosophical position adopted by government is one that is concerned not just with 
individual empowerment, but with maximising the welfare of the population. As the 
WHO make clear, in balancing sexual rights with the harms of sexual behaviour, there 
is invariably a distinction made between behaviours or ‘expressions of sexuality’ which 
lead to sexual health and well-being and those that put people at risk or make them 
more vulnerable to sexual and reproductive ill-health.
540
 However, I shall note, in 
particular, the danger within policy discourse of narrowly defining the concept of 
‘harm’, where the negative consequences of sexual behaviour are reduced to unplanned 
pregnancy, abortion and STIs. Of course, this is not to downplay the significance of 
these outcomes,
541
 but health promotional messages are in danger of being reduced to 
                                                 
536
 The principles of doing good and avoiding harm within health care are reflected in the four principles 
devised by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, in particular, beneficence and non-maleficence (T.L 
Beauchamp and J.F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 ed.), Oxford: OUP, 2013).  
537
 Meredith, Sex, 2. 
538
 See 1.3. 
539
 Sandel, Justice, 56. 
540




 In noting their severity, John Green, for example, points out: ‘Arguably no area of medicine brings in 
more psychological factors than sexually transmitted diseases’ (J. Green, ‘Psychological Factors in 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases’, J. Green and D. Miller (eds.), The Psychology of Sexual Health, London: 
Blackwell Science, 2002, 21-37, 21). 
 91 





In terms of the normative ethical framework which has emerged within sexual health 
promotion, the adequacy of a utilitarian calculus as a guide for individual and political 
moral action is immediately found wanting, not least by the fact that the full extent of 
the actual consequences, as opposed to just the expected ones for any sexual choice, are 
impossible to measure, both within the public and private realm. This is illustrated by 
the results from the National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles, which revealed 
that over half of women who had had sex before the age of 16, in hindsight, judged it to 
have been too soon.
543
 Not only is it difficult for the individual to ascertain the 
consequences of their own actions, it is arguably impossible to measure the impact on 
all those affected. For as John Lennox points out, how could we possibly measure the 
reaction of future generations to any decision, or how long would we have to wait to 
fully assess the unintended short and long-term consequences of the act?
544
 Even the 
most ardent proponents of sexual freedom argue that, in adopting an ethically 
responsible position, ‘decisions are subjects of judgement and projection, and their 
outcomes are only slowly revealed’.545  
 
Therefore, there remains a long-standing critique directed against the adequacy of such 
a moral judgement, for as Fitzjames Stephen stated: ‘Men are so closely connected 
together that it is quite impossible to say how far the influence of acts apparently of the 
most personal character may extend’.546 In addition, consequences of sexual behaviour 
invariably extend beyond the outcomes for physical health. To argue otherwise is to 
adopt a very narrow definition of both health and sexuality.
547
 Sex, when disconnected 
from a view of personhood, is therefore understood according to the consequences of its 
biological function. However, in pointing to at least one other aspect of our personhood, 
Brandon notes that ‘sex is not isolated from our overall emotional development, but 
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occurs within and contributes towards it’.548 Indeed, this corresponds with the WHO 
definition of sexual health.  
 
Nevertheless, what we can observe and measure consequentially, at least in part, and in 
the short term, are the physical health outcomes of current sexual norms in behaviour. 
These have resulted in significant ‘pain’, including unintended pregnancies, abortion, 
and an increase in cases of STIs. Limited progress was made during the lifetime of New 
Labour’s Teenage Pregnancy Strategy; despite New Labour’s 10 year goal to halve the 
number of conceptions to under 18s, the rate of under-18 conceptions in England 
between 1998 and 2008 fell by only 13%.
549
 However, recent figures show that teenage 
pregnancy rates have reached an all-time low.
550
 At the same time, STI rates continue to 
rise. Nearly half a million new STIs were diagnosed in England in 2012,
551
 an increase 
accorded to new data collection. The 2013 figures noted very little change.
552
  There has 
been a long-standing political concern for the state of the sexual health of the 
population. For example, in 2003, David Hinchliffe, the Chairman of the House of 
Commons Health Committee, reported to Parliament the findings of the Committee’s 
inquiry into sexual health: ‘We have been appalled by the crisis in sexual health we 
have heard about and witnessed during our inquiry. We do not use the word ‘crisis’ 
lightly but in this case it is appropriate’.553  
 
As the 2013 figures show, the 15-24 age category experienced the highest STI rates, 
amounting to 63% of chlamydia, 54% of genital warts, 42% of genital herpes and 56% 
of gonorrhoea diagnoses in heterosexuals.
554
 Attempts by public health to abate the 
crisis appear to be failing, indicating that health promotional messages around 
unprotected sex have either been ignored or proven ineffective. Indeed, in line with the 
moral mantra of informed choice, the rejection of the ‘healthy’ decision is a morally 
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legitimate outcome. Recent research has shown that some young women, while being 
fully aware of the consequences of unplanned pregnancy, are choosing to reject the use 
of contraception and are continuing to have unprotected sex.
555
 Therefore, while 
empowering the individual is ‘not a morally neutral activity’,556 within the current moral 
framework the health promoter inevitably faces such an outcome. 
 
Indeed, it is noteworthy to point out that within our narrow application of the harm 
principle, it is possible to arrive at a very different conclusion to our current sexual 
health ethic. For, as S. Jack Odell suggests, it may have been possible to argue within 
the early to mid-twentieth century for a rule prohibiting pre-marital sex on utilitarian 
grounds in view of the unwanted pregnancies, illegal and dangerous abortions and the 
spread of sexually transmitted infections.
557
 As he notes, this was the position voiced by 
Ronald Atkinson, who identified the potential for much harm in pre-marital sexual 
relationships.
558
 Indeed, Odell points out that this analysis might still apply:  
Of course, now that antibiotic-resistant strains of venereal disease bacteria are 
increasing, and some diseases (herpes, AIDS) are caused by viruses against which we 
have little medical protection, the argument for a rule prohibiting premarital (and other) 




It goes without saying, of course, that such public policy suggestions or legal 
manoeuvres would prove unpalatable within the current liberal metanarrative, but it 
does present a challenge to those who advocate a narrow definition of ‘harm’ within a 
utilitarian ethic.  
 
As for the outcome of the current welfare calculus, the health message around sexual 
health improvement remains consistent: ‘The best way for sexually active people of any 
age to avoid an STI is to use a condom when they have sex’.560 Accordingly, this shapes 
the moral judgments made against young people’s sexual behaviour, where ‘bad habits’, 
Tatchell points out, include ‘unsafe sex’ and ‘intercourse without contraception’.561 In 
addressing these, he suggests that teachers should present safer sex an ‘attractive, sexy 
alternative’.562 The same approach should be adopted, he suggests, for encouraging kids 
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to explore other means of sexual arousal.
563
 Indeed, Ingham suggests that an increased 
openness about masturbation might contribute to an understanding of, and achieving 
targets within, public health.
564
 When it comes to the sexual facts, as Tatchell denotes, 
‘nothing must be off limits’.565  
 
While I shall explore the adequacy of the worldview premise that underpins these 
conclusions on sexual morality in the next chapter, it is sufficient, at this stage, to 
suggest that at the heart of sexual health promotion remains a narrow definition of ‘safer 
sex’, giving perceived moral legitimacy to a policy framework which seeks to maximise 
the sexual autonomy of the individual, even at the expense of policy goals. Alan Soble 
argues that deciding what amounts to ‘harm’ in the public sphere has ‘profound 
implications’. For, in his view, ‘a narrow notion of harm yields a permissive (sexual and 
nonsexual) ethics, providing little justification for using the criminal law to interfere 
with behaviour; a broad notion of harm (which might include more offensiveness) 
implies the opposite’.566  As Kymlicka notes, due to disagreements over the measure of 
utility, the application of a utilitarian ethical theory within political discourse is ‘bound 
to yield fundamentally opposed judgements’.567  
 
As a result, it is possible, Soble suggests, to argue on utilitarian grounds for the 
widespread use of contraception in order to reduce unwanted pregnancies, recognising 
the difficulty in defining the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ consequences of making such a choice.568 
Indeed, the moral justification for doing so, it could be argued, is particularly applicable 
to young people, in view of the perceived social and economic fallout of teenage 
pregnancy.
569
 As a result, significant emphasis has been placed, within sexual health 
policy discourse, on improving outcomes through contraceptive provision and STI 
testing. In developing a policy response to teenage pregnancy, it is suggested that for 
every £1 that is invested in contraception, the NHS will save £11, on top of savings 
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made to welfare benefit costs.
570
 Evidence from 2011 suggests that ‘the provision of 
contraception saved the NHS £5.7 billion in healthcare costs that would have had to be 
paid if no contraception at all was provided’.571 In addition, it was estimated that a 
quarter of funds transferred to local authorities in England in April 2013 for their public 
health responsibilities would be spent on sexual health services.
572
 Government 
guidance on contraceptive services for young people, therefore, has followed suit, with 
the emphasis on providing widespread and comprehensive contraceptive provision.
573
   
 
As noted earlier, in making a moral judgement on the ‘harm’ of young people’s sexual 
behaviour, particular policy attention is directed towards the issue of teenage pregnancy, 
the justification for which being the potential social exclusion of the mother, and, in 
particular, concern expressed over levels of poverty, low aspirations, poor educational 
outcomes and the impact on future employment opportunities.
574
 All of these have 
particular costs for the socio-economic structures of society, not least incurring a 
significant cost that impacts present and future public finances. As such, with harm 
defined within narrow socio-economic parameters, it may be difficult to argue why 
long-acting methods of contraception do not become a morally legitimate option for 
teenage girls, indeed all teenage girls.
575
 Anecdotally, a columnist in ‘The Times’ 
newspaper, commenting in 2012 on the six fold increase over the past five years in the 
number of girls of 15 years and under who have received the contraceptive implant from 
a school-based NHS clinic, admitted that the harms of current behaviour may morally 
justify such a measure: ‘contraceptive implants are an ugly measure, a flawed fix, that 
should rightly make society uncomfortable. But they are better than a lifetime of trouble 
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for yet another vulnerable girl’.576 Even within this calculus of utility, however, it is 
overlooked that the contraceptive implant offers the teenage girl zero protection from 
STIs. 
 
It may be argued that if the notion of harm associated with young people’s sexual 
behaviour was broadened to include issues pertaining to their relational and emotional 
well-being, or, indeed, if evidence was to show damaging effects of long-acting 
methods of contraception on young girls’ developing bodies, we may well arrive at a 
different conclusion. Therefore, any calculation made in pursuit of reducing public harm 
is understood within a broader notion of a young person’s well-being. Nevertheless, it 
would appear that, in view of the public health response to teenage sexuality, as Soble 
predicts, a narrow definition of harm has yielded a permissive ethic. As Brandon 
suggests, our culture has placed a premium on securing sexual freedom, over and above 
the costs to public health and, indeed, the multi-faceted and far-reaching relational 
‘harms’ to the parties involved and the wider community. In addition, he points to the 
cumulative ‘harm’ of sexual behaviours on the individual’s character and the 
implications of sexual choices for future relational stability.
577
 On account of these 
factors, it is clear that the use of ‘harm’ as a moral indicator is currently limited in its 
scope and application and does not contribute to an adequate moral framework in which 
to position moral education or present a coherent vision of human flourishing, in 
particular, taking into account our inherently relational nature. 
 
Indeed, as Atkinson argued, utilitarian arguments are ‘culture-bound’, with the 
application of principles, therefore, vulnerable to social change, as, too, the notions of 
sexual practices that promote happiness.
578
  For example, with increased discourse 
around the inclusion of pleasure in SRE programmes, ‘harm’ may become understood 
as denying young people access to information on how to make their sexual experiences 
more pleasurable. Additionally, there are those who express little or no moral objection 
to the practice of abortion, judging the greater harm instead to lie in the ‘potential 
hazard’ of unplanned pregnancy.579 As a consequence, Atkinson suggests that ‘a 
utilitarian position hardly constitutes a basis for the reappraisal of our sexual 
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arrangements as a whole, nor will it take the weight of proposals for the really radical 
re-shaping of them’.580  
 
While recognising the limitations of the utilitarian argument outside of an understanding 
of the existing social order, Atkinson sees little alternative to it as a moral framework 
for drawing up legislation within a morally pluralist democracy.
581
 However, in 
acknowledging and addressing the oversimplification of its earliest proponents, 
Kymlicka suggests that modern utilitarianism ‘no longer defines a distinctive political 
position’.582 As such, while the consequentialist principle in and of itself may be a 
judged a useful measure in guiding public policy decisions, in particular as a means of 
finding an objective measure with which to maximise the outcomes for all affected,
583
 it 
cannot provide a definitive account of sexual morality, as it doesn’t offer an adequate 
vision of the intrinsic good of sexual behaviour, nor provide a sound moral foundation 




3.4 Educating for Morality: ‘Freedom of Choice’  
 
Reflecting the findings from my earlier discussion, Darcia Narvaez notes two dominant 
approaches to moral education in recent decades: ‘traditional character education and 
rational moral education’.585 While the first is focussed on the cultivation of virtuous 
character, the second is centred on facilitating autonomous moral decision-making.
586
 
Haydon notes that focussing on the aims of moral education helps to distinguish it from 
moral development.
587
 Narvaez’s second approach is reflected in what Blake and 
Frances suggest is the ‘consensus’ position with regards to SRE in England, where the 
educational focus is upon the ‘acquisition of knowledge, the development of skills and 
the clarification of attitudes and values’.588 Indeed, this is the position adopted within 
the ‘Education Framework’ of the Sex Education Forum.589 As noted in Chapter 1, the 
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SEF plays a leading role in the policy community that shapes SRE policy. However, 
with its formation, Thomson noted the challenge of reaching consensus on a moral 
framework for SRE amongst such a diverse group of stakeholders.
590
 Two key projects, 
which took place in the early 1990s, were attempts at achieving this. 
 
In Sex Education, Values and Morality, the Family Planning Association and Health 
Education Authority concluded that when it came to developing a values framework for 
sex education programmes within a pluralist society, achieving consensus on attitudes, 
values and beliefs was not necessary. Indeed, as a general principle, the promotion of 
one particular lifestyle to young people was not considered good practice. With the 
acceptance and celebration of difference, and the promotion of a moral framework of 
equal opportunity and respect, it was recognised that ‘values cannot be imposed, but 
children can be equipped with the skills needed to allow them to develop their own’.591 
This approach reflects a ‘values clarification’ theory of moral education, where the 
focus of education is on the ‘process of valuing’ and proposes that ‘whatever values one 
obtains should work as effectively as possible to relate one to his world in a satisfying 
and intelligent way’.592 This evaluation also echoes what Halstead and Reiss identify as 
the three fundamental values within a liberal education: freedom, equality and 
rationality.
593
 In particular, as evidenced in discussions on moral education, they point 
out that the process of developing the rational mind of the young person and 
encouraging open, critical thinking cuts to the very heart of liberal education. While 
recognising the significant role that this plays in moral development, they caution, 
however, against a narrow understanding of the young person that equates with their 
ability to reason, in a ‘way that ignores the emotions and dispositions and a balanced 
sense of personhood’.594 
 
The second project, led by the Sex Education Forum, echoed the moral conclusions of 
the first. They similarly rejected the promotion of a single moral standpoint, instead 
reaching consensus on the fact that sex education should be: ‘relevant to all young 
people; respectful of the cultural and religious identities of the individual; understanding 
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and accepting of diversity’.595 The project encouraged rational engagement with shared 
values as part of the process of moral development, with the young person being 
encouraged to engage with, and being helped by the educator to understand, the 
implications of their own moral understandings.
596
 At the same time the project 
recognised the part that religion might play in an individual’s spiritual and moral 
development and the importance of religion as ‘one aspect’ of an individual’s identity, 
and, in particular, ‘one factor’ in shaping a young person’s sexual identity.597 While the 
recognition of the contribution that religion brings to moral and spiritual development is 
self-evident, it is clear that their conclusions on the role that it plays painted a disjointed 
view of identity formation. In particular, it failed to appreciate the overarching influence 
a cohesive worldview, whether a religious or a secular one, can have in providing a 
moral framework that informs, shapes and directs all aspects of life, including sexuality. 
Mike Bottery identifies this as a problem of liberalism, in that it fails to appreciate the 
‘rootedness’ of individuals within their cultural and religious communities, a strength of 




In effect, both projects emphasised the distinction between ‘prescriptive’ and ‘enabling’ 
values in sex education, promoting the latter as a way of developing a moral language 
that establishes consensus around the “thou shalt”, as opposed to the “thou shalt not” of 
sexual behaviour.
599
 Such an approach, it was argued, develops a moral framework that 
is inclusive rather than exclusive,
600
 one in which young people should be given the 
freedom to explore and develop their own moral code.
601
 In light of this, the liberal 
metanarrative that is currently shaping the normative ethical framework of SRE, as 
espoused by Archard and Harris, presents the telos of education as the promotion of 
personal autonomy.
602
 Consequentially, ‘informed choice’ has become the moral 
touchstone of SRE policy rhetoric. It is important, therefore, to glimpse the 
philosophical landscape of moral education from which the pre-eminent position of the 
self-authenticated choice within SRE discourse has emerged. For while government 
seeks to curtail individual liberty, through the application of the ‘harm principle’ within 
                                                 
595
 R. Thomson, Religion, Ethnicity and Sex Education: Exploring the Issues, London: National 
Children’s Bureau, 1993, 4. 
596
 Thomson, Religion, 9. 
597
 Thomson, Religion, 119. 
598
 M. Bottery, ‘Can Schools in a Liberal Society satisfy Conservative Views on Sex Education? : A 
Preliminary but Necessary Discussion’, S.A. Mabud and M.J. Reiss (eds.), Sex Education and Religion, 
London: Islamic Academy, 1998, 150-167, 159. 
599
 Thomson, ‘Diversity’, 265. 
600
 Thomson, Religion, 11. 
601
 Blake and Frances, Just, 52. 
602
 See 1.4. 
 100 
a consequentialist framework, Carr points to a second concept of practical reasoning and 
the more recent use of Kant’s deontological ethic as a means of deriving rationally 
determined moral rules and securing a moral basis for education and political and social 
theory.
603
 This, Carr suggests, offers a ‘more viable basis’ on which a liberal democracy 




3.5 ‘Informed Choice’: The Dominant Metanarrative in SRE 
 
A Kantian ethic rejects the maximizing welfare and happiness maxim of public morality 
as the end of moral reasoning, and adopts instead an approach that upholds the moral 
will of the individual. As Sandel points out: ‘To act freely, according to Kant, is to act 
autonomously. And to act autonomously is to act according to a law I give myself – not 
according to the dictates of nature or social convention’.605 A rejection of a utilitarian 
ethic is, therefore, a rejection of the necessity of society to affirm one view of happiness 
over another.
606
 Accordingly, as Haydon points out, the ‘ethos of Informed Choice’ 
within Personal and Social Education suggests that ‘there is a conscious attempt not to 
“impose” values on the young’.607 Our freedom as rational agents accounts for our 
ability to uncover knowledge for ourselves without an appeal to a transcendent 
reality.
608
 For while justice and individual rights are regarded as moral goods to liberals 
such as Locke and Mill, for a true understanding of Kant’s deontological ethic, the 
principle of justice is judged not simply as a moral good that contributes to social 
utility, but as a moral category that precedes any conception of the good. As such, 
Sandel points out how, in its moral and foundational sense, deontology, as a ‘first-order 
ethic’ can be distinguished from, and opposes, both consequentialism and teleology.609 
Therefore, where right is prior to the good, the subject capable of autonomous will is the 
basis of the moral law and the supreme principle of morality.
610
 This is what 
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The weighty influence of Kant’s deontological ethic can still be felt in modern discourse 
around moral education. Indeed, Johannes Giesenger points out how the core ideas of 
Kant’s moral philosophy612 are present in his pedagogy, where the role of the educator 
is to bring forth the rational presuppositions of freedom and the moral law which are 
already present in the child.
613
 Commenting on Kant’s core text on education, Lectures 
on Pedagogy, and drawing from insights in his other works, Robert Louden echoes this 
understanding of Kant’s philosophy of education: ‘Kant understands both education and 
history as a development process involving the gradual realization of inherent human 
powers and capacities; the growth of freedom through rational control of instinct and 
desire’.614 The end goal of a Kantian education, he points out, is human perfection, 
where the moral actors behave consistently according to universalizable maxims.
615
 
Therefore, in line with a Kantian ethic, rational autonomy is developed within the 
principled framework of respect and tolerance for others.
616
 However, where the moral 
objectivity of Kant’s imperatives may prove problematic within a pluralist polity,617 
Carr points to the theories which promote self-legislation, such as the cognitive 
development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg as more appealing to liberal educationalists: 




The growth in the developmental and educational psychologist approach to moral 
education was invigorated by a significant number of American psychologists in the 
second half of the twentieth century.
619
 Within educational philosophical discourse in 
the UK, Richard S. Peters and Paul Hirst led the way in advocating a philosophical 
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approach focused on the analysis of concepts, exposing their underlying 
presuppositions, including ‘questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions 
and activities’.620 They acknowledged that these presuppositions were contingent in 
nature,
621
 and that justification of concepts remained unanswered without engaging in 
social and moral philosophy.
622
 Moral education became concerned with the process of 
constructing moral values rather than imparting a prescribed set of moral truths. Indeed, 
as Robert Fisher suggests, by creating a ‘community of philosophical enquiry’ in the 
classroom, values are open for creation and adaption.
623
 Outworked in the practice of 
moral education, Larry Nucci suggests that all developmental approaches ‘share a 
common view that moral growth comes about through the child’s progressive 
construction of ways of understanding the world, and not just an accommodation to the 
positions and practices of adults and society’.624 When it comes to sex and education, 
therefore, it is argued that the approach must be firstly ‘one of communication, and not 
of indoctrination’.625 
 
In acknowledging this bias towards enlightenment rationalism, the influence of the 
cognitive development theories of moral education expounded by leading proponents, 
such as Kohlberg, have been significant over recent decades.
626
 His insights, rooted in 
the theories earlier developed by Jean Piaget,
627
 attempt to explore a theory of moral 
development that he believes moves beyond the polar positions of indoctrination and 
relativity and can be justified ‘philosophically and psychologically’.628 He quantifies 
and articulates different stages of cognitive thinking in moral decision-making. In 
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critiquing the “bag of virtues”629 approach, in which individuals are presented with a 
prescribed list of positive values to which they are expected to conform, he appeals to a 
‘psychological theory of development with a rational ethical philosophy of 
development’,630 according to which the individual reasons over and makes their own 
moral decisions. Kohlberg’s six developmental stages of moral reasoning culminate in 
the individual validating a socially agreed set of universal ethical principles, moving 




While acknowledging the breadth of his thinking and influence, Carr suggests 
Kohlberg’s account of moral development is yet ‘largely a mosaic of post-
enlightenment ideas about moral reason’.632 As such, moral maturity is achieved by 
consistently holding to a rationally derived and self-legislated set of moral principles.
633
 
As Hunter points out, this ‘psychological regime’, of which Kohlberg was a part, was a 
move away from a prescriptive morality to one that focussed on the competency of an 
individual to make autonomous moral choices.
634
 However, Peters points to Kohlberg’s 
own ‘bag of virtues’, principles which he identifies as constituting basic content of 
morality, including justice, human welfare, respect for persons and society.
635
 In 
addition, he points to the fact that, while Kohlberg’s general theory appeals to principles 





Therefore, in light of this metanarrative, and in re-iterating the position presented by 
Archard, which underlies my central critique, a liberal education is one in which the 
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young person is educated to make free, autonomous choices; this, Archard points out, 
has three implications for sex education:  
First it means that young persons should be supplied with enough information to make 
informed, considered choices. Second it means that young persons should be taught to 
make their own choices. Third it means that choice should be accorded a central role in 




Only by educating according to these prerequisites, he argues, will we hold true to the 
ideals of a liberal education. However, as we have already identified, this is to presume 
that individual rights and autonomy is coherently understood within the liberalist 
tradition. As William Nelson points out, ‘some believe in natural rights, some are 
contractualists, and some consequentialists’.638 Nevertheless, when it comes to 
assessing the moral quality of choices that emerge from this process of autonomous 
reasoning, or, indeed, the moral truth on which such choices are founded, Archard 
suggests that such conclusions are determined by the young person themselves, with the 
pre-condition that they have the capacity to make the choice in the first place. This 
measure of capacity, however, appears to be an evolving precondition: ‘There is no 
bright line here. The line may shift across time and education itself can play a role in 
shifting the line’.639  
 
Thus, in critiquing the metanarrative of ‘informed choice’, I shall return to the crux of 
my critique and argue why this understanding of moral reasoning and underlying moral 
ontology is fundamentally flawed. In re-engaging with my two central points of 
critique, it firstly assumes the possibility that moral identify formation can take place 
aloof from any concept of the good, invariably shaped by particular cultural norms and 
values, and, secondly, that objective moral principles can be derived from the process of 
moral reasoning. 
 
3.5.1 Critique 1: The Falsity of a Self-Legislated Choice 
 
In recognising the ideal of moral autonomy as the end towards which moral education is 
directed, it should at least be noted that self-legislated choices must yet be balanced 
with community consensus and a vision of well-being. MacIntyre argues that in modern 
society, in the absence of an ‘educated public’, these two purposes are incompatible.640 
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However, Carr highlights Rawls’ Theory of Justice as an attempt to bring a somewhat 
contractualist
641
 reinterpretation to Kant’s universal principles,642 where a student sets 
aside their own concept of the good for the identified principles of justice and socially 
recognised primary goods – ‘liberties, opportunities, income and wealth’.643 Rawls 
presents the possibility of adopting an ‘original position’ of equality and fairness from 
which to derive just policy.
644
 Sandel notes this to be the ‘liberal egalitarian view’.645  
 
It is at least clear that challenging or affirming specific behaviours, or affirming societal 
norms and values, means a liberal educator is already moving a young person beyond 
the pursuit of their own self-determined well-being to have regard for the well-being of 
others. This is evidenced in the approach adopted within health education, with regards 
to sexual health outcomes. Fisher suggests that the moral development achieved through 
the community of enquiry in the classroom should develop values which are both 
personal and public i.e. related to the interests of the individual and related to the 
interests of others.
646
 As such, if a self-directed life is the ideal to be achieved, it could 
be argued that children must, at the very least, be brought up to understand that 
achieving this involves creating the conditions in which others can do the same: ‘Can a 
concern for one’s well-being be conceived in total abstraction from a concern with the 
well-being of other people?’647 At the very least, as Haydon suggests, moral decisions 
concerning sexual relationships cannot be viewed simply as a matter of self-regard, but 
must take into consideration the preferences and wishes of others through a process of 
‘informed consent’.648 This, as I noted earlier, has been carried through into policy 
discourse around young people’s sexual health. 
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Therefore, developing a young person’s identity, both in terms of their independence of 
thought and moral reasoning and decision-making skills, may be rightly defended as a 
worthwhile and necessary endeavour of education. However, moral education that 
focusses exclusively on individual judgment and rational enquiry is found wanting. As 
noted earlier, from a communitarian position, what results is the promotion of 
individual liberties at the expense of a commitment and identification with the goods of 
society and the community as a whole.
649
 Equally, the ‘asocial individualism’ of 
liberalism is critiqued for failing to take account of the community’s role in shaping 
people’s understanding of themselves and their values.650 As such, Sandel notes a 
fundamental problem with the ‘deontological self’:  ‘Where the self is unencumbered 
and essentially dispossessed, no person is left for self-reflection to reflect upon’.651 
 
In light of this communitarian critique, Nucci suggests that an understanding of moral 
development in education is moving towards an understanding of the context-specific 
nature of moral judgements.
652
 Callan and White point to the political and educational 
theory of John Dewey as evidence of a model of moral education that nurtures a 
communitarian commitment.
653
 Dewey identified the moral role of the school as one of 
service to the wider society: ‘The educational system which does not recognize that this 
fact entails upon it an ethical responsibility is derelict and defaulter’.654 It was the role 
and ethical responsibility of the school, he argued, to encourage and train the whole 
child for active participation in their network of social relationships, both within the 
school community and outside.
655
 Indeed, he went as far as to suggest that ‘apart from 
participation in social life, the school has no moral end nor aim’.656  
 
In developing the individual within community, Dewey’s assertion, according to Sidney 
Hook, was that education was the primary means by which an individual’s abilities 
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were ‘discovered and liberated’.657 In comparing and contrasting the influence of John 
Dewey and Émile Durkheim, considered two ‘philosophical giants’ of moral education, 
Jeffrey Dill notes that ‘both had a distinctively moral vision for the role of education in 
modern society that held great promise for the future; it was a rational, secular morality 
that would bind pluralistic society together for a common end’.658 For Durkheim, this 
involved the individual being shaped to conform to the state’s moral ideal; for Dewey, 
moral development started with the moral self. However, in service of wider society, 
Callan and White equally express concern that Dewey’s theory of education does not 
give adequate attention to the challenges of pluralism, which gave rise to the ideal of 
individual liberty in the first place.
659
 In recognising the plurality of community 
interests, they suggest that moral education is presented with the challenge of preserving 
those liberal ideals which are shared by the political community at large, e.g. freedom of 
speech, while at the same time embodying those ideals within a shared vision of the 




However, in the absence of any objective criteria by which to reason over different 
moral choices, the state educator has no justification for recommending one choice over 
another, apart from that which is conceived by the state. This ‘epistemological or 
pragmatic progressivism’ is reflected, Carr notes, in the philosophy of Dewey.661 While 
Dewey may recognise the socializing function of the school, the moral knowledge 
which is imparted is socially conceived and constructed to serve this end, raising serious 
questions about the abandonment of any understanding of the objectivity of moral 
truth.
662
 In Dewey’s defence, Hunter points out that this progressive era in moral 
education did not embrace a relativist approach to morality, but instead put its faith in 
the innate ability of the individual to reason morally and to act accordingly.
663
 In 
addition, it was not unconcerned with the training of character, but focussed on the 
development of autonomous characters with the ability to follow rationally prescribed 
rules.
664
 Yet in making a distinction between what she judges to be conservative 
moralism and liberal moralism, Amy Gutmann admits that nobody as yet has found a 
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way to teach the moral principle of autonomy: ‘Most conservative moralists set their 
moral sights too low, inviting blind obedience to authority; most liberal moralists set 
them too high, inviting disillusionment with morality’.665  
 
Echoing MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, what we are witnessing, suggests Taylor, is 
a ‘new understanding of freedom and moral agency’.666 Commenting on the effect this 
understanding has on the agent’s ethical outlook, he notes, ‘neutrality is the property he 
ought to perceive in the world, if he is to realize his potentiality as the free agent of 
dignity and rational control’.667 However, there is a flawed meta-ethical position. In 
light of this, Anselm Winfried Müller points out, ‘you cannot give children reasons, or 
encourage them to find out for themselves, before you have provided them with starting 
points of understanding and of searching’.668 For if the end goal of education is 
rationally determined moral decisions through the promotion of personal autonomy, 
why should students accept this ‘illicit steering’ or be required to conform to the views 
of their educators? In justifying an approach to morality that is determined by the 
autonomous will, is there room for its complete rejection in view of another principled 
way of living?
669 
If the liberal educator suggests that there is, this would evidence, 




Ultimately, as Carr observes, the difficulty arises when morality becomes a human 
endeavour seeking human consensus, for ‘who determines what counts as moral?’671 
Perhaps the relative, cognitive, structuralist approach to moral education, exemplified 
by Kohlberg, is the ‘best we can hope for’?672 Or, as Richard Rorty argues, perhaps 
‘unconditionalty and absolutes’ should no longer be the end goal of moral inquiry: 
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all inquiry – in ethics as well as physics, in politics as well as logic – is a matter of 
reweaving our webs of beliefs and desires in such a way as to give ourselves more 




Perhaps, as Thomson suggests, we should simply approach young people’s sexual 
decision-making with optimism and trust.
674
 If such a conclusion is drawn within 
education, Carr warns, ‘we should at least be clear that modern liberal notions of 
individual entitlement and democratic consensus provide far from sure grounds for 
moral knowledge and truth’.675 As a result of this ‘epistemological agnosticism’676 in 
moral education, the ‘informed choice’ approach to SRE gravitates towards a perceived 
relativist and subjectivist approach to moral truth with regards to sexual behaviour and 
relationships. As with the consequentialist approach to health promotion and health 
education, it provides a far from secure foundation on which to build a public sexual 
ethic. In view of this, it is hard to articulate, beyond the provision of information to 
meet sexual health targets, a coherent and adequate vision for ‘teaching’ the subject in 
the first place.  
 
3.5.2 Critique 2: Inadequate Foundation for Moral Truth 
 
In adopting a theory of moral education where decisions over the values by which 
young people should live are reduced to individual choice, Carr notes that the 
philosophical exploration of values themselves, axiology, is effectively disregarded.
677
 
In abandoning the process of axiology, a liberal approach to moral enquiry leaves 
important questions concerning moral knowledge and moral truth unresolved. This 
epistemological danger can equally exist for those seeking to develop a communitarian 
approach to moral education, as demonstrated in Dewey’s approach.678 As Sandel notes, 
even with a Rawlsian concept of the good, the lack of independent sanction against 
which to assess one’s wants and desires creates epistemological and moral 
difficulties.
679
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Ultimately, the emphasis within educational philosophy on the process of moral enquiry 
in deriving moral knowledge leaves unresolved foundational questions on the objective 
nature of moral truth. For example, Wilson argued that, in developing a new approach 
to moral education, we are no longer searching for a new basis on which to derive moral 
principles,  but instead identifying those principles ‘by which one judges between 
various moral codes and authorities’.680 When it comes to deciding on a moral code, he 
suggests ‘we must be prepared to start from scratch’,681 for the authoritative foundations 
for moral education lie not in any prescribed belief or ideology, but in the value of 
education itself: ‘Education has its own values, chiefly concerned with the pursuit of 
learning, truth and reason, and must not be contaminated by beliefs and values external 
to itself’.682 Moral education is, accordingly, something you do rather than something 
that involves delivering a prescribed set of right answers. The liberal approach is 
therefore ‘not ideological but logical or philosophical’.683  
 
This instigated a move within moral education away from the perceived ‘authoritarian 
morality’ of religion, arguing against any logical connection between the two.684 
Similarly, providing rational justification for one’s actions is, for Peters, a fundamental 
principle of a liberal education, where respect for truth ‘depends on reasons and not on 
the word or will or any man, body, or book’.685 The challenge, as Haydon points out, is 
making what he regards as an unimposed morality intelligible to the learner.
686
 Müller 
warns, however, against an unqualified tolerance within moral education, suggesting 
that both parents and teachers will ‘not find any lasting comfort in a subjectivist 
reinterpretation of the language of morals’.687 In addition, Carr and Steutel warn that the 
‘the allegedly “impartial” goal of values clarification… appears to enshrine a deeply 
relativistic moral epistemology’.688 
 
However, educating for rational autonomy should not infer the abandonment of all 
moral authority, including, as Callan and White point out, those values which have 
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previously shaped and directed the young person, in particular those passed on by 
parents and community. Instead a liberal educator embraces a re-examination of them in 
light of the young person’s own goals and aspirations.689 In addition, educating for 
rational autonomy does not amount to mere indifference with regards to moral 
knowledge and outcomes. For example, Wilson states: ‘It is hardly in dispute that 
education, at least to some degree, should be concerned with getting children to 
understand and act on “good reasons” as these apply in various spheres and departments 
of knowledge and life’.690 In addition, Wilson, along with Norman Williams and Barry 
Sugarman, identify various features of morality relevant to moral education and 
components, by which to assess a ‘morally educated person’.691 At least part of moral 
education, Wilson affirms, will involve ‘educating young people to realize the force of 
Kant’s injunction to treat people always as ends and note as means’.692 Nevertheless, 
Wilson’s philosophy, suggests Elias, concludes that ‘the morally educated person 
accepts the reasons of moral authority not because an authority has so stated but because 
the person recognizes that such acceptance is reasonable’.693 
 
In addition, regarding the outcomes derived from autonomous reasoning and the moral 
quality of the consequential judgments, Harris recognises that the acquired knowledge 
and understanding should be to some degree ‘worthwhile’; however, he fails to 
extrapolate on what, or whose, standards it should be judged so.
694
 Reflected in his 
expressed moral position on sex education,
695
 he contends instead that there are no 
prescriptive ‘facts’ regarding the subject of morality.696 It is the role of the moral 
educator, he asserts, to help pupils ‘think morally’.697 Yet Haydon suggests that it is not 
unreasonable to advocate an approach to personal and social education which supports 





Peters defends a rational account of morality by distinguishing between form and 
content in moral education. He points to fundamental principles of morality which 
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provide the ‘form of our moral consciousness’ but do not guarantee or dictate a uniform 
content.
699
 He notes that they provide ‘general criteria of relevance for determining 
moral issues’ rather than offering any definitive set of moral rules,700 pointing as such to 
their ‘logical necessity’ and ‘practical necessity’ over their ‘moral superiority’.701 
Nevertheless, Hirst recognised that these ‘rational’ foundational principles of ‘fairness, 
truth-telling, freedom, consideration of interests, and respect for persons’702 receive 
universal recognition, independent of any culture or religious belief;
703
 they are the 
principles that people consistently return to when justifying their actions.
704
 Similarly, 
in developing a conceptual framework for moral education, Wilson suggests that we 
already know the ‘‘rules of the game’, we just don’t adhere to them’.705 In the spirit of 
liberal tolerance, Hirst’s ‘foundation planks’ become the categorical imperatives706 by 
which societal cohesion is maintained. As he suggests himself: ‘Surely it is irrational for 
me to approve of my acting in a way that I do not also approve for anyone else in this or 
a similar situation’.707 In a similar vein, Harris defends his sexual ethic by giving the 
example of a married man contemplating an affair with his secretary. In his moral 
reasoning, Harris suggests, he should only proceed if he accepts that it would be 
morally justifiable for anyone in his situation to do the same.
708
 However, it remains 
unclear who or what mediates between a sexual behaviour that one person may seek to 
justify, yet another finds morally abhorrent. Additionally, Hirst concedes that the 




While Carr points to elements of social training and natural sentiment that may lead us 
to behave in a ‘moral’ way, for example, respecting the property of others, he argues it 
is the role of moral education to bring ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ to our way of living, to 
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demonstrate what is ‘conducive to individual and social flourishing’.710 What results 
from this liberal metanarrative, argues MacIntyre, is an emotivist culture, which lacks 
the criteria to determine whether moral judgments are true of false.
711
 For example, a 
worthwhile moral aim of SRE might be the promotion of responsible sexual behaviour 
but, as Reiss points out, defining what constitutes ‘responsible sexual behaviour’ within 
sex education material is invariably problematic.
712
 This is at least defined within sexual 
health promotion by an understanding of ‘safer’ sex. However, while promoting a 
particular religious viewpoint may leave a school susceptible to criticism over 
inappropriate indoctrination, health education delivered within an agnostic framework 
may be equally prone to such a critique. Indeed, Reiss suggests that such content may 
even be criticised for its ‘religionist’ tendencies.713  
 
Therefore, where the moral impetus within SRE policy is on helping the young person 
to think morally and clarify their own values and attitudes, it is essential to question, 
and offer a moral defence, for the basis on which to do so. For, while encouraging 
young people to think through and understand their choices is an essential educational 
endeavour, deriving moral standards on sexual behaviour from the exercise of their 
autonomous will alone not only denies an objective moral order beyond the conclusions 
of individual reason, but denies the contextual framing that inevitably informs our 
choice. Where advocates of a liberal approach to SRE acknowledge the decision making 
capacity of young people and the importance of moral enquiry, they falsely assume that 
‘accessing good information is key to making these decisions’.714  
 
3.6 Conclusion: Incoherent and Inadequate Public Vision of Moral 
Education 
 
An inevitable outcome of the liberal metanarrative of SRE discourse emerges; while 
seeking to promote the moral autonomy of the young person, a moral judgement on 
what constitutes ‘good information’ is made, informed by value judgements that are 
beyond the dictates of a young person’s autonomous will.715 For even those who 
advocate a ‘values clarification’ approach in the classroom, when it comes to its 
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outworking, it is suggested that choices are restricted in view of those activities that 
might result in ‘serious danger’, where it is judged ‘the consequences of an unwise 
choice are not tolerable or that the alternatives can probably not be well enough 
understood to make a choice meaningful’.716 In light of such reasoning, we are led to 
question what choices, if any, are currently restricted within SRE, in view of the fact 
that the consequences are judged to be intolerable or the choice cannot be regarded as 
meaningful. The moral parameters of such a restriction are clearly not set by the young 
person.  
 
In effect, within a ‘values clarification’ approach to moral education what is being 
judged and affirmed is not the decision-making capacity of the young person or the 
process of rational inquiry, but the source, validity and ‘good’ of the value-laden 
information received. As Hauerwas states, and as I shall defend in Chapter 5, ‘we do not 
create moral values, principles, virtues; rather they constitute a life for us to appropriate. 
The very idea that we choose what is valuable undermines our confidence in its 
worth’.717 At the very least, within the current liberal metanarrative, Halstead and Reiss 
point to fundamental liberal values, which would be thwarted if neutrality was extended 
to all behaviours, for example, the outworking of the values of human rights, equality 
and respect for persons would be undermined by the tolerance of rape, child abuse or 
other forms of exploitation.
718
 As a result, there are inevitably sexual behaviours to 





In addition, in exploring the possible content of SRE programmes, and the values that 
shape that content, Ingham and Stone stress the ‘crucial importance of the values of 
mutuality and respect’, while at the same time judging information that advocates sex 
within the moral context of marriage ‘simply irrelevant and hopelessly idealistic’.720 
Such a view is clearly not a moral conclusion arrived at through the rational, 
autonomous engagement of the young person, nor can one approach be accused of being 
more ‘moralistically based’ than the other.721 Nevertheless, educators who present 
young people with an explicit moral reason for choosing one sexual and relational 
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lifestyle over another, are dismissed for wrongly judging young people to be irrational 




Consequentially, Carole Ulanowsky notes that a ‘clarification/information’ model of sex 
education does little to help young people deal with the challenges presented by a sex-
saturated society:   
For the mature educator who develops and delivers sex education, this may be sufficient 
base on which to build her life, but it can leave young people morally adrift, to be blown 





She points out that many young people experience sexual intercourse, earlier than 
perhaps desired, as ‘they feel it is expected of them or because insufficient reasons have 
been provided as to why they shouldn’t’.724 Where a liberal moral framework will 
respond according to the principles of consent and the absence of harm, Halstead and 
Reiss question whether it provides a sufficient moral basis for evaluating the 
appropriateness of sexual behaviour.
725
 Instead they echo, as our own discussion has 
done, that the evidence points to the fact that young people’s greatest need is not more 
autonomy, but support and guidance as they develop their sexual values and attitudes.
726
 
It is questionable, therefore, to assume that the moral framework of SRE is strengthened 
when the exploration of attitudes and values becomes ‘primarily a listening exercise’.727 
Paul Vitz concludes: ‘Very simply put, the contradictions and incoherence of values 
clarification demonstrate that it is a simpleminded, intellectually incompetent 
system’.728  
 
In addition, it would appear that the current moral narrative leaves teachers morally 
adrift. In reflecting on the existing Government guidance, Reiss points out that many 
teachers feel ill-equipped to handle debates around sensitive issues such as abortion, 
homosexuality and masturbation, and call for more detailed instruction on how and 
what to teach.
729
 Thus, a fundamental problem with the ‘informed choice’ framework 
for SRE is that sex educators are not only making moral judgments on what they 
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purport to be ‘good’ information, in the absence of philosophical discourse on the 
possible moral approaches to SRE, they inevitably equate ‘good information’ with 
‘good’ decisions directed towards ‘good’ ends. However, Harris concludes that when it 
comes to the outcomes of moral education, ‘there are no simple, uncontroversial rules 
about what sort of results are ‘good’’.730 All things being equal, he suggests, happiness 
may be regarded as a ‘prime moral target’, but not in all circumstances. Apart from 
securing the goal of liberal education, that of producing independent, autonomous 
young people, and in the absence of a moral vision concerning the ‘ends’ of different 
choices, the educator can be forgiven for claiming moral indifference. As one school 
nurse reported: ‘I don’t consider I’ve failed if a girl gets pregnant as long as she’s got 
pregnant because she knew where advice was and chose not to access it’.731 However, 
with what has been suggested to be the ‘growing pathologisation of teenage 
motherhood’,732 the state has not and, arguably, cannot remain morally indifferent.  
 
As such, we shall suggest that what emerges from the incoherence of an ‘informed 
choice’ approach to education is a social context in which, as Zygmunt Bauman 
observes, ‘the entitlements of sexual partners have become the prime site of anxiety’.733 
Questions over the meaning and nature of sexual encounters give rise to such anxiety: 
‘What sort of commitment, if any, does the union of bodies entail?’734 In addition, are 
there certain fundamental cultural values which are assumed and therefore not 
technically alternatives to be chosen or discarded? Should all alternative choices or 
value-approaches be judged of equal value and worth, both for the individual and 
society? Or is it simply inevitably the case that ‘most of our sex codes must now 
compete in the open market-place of ideas’?735  
 
It is at least for the moment acknowledged that when it comes to SRE policy and 
practice, the promotion of enabling values does not disqualify the use of prescriptive 
values within individual school settings.
736
 However, where a perceived epistemological 
agnosticism is noted, what is emerging, in effect, within the moral discourse of SRE, is 
an implicit and explicit vision of health and well-being that, we will argue, provides a 
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less than human approach to moral education and human flourishing. For, with regards 
to the process of moral education, Carr points out that we are in danger of losing sight 
of the wider moral effect of education itself; where education ‘actually concerns 
personal formation’, he points out, ‘it is hard to see how it can avoid the transmission of 
values, or of substantial views of the good life, that go beyond mere cultivation of 
attitudes or disinterested tolerance and respect for others’.737 This echoes the embodied, 
interactive understanding of the learner who, according to Smith, is being formed and 
shaped by the surrounding cultural liturgies. It is, therefore, to the public moral 
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Chapter 4  
Glimpsing the ‘Moral Zeitgeist’: The Morality of Sex 
 
4.1 Introduction: Exploring the Moral Narrative 
 
Government policy on SRE, as witnessed in the brief historical account of its 
emergence as a public policy concern in Chapter 2, and evidenced in the moral 
judgements in policy discourse in Chapter 3, is extremely sensitive to changes in the 
socio-political climate, influenced profoundly by pervading public moral commitments. 
A central tenet of this thesis, therefore, is that the moral decision-making of the 
individual or, indeed, that of government policy-makers, does not happen in a moral 
vacuum, but is shaped by an existing moral narrative which determines a concept of the 
good and human flourishing. Culture and context matter for, as Sandel points out, the 
‘sociological objection’ to liberalism is that a position of neutrality is impossible to 
achieve because, ‘try as we might we can never wholly escape the effects of our 
conditioning’.738  
 
As noted earlier, moral education, in particular, is a reflection and appropriation of the 
existing cultural narrative. As such, in this Chapter I will explore the current moral 
narrative that is shaping a cultural understanding of sex and relationships in SRE policy 
discourse and providing answers to fundamental philosophical and ethical questions. 
Gutmann observes that, even within a liberal-democratic system of education, 
‘agnosticism about the significance of sex is no more neutral than agnosticism about the 
existence of God’.739 Therefore, if, as it is suggested, teaching sexual literacy within 
education is just as important as teaching literacy in reading and writing,
740
 it is 
imperative that we understand the moral narrative that gives shape, meaning and content 
to the script.  
 
In this Chapter, I shall critique, in particular, the moral proposition that there is nothing 
inherently moral about sex; instead, it is argued that the moral value of a sexual act is 
determined by the value that the individual moral agent places on it, framed within a 
libertarian political philosophy.  This results in the moral conclusion, espoused by 
Archard, that ‘anything sexually goes so long as it is in private, between consenting 
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adults, and harms no-one else’.741 In effect, sexual morality becomes a matter of social 
construction and consensus. Where sexual activity and desires are ‘imbued with erotic 
meanings’ by the surrounding culture, this is differentiated within sex education 
discourse from ‘biological essentialism’ or the biological function of reproduction.742 
Thus, where liberal values dominate our thinking, not only about sex, but about 
education, Halstead and Reiss conclude that this will inevitably have an impact on the 




There are those, however, who object to the social framing that inevitably gives shape to 
the existing ‘cultural liturgies’, and the implications for sex education. For example, a 
‘post-structuralist feminist perspective’ on sex education seeks to critique the political 
nature of language and its development as a product of the value systems and meanings 
at work within any particular social context.
744
 Sex education, according to proponents 
such as Louisa Allen, should be re-imagined by placing the needs and desires of young 
people at the centre of programme effectiveness, rather than any constructed agenda or 
adult-determined measure of programme effectiveness.
745
 This echoes criticism directed 
against a school health education programme that views young people as in some way 
‘deficient’.746 While Allen does not dismiss the significant challenge in maintaining 
such a demanding practice, she views the promotion of the sexual agency of the young 
person as an issue of ‘social/sexual justice’.747  
 
Despite this emerging discourse, an automatic correlation within education policy and 
practice between the expressed concerns and needs of young people and the emerging 
policy and programme content is inherently problematic. As noted earlier, parents retain 
authority as primary educators; in addition, there are inevitably attitudes and values that 
a public education system will desire for its young people to appropriate. Sexual 
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behaviour, as with any other behaviour considered within public discourse, is inevitably 
accompanied and shaped by ethical principles. As evidenced in Chapter 3, what we are 
witnessing is a public vision of the ‘good’ which is shaped and directed by the principle 
of autonomy. However, framing the philosophical ideals at work within health and 
moral education is a liberal moral commitment towards sex and relationships that will 
shape a public sexual ethic, and corresponding attitudes and values. An understanding 
of this is necessary if we are to more fully understand, and critically reflect on, the 
adequacy of the vision of human flourishing that currently informs the moral framework 
of SRE policy. 
 
4.2 The Philosophy of Sex and Love 
 
In exploring the ‘Moral Zeitgeist’ of contemporary philosophical discussions on sex, we 
will acknowledge, in particular, as we have done throughout, an emerging philosophical 
genre specifically concerned with the ‘concepts, propositions, and arguments’ affiliated 
to sex and love.
748
 In identifying the insights of key proponents of this genre, we will do 
so alongside a theological understanding of sexual identity and behaviour. The purpose 
will be to evidence how the moral positions adopted, and conclusions being drawn 
within contemporary philosophical discourse on the subject, are shaping the cultural 
metanarrative, and inevitably being carried through into SRE discourse.   
 
Alan Soble, the founder of ‘The Society for the Philosophy of Sex’ and the editor of the 
formidable two-volume Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia has 
played a significant role in this renewed philosophical discourse, prompting 
fundamental questions to be asked about the meaning and purpose of sex. While a 
comprehensive critique of Soble’s work and, indeed, the wider genre is beyond the 
remit of this thesis, in noting a number of the contributions to this philosophical 
enterprise, I will seek to sketch an understanding of the nature of sex and the moral 
principles that are emerging. In particular, I will explore the foundations of the moral 
epistemology therein and the implications for a public sexual ethic. It should be noted 
that Archard, whose philosophical position stands at the heart of our critique,
749
 sat on 
the Advisory Board for the Philosophical Encyclopaedia, and in his own philosophical 
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discussion on sex education, he references the work of Alan Soble and Igor Primoratz 




Soble offers a detailed analysis of the conceptual notions of sex, including sexual desire, 
sexual activity, and sexual pleasure. This is done in order to answer what, for him, are 
the first elementary questions of analytical philosophy: what these concepts are.
751
 He 
identifies two further conceptual questions: ‘What are the logical links among all these 
central notions?’ and ‘Must this be so?’752 Such an understanding, he suggests, is 
particularly important to any discussion on sexual ethics and indeed, sex education for, 





Despite offering a detailed and useful, yet inconclusive and insufficient exposition of 
these concepts,
754
 what we will evidence in contributions to this philosophical 
endeavour are underlying presuppositions that set the moral tone for the philosophical 
discourse. This is evidenced by, in particular, the suggestion that contemporary culture 
is emerging out of the antisexual tradition of the past. Igor Primoratz, for example, 
points to the mid-sixties as the time when the philosophy of sex came ‘into its own’, 
partly explained, he suggests, by the many cultural and social factors contributing to the 
so-called sexual revolution. What was of marked significance in this era, he claims, was 
the fact that, where previously only the basic concepts of morals, politics, and law were 
analysed, increasingly the norms and values that shaped them were coming under 
critical scrutiny.
755
 The foundation, in 1977, of ‘The Society for the Philosophy of Sex 
and Love’,756 was a significant indicator of the growth in this philosophical genre. 
 
Primoratz offers a selected and critical overview of the philosophers who, in his view, 
have historically contributed towards our understanding of sex within the West, 
suggesting that surprisingly only in recent times have professional philosophers 
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engaged a ‘stronger and sustained’ interest in the subject of sex.757 This, he believes, is 
explained in part by the ‘strong metaphysical tradition’ of Western philosophy that 
tended to extol the function of the soul and treat the body, which included sexuality, as 
a necessary evil.
758
 In addition, where supreme value was placed on the life of 
rationality, freedom and inner peace, this could only be achieved by subduing the 
natural passions, including the sexual appetite.
759
 Soble identifies Western philosophy’s 
concept of sexuality, from the outset, as being equated with animal appetites, 
positioning it ‘on the disreputable side of the fence between mind and flesh’.760 This 
concept of sexuality was shaped by the worldview of asceticism which, emerging within 




It is beyond the remit of this thesis to adequately critique this worldview position, apart 
from re-iterating the problems Hollinger identifies with it in terms of its theological 
deficiencies.
762
 Nevertheless, it would yet appear to be a boldly distorted claim that the 
foundations and history of Western thought had nothing of value to say on the matter of 
sex or sexual morality, even if what was said is judged to have had a certain 
incoherence. For example, Michel Foucault, in his account of Greek sexual practices, 
notes the challenge in satisfactorily categorizing the many acts and practices that would 
in some way have been regarded as ‘sexual’. However, as he points out, this does not 
disregard or deter from the ethical considerations attached to these behaviours: ‘The 
manner in which this kind of pleasure was enjoyed was considered by them to be an 
ethical problem’. In addition, he suggests that the laws of the land were deemed 
insufficient to regulate sexual behaviour.
763
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In addition, Trevor Stammers, in his exploration of the earliest accounts of sexual 
virtue, points to the influence of platonic thinking in a philosophical exploration of 
sex.
764
 Plato, he notes, makes reference to eros in the Laws, the Republic, as well as 
certain other works, with a more extensive exploration in the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium.
765
 In particular, Stammers observes in Plato’s thinking the understanding 
that eros should to be directed towards a transcendent moral good.
766
 Dale Kuehne, in 
his evaluation of the understanding of sex within early Western civilization, referring to 
it as the ‘tWorld’ (traditional world), comes to a similar conclusion: ‘For Plato and the 
tWorld, sexuality was a drive and appetite that had a function and purpose, but if not 
harnessed and channeled appropriately, it would enslave us’.767 
 
In brief, therefore, it is important at the very least to acknowledge that the purpose of 
these earliest philosophical endeavours into the metaphysics of sex was to understand 
sexual activity in accordance with the form it took, in addition to the position it 
occupied within the wider purposes of human nature and activity. This invariably 
involved apportioning a moral significance to its content and context. As Foucault 
suggested: ‘For classical Greek thought, this force was potentially excessive by nature, 
and the moral question was how to confront this force, how to control it and regulate its 
economy in a suitable way’.768  
 
However, the Greeks, followed by the Romans, are not the only philosophers to feature 
within Primoratz’s ‘antisexual tradition’.769 Pointing to the influence of the early 
Christian philosophers, in particular Augustine and Aquinas, he notes that their 
contribution only added to this tradition the religious command, “Be fruitful and 
multiply!”770 As a result, he notes, they ‘developed theories of sexuality which confined 
sex to heterosexual genital intercourse within monogamous marriage’.771 Indeed, the 
moral philosophies of the Enlightenment, those proposed, for example, by Hume and 
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Kant, fared no better in progressing a more positive view of sex, continuing instead to 




While a detailed exploration of even one of these moral philosophers and their 
conclusions on sex is beyond the remit of this thesis, the purpose of this brief discursive 
account is to highlight what would appear to be a flawed philosophical endeavour of 
conceptual analysis, one that simply dismisses centuries of rich philosophical thought, 
on account of it being ‘antisexual’. Such a charge arguably exposes the imposition of a 
subjective and pre-determined moral understanding of sex on to the philosophical task. 
In view of this, it is important to note for my own discussion, that the critique of the so-
called ‘anti-sexual tradition’ has carried through into philosophical discussions on sex 
education. For example, Harris, in exploring the meaning of sex education, argues that 
‘it is high time we adopted a wholly positive approach to sex education, instead of 
grudgingly throwing a few titbits of information in an atmosphere of moral gloom’.773 A 
positive approach to sex education infers a less restrictive or prescriptive attitude 
towards sexual morality, which seemingly is judged to be a hangover from the falsity of 
previously conceived ideas: ‘At present, the situation of sex education is rather like that 
of astronomy in the time of Galileo: hedged around with taboos and superstitions, and 
conducted by a process of tight-lipped indoctrination’.774 Additionally, when it comes to 
teaching about sex, Tatchell asserts: ‘Sex is portrayed overwhelmingly in a negative 
light, with far too much emphasis on the dangers rather than the pleasures – creating 
needless fears and anxieties’.775 
 
However, it is unclear how adopting a ‘wholly positive approach’ to sex equates with 
adopting a definitively moral one. When it comes to sex education, Tatchell seeks to 
differentiate between a moral framework and a moralistic one, where seemingly 
inclusive, rather than exclusive, judgments are made on sexual behaviours and 
lifestyles.
776
 Nevertheless, within public moral discourse a moral judgement is still 
made, and behaviours will inevitably still fall on the right or wrong side of a morally 
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respectable scale. For Tatchell, immoral behaviour includes ‘coercive and unsafe sex, 
domineering and violent relationships’.777 However, ‘disordered relationships’ are 
equally judged to be those that are just ‘plain dull’, placing particular moral weight on a 




Despite the ‘anti-sex’ rhetoric pitched against Western philosophical tradition, and 
evidenced in SRE discourse, what we can ascertain from the overwhelming view of 
philosophers throughout the ages, concludes Stammers, is that sexual goodness does 
exist.
779
 This is mostly derived, he suggests, from an awareness of the transcendent 
meaning of sex, a specific understanding of its function, or the longstanding recognition 
of the union which frames and results from the sexual act.
780
 However, a further 
exploration of key aspects of the emerging philosophy of sex and love reveal that a 
previously held moral knowledge, which accorded value and meaning to sexual 
behaviour within an identified relational matrix, is being largely replaced by a newly 
scripted liberal narrative.  
 
4.2.1 A Conceptual Account of Sex 
 
In adopting an analytical approach to his philosophical enquiry, Soble seeks to offer an 
account of what a sexual act is.
781
 Thus, he argues that contact with, or use of, a sexual 
body part may not be necessary for an act to be described as sexual, e.g. hands can be 
used in a sexual way and flirting could be categorised as a sexual act.
782
 In addition, acts 
that have the potential to be procreative or that serve as a precursor to coitus cannot 
sufficiently define a sexual act, for such a category excludes the practice of, for 
example, solitary masturbation.
783
  While he argues that pleasure may be used as a 
measure of the quality of the sexual act, Soble recognises that while some sexual acts 
generate no pleasure, this does not negate the sexual nature of the act.
784
 Primoratz 
responds to this by suggesting that if an action, however, does result in some experience 
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Nevertheless, where Soble concedes that his analysis is inclusive, Alan Goldman 
recognises the balance that needs to be struck between questions that are both 
conceptual and normative, and argues that what we need is a ‘“reflective equilibrium”’ 
between the two.
786
 This is achieved, he believes, by thinking about ‘plain sex’: 
‘Because sexual activity, like other natural functions such as eating or exercising, has 
become imbedded in layers of cultural, moral, and superstitious superstructures, it is 
hard  to conceive it in its simplest terms’.787 He is critical of what he describes as the 
“means-end analysis”, where, in his view, an unnecessary end goal is attributed to 
sexual activity.
788
 These include the end goals of reproduction, love, communication 
and interpersonal awareness. The simplest analysis of sex, according to Goldman, is that 
‘sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure 
which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfil such desire 
for the agent’.789  
 
Goldman suggests that such a definition enables us to bypass the process of analysing 
specific sexual activities in order to account for their sexual nature, recognising instead 
that the desire for contact with another person’s body is a sufficient ‘minimal criterion’ 
to qualify a normal desire as sexual.
790
 However, despite his dismissal of the “means-
end analysis”, it appears that his own analysis has itself attributed an external goal and 
purpose to sexual activity. For while he claims that the goal of sexual desire is simply to 
achieve the physical contact, without aiming for something that the physical contact 
might express,
791
 the external goal and purpose is expressly one of pleasure. 
 
For Primoratz, Goldman’s ‘“down-to-earth” approach to sex is truly refreshing’.792 
However, in his view, his ‘minimal criterion’ does not go far enough in giving a plain 
description of sex, as it maintains the interpersonal understanding of sexual activity, and 
thus excludes the practice of masturbation. In rejecting the idea that such an activity 
may be regarded as a substitute or deviation for contact with another person’s body, he 
therefore argues for the adoption of a ‘plainer’ view of sex: ‘Sexual activity can then be 
defined as activity that tends to fulfil sexual desire, while sexual desire is sufficiently 
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defined as the desire for certain bodily pleasure, period’.793 However, such a view is 
problematic for Soble, for if there is no desire for the sexual act, e.g. in the case of a 




Notwithstanding the evolving nature of this philosophical discourse and the thought-
proving questions it raises, not least for public moral discourse,
795
 what is problematic 
with such analysis, from a theo-ethical standpoint, is that it attempts to strip sexual 
behaviour of any inherent moral significance.  Indeed, Goldman concludes that his 
analysis of ‘plain sex’ achieves moral neutrality: ‘To the question of what morality 
might be implied by my analysis, the answer is that there are no moral implications 
whatever’.796 That is to say, there are, in his view, no moral requirements that are 
intrinsic to sex:  
We can speak of a sexual ethic as we can speak of a business ethic, without implying 
that business in itself is either moral or immoral or that special rules are required to 





It is possible, therefore, to strip sexual activity of any pervading and intrinsic moral 
significance: ‘Sex affords us a paradigm of pleasure, but not a cornerstone of value’.798 
In contrast, in expounding the purposes of sex within a Christian worldview, Hollinger 
presents a Biblical understanding of pleasure that is ‘expected and honoured in sex’.799 
In addition to Scriptural revelation, he notes that ‘through reason and human experience 
a person can know that pleasure in physical intimacy must be set in a context and have 
some limits’.800 Within the Judeo-Christian worldview, the context for the intimacy and 
pleasure of the ‘one-flesh’ union between a man and a woman has been traditionally 
understood as the consummation of marriage.
801
 However, pleasure, as configured 
within such ‘religious discourse’, is for Allen, a denial of the sexual agency of the 
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O’Donovan points to what he believes to be the consequences of such a conclusion, in 
that ‘the more we detach erotic relationship from its natural ends, the more the element 
of play predominates, and with it the exploration of ingenuity and device within the 
erotic realm’.803 As such, Roger Scruton warns: ‘A world without values is one in which 
all activity has an ending, but no activity has an end’.804 For example, for Jonathan 
Jacobs it is unclear in his judgment ‘why there should be just one  aim or purpose of 
sexual behaviour, or just one (small) set of conditions that defines perversity’.805 Indeed, 
it would appear that in arriving at a conclusion that subjective pleasure is the end of 
sexual behaviour, the inference is that all sexual acts, stripped of any objective meaning, 
are given equal value, for there is no criterion from which to argue otherwise.  
 
4.2.2 Deconstructing Norms and Values 
 
Emerging philosophies of sex have attempted to analyse sex on its own terms, free from 
cultural and moral ‘baggage’ which might somehow cloud judgement; nevertheless, the 
influence of culture is not overlooked. As Soble notes: ‘The effects of knowledge, social 
expectations, and norms on our sexual pleasure (or our retroactive judgements about 
what we experienced) implies that the culture is surely an important influence on our 
sexuality’.806  In affirming the framing of the cultural narrative, MacIntyre points out 
that it is impossible to separate concepts from action: ‘Every action is the bearer and 
expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing 
and every expression of belief is a political and moral action’.807 Therefore, I am 
concerned, in particular, with how a contemporary analysis of the concept of sex and the 
beliefs imbued within this, are outworked in political and moral action within SRE 
policy discourse. I will principally note a re-evaluation of the norms and values that 
have traditionally shaped societies understanding of sexual activity, specifically the 
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(a) Sex and Procreation 
 
Primoratz identifies the historic and ongoing link between sex and procreation in giving 
an account of the nature and value of sexuality.
809
 His own rejection of this normative 
link is informed, in particular, by what he regards as the ‘extremely restrictive sexual 
ethic’ of Augustine and Aquinas, which understood sex in terms of its procreative end 
within marriage.
810
 Primoratz suggests that Augustine’s own experience accounted for 
this ‘restrictive’ position, in attesting to the controlling power of sexual arousal over 
reason and will, recognising its potential to impact a person emotionally, physically and 
mentally.
811
 Hollinger notes that with Augustine we find a ‘very complex and nuanced 
theology of sex’.812 Nevertheless, while sexual abstinence was the preferred state813, and 
‘holy’ virginity esteemed as ‘the more perfect gift’,814 Augustine did not reject the 
purposes and good of marriage, but defended matrimony on the grounds that it not only 
allowed for the procreation of children, but also for the fellowship between partners.
815
 
Further, in defence of Aquinas’ view of marital intercourse, John Finnis, for example, 
suggests that it is commonly misunderstood when it is limited solely to the intention of 
procreation. Instead, he states that Aquinas’ moral position accords with what he 





In arguing, in particular, against a Catholic sexual ethic that draws a normative link 
between sex, marriage and procreation, Primoratz draws attention to what he regards as 
the internal inconsistencies. If the practice and intention of limiting sexual intercourse to 
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‘safe days’ is to avoid conception, for example, why then is contraceptive intercourse 
condemned?
817
 Soble echoes this criticism: ‘One might argue that if God designed 
heterosexual coitus for procreation, restricting coitus to those times of the month when 
fertilization is unlikely to occur is unnatural and immoral’.818 In defence of the logical 
consistency of Catholic practice, Anscombe argued in her papers ‘You can have Sex 
without Children’819 and ‘Contraception and Chastity’,820 that a distinction could be 
drawn between acts that are intrinsically generative and intrinsically nongenerative in 
their intention. However, beyond what might be judged as internal inconsistencies of 
practice, what appears to be particularly objectionable are the normative 
presuppositions, advocated by philosophers like Anscombe, about the nature of sex and 
the purpose of marriage: ‘Anscombe does not argue for the proposition that nonmarital 
sex is morally impermissible. She assumes it’.821 As such, it appears that Primoratz 
objects to this normative link between sex and procreation, primarily on account of the 
fact that it is relevant only to those who chose to uphold it. In contrast to Anscombe’s 
position, it is ‘merely a sexual ideal, not the ethics of sex’.822  
 
Nevertheless, the potential of the reproductive function of heterosexual intercourse 
marks it out as a distinctive type of sexual activity. As such, it is noted that the 
elementary biological truth that intercourse is a reproductive activity cannot be regarded 
as a trivial matter.
823
 Although the ‘human good’ of the child may be excluded from 
sexual activity, Gormally points out that we can’t ‘pretend that sex has nothing to do 
with this human good’.824 Where reproduction is an obvious outcome of human sexual 
capacity, having a child may be regarded as a ‘common good’, relevant to all.825  
 
Therefore, while ‘affirming the centrality of procreation’ within a Christian sexual ethic, 
sexual activity is also viewed as contributing more broadly to the good of marriage and 
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the good of society.
826
 In addition, the normative link between sex and procreation is 
not limited to a Catholic sexual ethic. For example, Hollinger affirms that sex, by its 
very nature, is procreative. However, he supplements this affirmation with the caveat 
that he finds ‘no biblical or logical justification for contending that an inherently 
procreative act cannot employ stewardship in attempting to prevent conception’.827 
Rowan Williams points out that, while recognising the theological significance of 





Moreover, in rejecting a view of sex limited to procreation, contemporary philosophical 
discourse, as exemplified by Primoratz and Soble, appears to also fundamentally reject a 
view of sex limited to monogamous marriage. In response to Peter Geach’s judgement 
that sex outside of marriage is poisonous,
829
 Primoratz responds by suggesting that 
people have ‘come to hate sex in marriage and regard it as just as poisonous as sex 
outside it’.830 As such, Soble suggests that sex within marriage will provide decreasing 
amounts of pleasure as the novelty of sexual encounter diminishes, therefore, ‘spouses’ 
experiencing passion outside the marriage, after it has died in the marriage, may be a 
viable option’.831 However, this is to make a value judgement on the quality of sex, 
rather than the relational nature and context of marriage or its moral good or end as an 
institution. 
 
In view of these philosophical conclusions, and central to my own discussion, is the 
evidenced disjuncture between sex, procreation and marriage reflected in SRE policy 
discourse. For example, the relational values and norms, evidenced in the SRE 
Guidance 2000, advised that young people should learn the ‘value of family life, 
marriage, and stable and loving relationships for the nurture of children’.832 However, at 
the same time, the Guidance also recognised there are ‘strong and mutually supportive 
relationships outside marriage’,833 seemingly putting marriage and non-marriage on an 
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 In addition, in view of more recent changes in the public definition of 
marriage, Julian Rivers warns that the re-definition of marriage will sever the 





(b) Sex and Love 
 
Alongside the dissolution of the normative link between sex and procreation, we can 
also evidence the dissolution of the normative link between sex and love, within both 
philosophical discourse and as it is outworked in policy discourse. For example, while 
an aspect of the attitudes and values content of SRE includes ‘learning the value of 
respect, love and care’,836  it is not clear in the Guidance whether these values are moral 
requirements or even ideals in a sexual relationship. Where Halstead and Reiss suggest 
that children and young people’s biggest need within sex education is not more 
information, but support and guidance in developing their sexual attitudes and values, 
this includes, they suggest, as part of educating the emotions, reflecting on the nature of 
love, including ‘sexual love, intimacy and desire’.837 It is increasingly clear, however, 
that among a number of the identified philosophers, the normative link between sex and 
love is being rejected. Soble, for example, points out that the many reasons people give 
for getting married, having sex or loving someone are so disparate that, for him, this 
‘reinforces the idea that the three are not essentially linked’.838 However, once again, 
subjective observation is being translated into normative conclusions.  
 
In contrast, Scruton’s analysis on the place of love within sexual relationships, for 
example, explores different philosophical questions and arrives at very different 
conclusions. In offering insight beyond a mere conceptual analysis of sexual desire, 
Scruton explores instead the purpose or end of sexual desire; in his view, this amounts 
to the channelling of our animal urges towards ‘an interpersonal aim, and an 
interpersonal fulfilment’.839 He recognises the capacity for erotic love to be a virtue, 
and, unlike Goldman, apportions ‘incomparable value’ to this exchange of love.840 In 
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addition, unlike Soble, he regards sexual desire as “inherently ‘nuptial”’.841 According 
to Scruton, the end goal of sexual desire is love: ‘Love is the fulfilment of desire, and 
therefore love is its telos’.842  
 
However, the interpersonal nature of sex remains under critical scrutiny. Particular 
objection is taken to Scruton’s case for the inherent ‘individualizing intentionality’ of 
sexual desire, with Primoratz accusing him of being not only out of touch with common 
cultural experiences, but incorrect in his assessment: ‘The phenomenon of unfocused 
sexual desire, sexual hunger not directed at anyone in particular but felt as hunger and 
desire none the less, would seem to present an obvious counterexample to Scruton’s 
central thesis’.843 However, it would equally point to the god-like danger that Lewis 
apportioned to eros.
844
 In addition, Primoratz questions his understanding and use of the 
term ‘interpersonal’, recognising that while humans are on the whole ‘interested in 
sexual access to other humans, rather than physical objects, or animals, or inflatable 
dolls’, the other may simply be ‘a person’ rather than ‘the total , unique person he or she 
is’.845 Where all impersonal sex is regarded as perversion, Stammers suggests that such 
‘sweeping over-inclusiveness does leave him (Scruton) open to understandable 
challenge’.846 In addition, to emphasis the irreplaceable desire for the other is, according 
to Soble, to defy experiential knowledge, as experience would show that one desire is 
often replaced with another.
847
 As such, when it comes to love, Soble claims, we should 
forget the ‘“forever” thesis’.848  
 
Identifying with this ‘uphill struggle’ of combining sex with love, Primoratz draws on 
Alan Goldman’s assessment of the ‘internal tension’ between the two.849 Goldman 
concludes that while sex, as a form of recreation and a necessary ‘outlet’ for desire, is 
pleasurable and thus enjoyable, it does not contribute towards the ‘lasting kind of value 
which enhances one’s whole life’.850 Love, on the other hand, occupies a superior 
standing: ‘By contrast, love typically develops over a long term relation; while its 
pleasures may be less intense and physical, they are of more cumulative value’.851 As 
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Primoratz concludes, ‘there is casual sex, but love is never casual’.852 He draws his 
conclusions on the basis that sex, stripped of any inherent moral significance, should be 
enjoyed on its own terms, whether in a loving relationship or in a casual encounter. His 
argument appears simply to rest on the presumption that when it comes to sex and love 
‘the combination does not seem to be an obvious and necessary one’.853 The only moral 
precondition is that informed and freely given consent is given and the person is 
apportioned due respect. In contrast, Halwani tightens the moral boundaries by 
suggesting that casual sex may still be wrong, even if fully consensual, in view of the 
consequences, for example, unplanned pregnancy and STIs, identifying these as  ‘an 
“external” reason for its wrongness’.854  
 
However, what appears particularly objectionable to Scruton’s understanding of a 
normative link between sex and love is the implied obligation for sexual exclusiveness 
and the condemnation of certain sexual practices. Indeed, such a ‘restriction’ is judged 
by Grayling to be both an ‘unnatural’ and ‘unkind’ arrangement.855 Recognising that the 
power of sexual desire ‘poses a threat (moral or prudential) to love’, Soble accepts that 
love will inevitably suffer; however, multiple sexual relations may not, in themselves, 
be inherently immoral.
856
 Similarly, in his account of what constitutes virtuous sexual 
behaviour, Halwani concludes that promiscuity, sex work and open marriages can 




As I will explore in more detail in Chapter 5, the nature and meaning attached to sexual 
love has placed disproportionate value on eros, in comparison to other understandings 
of love. Bertrand Russell described romantic love as ‘the source of the most intense 
delights that life has to offer’.858 He commended its value: ‘In the relation of a man and 
woman who love each other with passion and imagination and tenderness, there is 
something of inestimable value, to be ignorant of which is a great misfortune to any 
human being.’859 However, as Hollinger points out, the value he placed on love was 
rooted in an ‘ethical egoism’ and conditional on the freedom and spontaneity from 
which it sprung, with the end being the happiness and pleasure that it generated for the 
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 As such, according to his utilitarian calculus, he defended practices 
including pre-marital sex and adultery.
861
    
 
There is evidence of this normative disjuncture between sex and faithful commitment 
amongst young people. For example, the findings of an MTV survey in 2008 revealed 
that, of the 1,000 young people questioned, 40% believed that one-night stands are “no 
big deal”, and one third of young people believed it is acceptable for someone to have 
had as many as 10 sexual partners by the age of 21.
862
 With a marked expansion in its 
use, Bauman suggests that the ‘love’ word no longer possesses the promise and 
intentionality that it once did. Standards, he asserts, have been lowered: ‘One night 
stands are talked about under the code name of ‘making love’.863 Within our 
‘contractual sensate society’, Pitirim Sorokin argues, an increasing desire and appetite 
for sensory values has triumphed over our contractual duties and relationships.
864
 This 
‘interchangeability of function-bearers’865 is what happens, contends Thielicke, when 
sex is reduced to a mere biological function: ‘Wherever sexual chaos, i.e., exchange of 
partners at will, prevails, we are confronted with a crisis, a breakdown of personal 
being, of personhood’.866  
 
However, despite evidence of this culturally constructed normative disjuncture between 
sex and love, Halstead and Reiss argue that love is the missing dimension of sex 
education. While recognising the difficulty in articulating and discussing in a classroom 
context, they nevertheless observe that sex and love are two concepts that are closely 
interconnected and mutually complement one another, pointing out that ‘the lessons of 
history, many people’s experience and formal research all suggest overwhelmingly that 
the combination of sex and love is both enriching and elevating.’.867  
 
In addition, it is worth noting that Primoratz, while critiquing Scruton’s moral 
assumptions on the interpersonal nature of sex, does recognise that his vision of human 
sexual experience may well be regarded as an ‘ideal’, i.e., ‘richer, more fulfilling, more 
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worthwhile than casual sex’.868 He concedes, however, that ideals are at the same time 
only ideas and ‘cannot be legislated for universal guidance; they cannot generate moral 
prohibitions and cannot ground condemnation of those who chose to do otherwise’.869 
With different conclusions drawn over the nature of love and the nature of sex, what we 
are left with are disparate value judgements over the intrinsic association between the 
two.  
 
However, in light of the inevitable disparity and, if, as suggested, Scruton’s ‘ideal’ of 
sexual relations cannot amount to a normative precondition, it prompts the question as 
to why the ideal of free and informed consent and respect for persons requires universal 
moral acceptance? While Scruton is warned of presupposing certain norms rather than 
the descriptive task generating certain norms,
870
 it appears that his critics have brought 
their own normative presuppositions to the philosophical task:  ‘Mutual free and 
informed consent, in the absence of third-party harm, guarantees that sexual acts are 
moral. No law of God supplements this principle of proper relations among humans’.871 
This is reflected in Archard’s conclusion on how we should teach sex, and would appear 
to be the moral prerogative within a secular humanist worldview, which seemingly 
requires no justification. Instead, it is taken increasingly to be the unquestioned and 
unchallengeable rule of ethics that ‘all moral thinking must lie under the government of 
the Harm Prinicple’.872 However, it is unclear why this ethical ‘ideal’ should hold any 
more credence than any other within a socially constructed normative framework, 
including those that shaped the supposed ‘anti-sexual’ tradition of the past. Indeed, as 
Primoratz concludes, even if sexual ideals were deemed to have moral significance, they 




4.2.3 Emerging ‘Moral Zeitgeist’: The Amorality of Sex 
 
The purpose of glimpsing the ‘Moral Zeitgeist’ with regards to a philosophical 
exploration of sex is to identify the moral conclusions that are being drawn within the 
current liberal metanarrative on sexual morality and the impact on SRE discourse. In 
addition to the deconstruction of sex from identified normative ends, it should be noted 
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that contemporary philosophical discourse has engaged the view that sex has no 
intrinsic moral significance. For example, in setting out what ethics is not in Practical 
Ethics, Peter Singer states: ‘So the first thing ethics is not, is a set of prohibitions 
particularly concerned about sex. Sex raises no special moral issues at all’.874 He briefly 
defends his position:  
Decisions about sex may involve considerations of honesty, concern for others, 
prudence and so on, but there is nothing special about sex in this respect, for the same 
could be said of decisions about driving a car. (In fact the moral issues raised by driving 
a car, both from an environmental and from a safety point of view, are much more 




Reflecting the anti-sexual pre-suppositions identified in earlier discussions, his sexual 
ethic may conceivably be coloured by the fact that he views discussion on ethics and 
morality generally to be too closely connected with the ‘sexually-obsessed morality of 
conservative Christianity’.876  
 
Nevertheless, Goldman adopts the same analogy, noting that ‘immoral’ conduct on the 
road is judged so because it places others in danger ‘a circumstance which, when 
avoidable, is to be condemned in any context’.877 While no-one could deny the moral 
significance of decisions made behind the wheel of a car, Geach argues that ‘car driving 
is not the manifestation of a fundamental human inclination, in the way that sexual 
activity is’.878 If we were to compile a list of things essential for a ‘well-ordered human 
being’, she adds, sexuality would inevitably be on the list, whereas the ability to drive a 
car may invariably be absent. Her conclusion, of course, presupposes that there is a need 
to order the human passions and that there is conceivably a right ordering when it comes 
to sexual matters, invariably founded on a belief about the fundamental nature and 
purpose of human sexuality.  
 
Primoratz similarly deduces that the same moral rules and principles that apply to 
sexual behaviour equally apply to non-sexual behaviour: ‘In sex, just as in non-sexual 
matters, we can hurt, harm, coerce, deceive, or exploit others, or default on our promises 
and commitments – and we are morally required not to do so’.879 Thus, he concludes: 
‘Rape is not wrong as sexual battery, but as sexual battery’.880 Goldman arrives at the 
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 Halwani, however, raises objection to this position, believing that it 
is wrong because of the sexual nature of the violation. In his view, such an act 
demonstrates intemperance, a vice specific to sexual behaviour and feelings, which does 




Offering a further nuanced position, Jones acknowledges that there are ‘special features 
of sex that impose special obligations’.883 Drawing on the comparison of a person 
performing surgery on another, he suggests that a special obligation of care is required 
for both acts in view of the vulnerability of the other and the potential for damage. 
However, the same could be said of flying a plane or removing a wisdom tooth; there is 
equally a special obligation of care needed due to the vulnerability of the other and the 
potential for damage.  
 
The comparisons being drawn between sex and other activities would seem to indicate 
an incoherent and disjointed understanding of the aims, purposes and moral end of 
sexual desire and activity. It is evident, at least, that such a comparison fails to give full 
weight to the social framing that inevitably accompanies any sexual union, in addition 
to the nature of the motivating factors, including the self-seeking, insatiable nature of 
lust. Out of all the human desires, it is sexual desire, concludes Bauman, that strives for 
togetherness and union, and ‘renders any human being, however accomplished and in 
other respects self-sufficient, incomplete and wanting – unless united with another’.884 
In pursuit and fulfilment of this sexual union, Geach points out that this bodily passion 
has the ability to present its own fulfilment as essential to an individual’s future 
happiness, reflecting the permanent attachment that is signified by the sexual act, in 
addition to its potentiality for destruction. As such, Rowan Williams notes the moral 
risk and ambiguity that sexual desire exposes: ‘For my desire to persist and have some 
hope of fulfilment, it must be exposed to the risks of being seen by its object’.885 
 
Nevertheless, as noted already, the aim, purpose and moral end of sex has been reduced 
to a paradigm of pleasure. Interpreted within the arena of sexual rights and liberty, 
pleasure has gained in value and significance, particularly evident among proponents of 
humanist sexology: ‘We assert that physical pleasure within the context of meaningful 
human relationships is essential, both as a moral value and for its contribution to 
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wholesome social relationships’.886 As Primoratz concludes, pleasure is a definitive 
aspect when examining the nature of sex: ‘What else could it be? What else remains 
when we put aside its biological aspect and its romantic and expressive potential?’887  
 
In the face of a perceived amoral position on sex, the emergence of pleasure as a moral 
value for guiding sexual activity is notably problematic, not least in light of the fact that 
pleasures are highly subjective; within human experience there are many different types 
of pleasures. As a result, even the earliest proponents of utilitarianism had difficulty in 
measuring the comparative value of pleasures. As MacIntyre retorts: ‘“But which 
pleasure, which happiness ought to guide me?”’888 While Bentham did not make a 
distinction between the quantity and the quality of pleasure,
889
 Mill viewed the pleasure 
of the mind superior to the pleasure of the body: ‘Human beings have faculties more 
elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not 
regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification’.890 As such, the 
value of pleasure amounts to more than mere sensuous self-indulgence, but it is also 
accorded an intrinsic value.
891
 The intrinsic value corresponds to the intrinsic nature of 
the human being: ‘It is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’.892 As Sandel notes, with such a statement 
Mill moves outside of his own moral framework, identifying a measure of human 
dignity that is not derived from our desires: ‘The higher pleasures are not higher 
because we prefer them; we prefer them because we recognize them as higher’.893 
 
It is evident that the concepts of pleasure and desire are receiving greater scrutiny in 
discourse on sex education, indeed, perceived to be ‘increasingly accepted as a ‘good’ 
within sexuality research’.894 They are also increasingly evident in policy guidance. For 
example, in describing high quality SRE in the recent supplementary guidance, the 
authors note that it should be delivered by people trained and confident in talking about 
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issues which include pleasure, and sex should be taught as a ‘normal and pleasurable 
fact of life’.895 
  
It is important to note, of course, that this discussion is not questioning the potential 
pleasure associated with sexual experience, but the moral status apportioned to it, and 
the challenges that invariably emerge when seeking to use pleasure as a gauge for 
assessing the moral legitimacy of sexual behaviour. As Trevor Stammers points out, 
sexual pleasure is powerful and easily obtainable, and people will understandably 
engage in it unless they are presented with a good reason for refraining.
896
 In particular, 
he notes that if we are to effect any change in sexual behaviour, we must invariably 
question the role pleasure plays in colouring our moral understanding of sex, for 
‘neither abstinence nor condom-use are likely behaviours in the absence of even a 
rudimentary moral understanding of sex’.897 For, as he suggests, the first denies any 
sexual pleasure while the second reduces it, at least for men. 
 
Fundamentally, where pleasure has emerged as a ‘good’ end, if not the end of sexual 
activity, this, according to Gormally, is to apportion pleasure an incorrect value for, in 
his view, the ‘value of pleasure is measured by the value of the activity or experience in 
which one takes pleasure’.898 As pleasure remains a purely subjective experience, 
making it impossible to place a moral value on the other person’s sexual preference and 
behaviour, it raises important questions around the moral limits a state can impose on 
sexual diversity. According to Bentham, the welfare value of a pleasure or a pain is to 
be determined, among other factors, according to its duration and intensity.
899
 Thus, acts 
such as rape, paedophilia and incest, Odell suggests, could be judged immoral on 
account of the measure of harm done to the victim, outweighing the pleasure 
experienced by the perpetrator.
900
 However, the same calculus applied to practices such 
as incest, bestiality and necrophilia may invariably give rise to a different moral 
conclusion.
901
 Of course, there are fundamental judgements on human dignity and well-
being that are factored into value judgements on such sexual behaviours, as 
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demonstrated in the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
902
 but these clearly lie outside of a 
consequentialist moral framework.  
 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the morality of individual sexual practices, John Harris 
echoes the views of Singer and Goldman in concluding:  
There is no reason to suppose that there is such a thing as sexual morality in the sense of 
a morality which provides grounds for moral judgments about sexual desires or 
practices which cannot be shown to be immoral in any of the ways which would make 




While it is apparent that Harris and his contemporaries do not seek to eradicate the 
application of moral principles to sexual behaviour, they at the same time do not 
recognise an intrinsic association between the two. Instead they seek to ‘demolish the 
very tenacious idea that there is something good, or at least morally respectable, about 
things or practices or even inclinations that can be thought of as being, in some sense, 
natural’.904 In his view, there is nothing intrinsically right or wrong about any sexual 
practice. Even sexual practices, according to Harris, which may be regarded as ‘obscene 
and disgusting’,905 are not for this, or any other reason, immoral: ‘There is nothing 
wrong with sex of any kind including fetishism, bestiality, necrophilia, buggery, incest, 
paedophilia and the variety approved by the missionaries’.906 It is the ‘general 
immorality’ of acts that involve ‘violation, injury exploitation and so on’ that are 
objectionable and the sexual attitudes that express love and respect for others that are 
‘morally preferable’.907  
 
While his morality is grounded in consequentialist principles, we should note that those 
values that fall within the scope of ‘general morality’ do so on a non-consequentialist 
basis. What he wishes to establish is an ethic that could be universally applicable. 
Singer states that ethics requires us to ‘go beyond “I” and “you” to the universal law, 
the universalisable judgement, the standpoint of the impartial spectator or ideal 
observer, or whatever we chose to call it’.908 Singer’s preference utilitarianism involves 
taking into account the interests and preferences of not only those closest to us, but 
indeed our enemies, as we decide what we ought to do. However, as with Dawkins’ 
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sexual ‘commandment’, such an approach, by his own admission, can provide perhaps a 
persuasive but not a conclusive ethic.  
  
If sex can be reduced to a subjective paradigm of pleasure, and sexual practices in 
themselves judged intrinsically amoral, in so far as they do not cause harm, we must 
recognise the potential impact for SRE. For it is evident that the significance 
apportioned to ‘plain sex’ is being translated into discourse around policy and practice. 
Programme content, in particular, has come under criticism for its failure to engage with 
a ‘discourse of desire’.909 The inference is that if the value and end of sex is, as 
Primoratz suggests, ‘the desire for certain bodily pleasure, period’, then sex education 
programmes fail if they do not engage with different means of arousing sexual pleasure: 
‘Pupils wanted information about ways of interacting sexually that could be exciting 
and even satisfying, but which stopped short of intercourse’.910  
 
As such, the discourse of pleasure and desire is argued to be an essential element in 
responding to young people’s need for information and seen as providing ‘counter 
discourse to education based on fear and pathology’.911 Young people, it is argued, need 
space to articulate and express their desires, where pleasure becomes a construct of the 
individual’s sexual preference. However, in associating sexual desire with the 
realisation of individual identity, the logical question arises as to why, in the name of 
liberal equality, should the Curriculum not be expanded to include teaching on all 
sexual practices that have the potential to maximise individual sexual satisfaction and 
pleasure, for example, auto-eroticism or fetishism?
912
 After all, if, as Tatchell notes, 
‘there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ when it comes to sex and love’,913 and education is 
reduced to ‘dispelling ignorance and imparting knowledge’, he concludes: ‘Sex 
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education has an obligation to give all the facts and tell the whole truth about every kind 
of sex and relationship’.914  
 
A similar attitude is reflected in the question and answer section on a NHS website, 
Respect Yourself, designed to provide information for young people from the age of 13; 
it responded to a question concerning the normality of having sexual fantasies over 
dolphins with: ‘Sex and normal don’t really go together. People get turned on by some 
very weird things and this is perfectly normal. As long as you are not hurting anyone 
else – then it is ok. Although, sex with animals is illegal (fantasising is not)’.915 
However, while pleasure, as suggested earlier, has become the ‘good’ of sex it, at the 
same time, is regarded as inherently meaningless. Allen and Carmody point out that, in 
contrast to desire, ‘pleasure is only related to itself, it does not represent anything and 
therefore cannot be counterfeit. Pleasure is free of use, almost devoid of meaning’.916 
Reflecting on ‘ethical sex’, Carmody suggests, also requires ‘consideration of the 
interrelationship between desire, acts and pleasure and their impact on others’.917 A 
secular humanist worldview admits to offering no clear answer to the question of the 
‘natural place’ of sex within human purpose.918 As such, with the application of a liberal 
moral framework, Carr suggests, it is unclear what amounts to harm in the absence of a 
clearly defined notion of human flourishing. While sexual activity is increasingly 
regarded as a necessary precondition, without a sufficient moral understanding of sex 
itself, we may end up simply concurring with Thomas Nagel’s conclusion: ‘Even if 
perverted sex is to that extent not so good as it might be, bad sex is generally better than 
none at all’.919 
 
4.3 Shaping the ‘Moral Zeitgeist’: The Epistemological Deficit of 
Naturalism 
 
In view of the increasingly popular view that sexual acts intrinsically carry no moral 
significance, it is evident that a consequentialist calculation is deemed to be a sufficient 
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means of determining sexually moral behaviour, as evidenced in Archard’s moral 
position. It is, therefore, imperative for my own discussion that I explore the ontological 
underpinnings of this liberal ethical theory, as well as critique its application and its 
influence in shaping a public sexual ethic.
920
 Only in answering the ontological 
questions, as Sire suggests, are we able to observe and answer questions on the nature of 
the external reality and understand the foundations of epistemology.
921
 Therefore, in 
light of the ‘epistemological agnosticism’ evident in current SRE discourse in Chapter 
3, I am particularly concerned with the ontological position that is undergirding the 
moral narrative of policy and practice, and the overarching cultural narrative of sex that 
is evident in a public sexual ethic.  
 
As noted in Mill’s theory of education, it was hoped that free enquiry and the pursuit of 
moral conclusions through empirical knowledge would advance society and increase 
human happiness.
922
 As such, John Lennox suggests that utilitarianism is ‘at its heart 
atheistic’.923 In seeking to derive ethical conclusions from natural properties, it would 
appear that it is the flexibility that utilitarianism affords to the moral agent that 
understandably appeals to its followers. As J.C.C. Smart and Bernard Williams suggest, 
‘with its empirical attitude to questions of means and ends it is congenial to the 
scientific temper and it has flexibility to deal with a changing world’.924 A principal 
attraction is that it does not require an appeal to a transcendent source of moral 
authority.
925
 Thus, where moral principles are reduced to human constructs, naturalism 
is the worldview from which moral knowledge is derived. Born out of the emergence of 
Enlightenment reason, it persists today, suggests Sire, for two reasons:  
First, it gives the impression of being honest and objective. One is asked to accept only 
what appears to be based on facts and on the assured scientific investigation of 
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However, in echoing Mark Linville’s “Argument from Evolutionary Naturalism”, and 
his critique of the epistemological claims therein, I shall argue that ‘theists can, where 
naturalists cannot, offer a framework on which our moral beliefs may be presumed to be 
warranted’.927  
 
It is important to note that a naturalist worldview is evident not only within 
philosophical discourse, but has also come through strongly in ‘objective’ public 
research into sexual behaviours. Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues, in instigating a 
scientific, ground-breaking study of sexual behaviours, noted: ‘No theory, no 
philosophy, no body of theology, no political expediency, no wishful thinking, can 
provide a satisfactory substitute for the observation of material objects and of the way in 
which they behave’.928 However, as with contemporary philosophical analysis of sexual 
concepts, the purpose of the research was not to draw moral conclusions, but simply 
provide an empirical account of patterns of sexual behaviour: ‘This is first of all a report 
on what people do, which raises no questions of what they should do, or what kinds of 
people do it’.929  
 
Nevertheless, it is evident that moral conclusions are being drawn from empirical 
research. For example, the first British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and 
Lifestyle (NATSAL), instigated as a response to the lack of empirical evidence on 
sexual behaviour in Britain,
930
 noted the traditional conventions that ‘still colour our 
moral judgement’.931 Instead, it was inferred that sexual morality should be a matter of 
social construction in order to accommodate social convention. For example, in 
encouraging the modification of health advice to accommodate current sexual 
preferences, it was suggested that health educators should use the survey results to 
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‘harness those attitudes most likely to support sexually healthy behaviour’.932 For, as the 
report noted, it would seem futile to encourage ‘monogamy and sexual restraint on a 
population heavily committed to polygamy and sexual licence’.933 Such a position 
reflects the belief of Archard that sex education should ‘work with, and not against the 
grain of the social realities in which young people find themselves’.934 However, in the 
face of such reasoning, O’Donovan point out that people are ‘thoughtless’ in their 
public reasoning if they ‘fail to distinguish custom (like eating bacon at breakfast) from 
their moral obligation (like protecting their children from danger)’.935 ‘A reflective 
culture’, he suggests, ‘finds its final justification of human acts outside local tradition or 
custom, however, sacred’.936  
 
However, in view of the utilitarian principles shaping policy discourse around SRE and 
shaping the moral framework in which sexual behaviour is understood, it is necessary to 
draw attention to what is argued to be the fundamental epistemological flaw of 
utilitarian thinking - the hedonistic assumption that something is good in itself, based 
solely on the premise that we are pleased with it, or that it is desired.
937
 Accordingly, a 
sexual act is judged, not in view of a particular inherent moral quality, but in light of the 
consequences of the act. According to G.E. Moore, Mill’s ethical theory primarily falls 
down on account of the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’, i.e. the ‘failure to distinguish 
clearly that unique and indefinable quality which we mean by good’.938 Mill’s attempt 
to equate ‘good’ with ‘desired’ fails to recognise the very clear differentiation between 
‘desired’ and ‘desirable’, i.e., ought to be desired or deserves to be desired. In Mill’s 
defence, however, Crisp points out that he did not claim that goodness could be equated 
with desired, recognising instead the obvious deviation of many people’s desires. 
However, in appealing to people’s experience as a source of knowledge, he did, as Crisp 
suggests, say that desire offers the only ‘evidence’ for the goodness of something.939 He 
could only, in effect, offer a defence of his theory based on empirical observation, the 
acceptance of which would be left in the hands of the reader: ‘But if this doctrine be 
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true, the principle of utility is proved. Whether it is so, or not, must now be left to the 
consideration of the thoughtful reader’.940  
 
Beauchamp and Childress note that Moore, along with other more recent utilitiarians, 
have expanded on a hedonistic understanding of utility, to include values such as 
‘beauty, knowledge, health, success, understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal 
relationships’, which contribute to well-being.941 As such, it would appear, however, 
that Moore fares no better in giving an objective account of the good. MacIntyre points 
out that Moore, despite advocating the ‘non-natural’ property of good, the ‘intuitions’ 
that are incapable of being proved or disproved, drew his own conclusions on the things 
that are ‘ideal’ or goods or ends in themselves and the ‘truths’ of moral philosophy: 
‘that personal affections and aesthetics enjoyments include all the greatest, and by far 
the greatest, goods we can imagine’.942  
 
The same complaint could be filed against contemporary philosophies of sex, which 
derive moral values from a conceptual understanding of the nature of sex. It is possible 
to see the same fallacy being argued within moral discourse on sex education. Where, 
for example, White suggests that a morality for sex education should be derived from 
young people’s sexual desires which, he argues, gives reasons for actions, such a 
proposition can provide no objective statement on sexual morality, nor indeed provide a 
means of reconciling competing sexual preferences.
 943 
 
There is a longstanding understanding, exemplified in the enlightenment philosophy of 
David Hume, that there is no rational basis for deriving an ethical ‘ought’ from nature, 
and to do so is, not only a failure to recognise that nature gives conflicting signals, but it 
is to commit an essential category mistake.
944
 As Lennox notes, Hume recognised that 
‘observations of nature are first-order activities, whereas value judgments are second-
order, that is, they do not belong to the same category’.945 In his variety of 
‘epistemological moral skepticism’, Linville points out that Hume offered neither a 
meta-ethical nor a meta-physical account of moral reality.
946
 While an evolutionary 
naturalist adopts the premise that moral beliefs are developed as a bi-product of natural 
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selection, Linville notes that they must further ask ‘whether there is a reason to suppose 
that the belief-producing mechanisms of our moral beliefs are truth-aimed?’947 As such, 
while evolutionary naturalists at least give an account of our cognitive faculties in 
deriving moral reason, Linville suggests that it ‘inspires no more confidence than that 
displayed by Hume’.948 
 
For those who continue to argue that moral truth can be derived from nature or science, 
they cannot resolve the same epistemological hurdle. For example, Sam Harris argues 
that morality is simply an underdeveloped branch of science: ‘Once we see that a 
concern for well-being (defined as deeply and as inclusively as possible) is the only 
intelligible basis for morality and values, we will see that there must be a science of 
morality’.949 However, by starting with the assumption that concern for well-being is in 
and of itself good, he is already presupposing a moral conviction which has not been 
derived from science. In addition, he suggests that our conceptions of ‘well-being’ are 
evolving, and while we may be able to use science to maximise human well-being, as in 
the sphere of medicine, we cannot use science to determine why we should.  
 
In addition in responding to Harris and other ‘New Atheists’, Angus Ritchie presents a 
robust case for why secular worldviews cannot account for the human capacity for 
moral reasoning and the ability to discern moral knowledge.
950
 If, as Singer suggests, 
we should prefer an ethic of practicality over one based on sound logic,
951
 why should 
we even trust human reason to determine a workable ethic if, in staying true to an 
evolutionary naturalist worldview, humanity’s rational faculties are a consequence of 
irrational blind chance? It follows that, in its attempt to offer a coherent worldview, 
naturalism ends up being ‘logically self-defeating’.952 
 
As such, a naturalistic worldview, without any sound intellectual defence of our 
capacity for moral knowledge, also provides us with no definitive moral obligation to 
behave in a certain manner, thus destroying the very possibility of absolute moral 
values. As Lewis reiterated:  
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From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusion can ever be drawn’ for one 
is ‘trying to get a conclusion in the imperative mood out of premises in the indicative 





As a consequence, Douglas Groothuis warns that naturalism is a prime source of our 
culture’s ‘truth decay’, and contains within it ‘the philosophical seeds of its own 
destruction’.954 He points to nihilism as the end result of postmodern presuppositions: 
‘When everything is deconstructed, no original remains’.955 Anthony Giddens suggests 
that nihilism is not a postmodern construct but that it was already evident in 
Enlightenment thinking: ‘if the sphere of reason is wholly unfettered, no knowledge can 
rest upon an unquestioned foundation, because even the most firmly held notions can 
only be regarded as valid “in principle” or “until further notice”’. 956 
 
Finally, while it may seem apparent why we would naturally choose to promote our 
own happiness, it is not so obvious, on the basis of our own desires, why we would 
want or, indeed, be required to promote the happiness of the other. This unresolved 
difficulty remains for any modern application of the theory. For example, according to 
Singer, living an unethical life is not immoral or irrational per se, it is simply unwise. In 
his attempt to find a good reason why we ought to choose an ethical life, Singer resorts 
to an appeal to some observable element in human nature which engenders feelings of 
goodwill towards the other. As Hollinger points out, however, Singer’s theory is based 
on the assumption that we naturally seek what is morally good.
957
 Instead of 
introspective reflection, Singer concedes, one is motivated to get out into the world and 
do something worthwhile: ‘As yet, I offer no philosophical justification for taking this 
apparently objectivist stance. For the moment, it is enough that, in practice, it seems to 
work’.958 It is conscientious members of society, Singer concludes, who will tend to 
promote that which a society regards as valuable, where values are decided by the 
majority.  
 
Henry Sidgwick appealed to the same element of goodwill within late 19
th
 century 
English society to justify his utilitarian position, in what he referred to as the ‘Morality 
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of Common Sense’.959 Such an observation, he concluded, should aid and control the 
moral philosopher in his ‘theoretical construction of the Science of the Right’.960 
However, no reason is offered as to why an individual should be morally obliged to 
behave in accordance with this spirit of goodwill. For, as Linville points out, while Mill 
seeks to apply presumptive rules to his utilitarian theory, e.g. a rule against lying, such 
rules are contingent upon social utility, and therefore do not offer intrinsic moral worth 
and standing to the individual.
961
 In addition, in critiquing the on-going appeal to 
intuition in moral philosophy, MacIntyre notes ‘that the introduction of the word 
‘intuition’ by a moral philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly 
wrong with an argument’.962  
 
In light of this observed ‘intuition’ of human nature, Dawkins, in what he accounts as 
being logically ‘unnatural’ behaviour, is forced to detract his evolutionary premise that 
our actions are simply a product of the mindless outworking of our genes. He argues for 
the ability of modern man to rebel against his genes in favour of altruistic behaviour, 
but fails to explain on what basis we either have the ability or the inclination to do so.
963
 
Perhaps values, as indeed our belief in God, should simply be accepted as ‘part of the 
stuff of the universe’, caught up within the evolutionary process.964  This judgement, at 
its most basic, denies the existence of values of any permanent or lasting significance. 
 
Therefore, while an appeal to a life that exercises moral values and transcends self is 
indeed a noble one, a justification for doing so, based on Singer’s observation that ‘it 
seems to work’, demonstrates, at best, a dangerously shaky philosophical commitment 
and, at worst, a defence for its complete rejection. Indeed, it is unclear how society is to 
identify a conscientious member on naturalist grounds, if, according to physical 
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4.3.1 Implications for a Public Sexual Ethic 
 
Primoratz points to the naturalistic philosophy of Schopenhauer
966
 and Nietzsche as an 
impetus for a new understanding of sexuality.
967
 However, the end result of such a 
philosophical commitment for a public sexual ethic should not be underestimated. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, described by MacIntyre as ‘the moral philosopher of the present 
age’,968 called for a ‘Revaluation of all values!’,969 accompanied by a reassertion and 
awakening of animal instinct.
 In condemning all forms of ‘Anti-natural’ morality, he 
formulated his own principle: ‘All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is 
dominated by an instinct of life’.970 Thus, he argued that the harnessing of sexual 
impulse and passion should be condemned as a suppression of life itself. Kathleen 
Wininger, for example, notes that ‘Nietzsche’s entire philosophy, from start to finish, is 
an indictment of those who fear the erotic’.971 She observes that while the reader is 
‘teased by his metaphorical promises’ about sex, he fails in his writings to present a 




However, a vision of sexuality that is evident within philosophical discourse is one that 
reduces sex to the individual pursuit of pleasure. Hollinger suggests this to be a 
consequence of reducing our sexual behaviour to a naturalistic understanding of reality: 
‘Humans are then functionally reduced to their material impulses that ultimately seek 
pleasure, happiness, or their own interests’.973 According to the logical outworking of 
Singer’s worldview premise, there is no moral duty to live in a certain way, nor is there, 
or should there be, any attempt made to impose such a duty. As with Dawkins’ 
‘Commandment’ on sexual behaviour, the individual is under no moral obligation and is 
therefore free to take it or leave it. For if all actions are determined by the mindless 
forces of nature, what justification can be given for human rational deliberation 
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regarding sexual behaviour, including a careful examination of intentions, purpose and 
meaning?  
 
It follows, therefore, as an inevitable consequence of the underlying naturalist 
commitment, that no sexual practice is objectionable or preferable, as might be 
suggested, as there can be no appeal to an objective account of intrinsic worth or value; 
for within a naturalist worldview perspective there are, in effect, no grounds on which to 
make such an appeal. As the ‘Secular Bible’ suggests: 
no human law or folly can change the river of life, that must flow in its power from the 
beginning always onwards, 30. And seek every path to its future, accepting no obstacle 
or hindrance. 31. For its own monarch is nature, its one guide nature’s hand, its one aim 
fulfilment of nature’s great imperative.974  
 
If, as Grayling suggests, ‘the propagation of beings is the greatest object of nature’,975 
why should even a humanly constructed moral law stand in its way?  
 
Therefore, where utilitarianism seeks to ground its moral principles in the unguided, 
mindless forces of nature, it runs into insurmountable difficulty. As Lennox observes: 
‘How can something that is ultimately mindless and impersonal, and therefore amoral, 
impose any sense of morality upon us whatever?’976 Accordingly, when it comes to sex, 
why should the ‘unwanted infliction of pain, suffering, harm, injury, and so on’, that are 
somehow beyond the natural, fall within Harris’ sexual moral framework? 977 Of course, 
there are few who would disagree with Harris’ identified moral duties towards the other; 
however, their ethical imperatives cannot be derived from nature. As such, Anscombe 
seemed justified in concluding: ‘It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a 
shallow philosophy’.978 Indeed, she raised objections to drawing moral standards from 
society at all, believing that ‘one cannot be impressed by this idea if one reflects what 
the ‘norms’ of a society can be like.’979  
 
Naturalism, therefore, faces insurmountable difficulty in providing a robust foundation 
from which to derive moral principles and shape a moral framework for sexual 
behaviour. For as Hollinger points out, Singer’s own ethic remains open to the 
possibility of sexual contact with animals on the condition that no harm is done to the 
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 According to Harris, this sexual practice is not in and of itself morally 
objectionable: ‘If we assume, for example, that the animals either enjoy themselves or 
do not find sex more repulsive than other human contact that they have, the only thing 
wrong with bestiality would be any harmful effects on the human agent’.981 As 
Hollinger notes, such a conclusion ‘reminds us that there really is no intrinsic meaning 
in the naturalistic worldview, and hence no inherent moral limits to natural impulses’.982 
Lewis eloquently spelt out the implications of attempting to derive a moral obligation 
for sexual behaviour from a naturalist premise:  
If we do not bring to the examination of our instincts a knowledge of their comparative 
dignity we could never learn it from them. And that knowledge cannot itself be 
instinctive: the judge cannot be one of the parties judged; or, if he is, the decision is 
worthless and there is no ground for placing the preservation of the species above self-




While it may seem that sexual practices such as bestiality are outside the bounds of our 
current understanding of social norms, as our following discussion on the law on sexual 
offences will demonstrate, their intrinsic ‘wrongness’ is currently not recognised within 
Government guidance. In responding to the question of whether it is illegal to have sex 
with an animal that is dead, the answer given to young people on the NHS ‘Respect 
Yourself’ website stated: ‘People can and do fantasise about very weird and wonderful 
things however bestiality – sex with animals (dead or alive) is illegal. Animals cannot 
consent (agree) to sex and it is wrong to ever force anyone or anything to have sex’.984 It 
would appear from the answer given that the moral assumption is that that sex with an 
animal, dead or alive, is illegal, not because there is something intrinsically immoral 
about the act, but because the animal is unable to consent. Indeed, there is nothing in the 
answer to suggest that such an action might have a harmful effect on the human agent, 
which, within Harris’s ethic, is the only moral caveat.  
 
In view of the confusion that exists around our moral understanding of sex and the 
possible implications for current social and relational order, we must turn our attention 
to examine what it is that presently dictates the public moral boundaries of our sexual 
behaviour – the law. Robert Louden points out that the absence of ‘agreement regarding 
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human purposes and moral ideals seems to drive us (partly out of lack of alternatives) to 
a more legalistic form of morality’.985  
 
4.4 Public Account of Sexual Morality: The Law on Consent 
 
The state’s role in the sexual lives of its citizens cuts to the heart of debate around the 
parameters of individual liberty. H.L.A. Hart, in his assessment of the legislative limits 
of the state with regards to the individual’s sex life, suggests that the frustrations of 
sexual desires in the face of punishment ‘may create misery of a quite special 
degree’.986 His position is shaped by a presupposed value judgement on the role and 
importance of sexual behaviour in the life of the individual: ‘suppression of sexual 
impulses generally is something which affects the development or balance of the 
individual’s emotional life, happiness and personality’.987  
 
In adopting a liberal theory of law,
988
 Ronald Dworkin adds his weight to these 
assumptions, believing that, in view of its impact, government needs ‘compelling 
justification to regulate reproductive or sexual acts’.989 He argues that each person must 
live an authentic life, a life which maintains ethical independence and ensures that they 
alone have personal control over, and responsibility for, their own body. However, in 
responding to this libertarian utopia, Taylor argues that realising the ‘ethic of 
authenticity’, at the expense of wider society, is unworkable: ‘It is clear that to have any 
kind of liveable society some choices have to be restricted, some authorities have to be 
respected, and some individual responsibility has to be assumed. The issue should 
always be which choices, authorities and responsibilities’.990 
 
The exception with which Dworkin qualifies his ethical maxim concerns cases of 
deliberate harm.
991
 This is the least that would be expected in order to guarantee the 
effective functioning of liberal democracy; this leaves the state to arbitrate within moral 
discourse as to what an acceptable notion of ‘harm’ might look like, which in turn 
                                                 
985
 R.B. Louden, ‘On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics’, R. Crisp and M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics, Oxford: 
OUP, 1997, 201-216, 215. 
986
 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, Oxford: OUP, 1963, 22. 
987
 Hart, Law, 22. More recent philosophers, such as Lori Gruen, have embraced Hart’s conclusion:  ‘A 
society composed of miserable, off-balance citizens is not one the law should help create or maintain’ (L. 
Gruen, ‘Law, Sex and the’, A. Soble (ed.), Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia, Vol. 
2: M-Z, London: Greenwood Press, 2006, 583-589, 584). 
988
 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1977. 
989
 R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, London: HUP, 2011, 376.  
990
 Taylor, Secular, 479.  
991
 Dworkin, Justice, 288. 
 155 
shapes our public understanding of sexually immoral or offensive behaviour. However, 
as Adeney points out, and as discussed already, ‘it is difficult to establish a precise 
formulation of liberal principles concerning harm and offense’.992 In addition, and, as a 
consequence of his position, MacIntyre notes that a concept of the human good is for 
Dworkin ‘systematically unsettlable’ within the public sphere.993 
 
However, as David McIlroy argues, the suggestion that the law can remain morally 
neutral on what constitutes the good is inconceivable, highlighting the misconception of 
advocates of legal positivism
994
 in the twentieth century, like Hart, who argued that the 
law and morality were two distinct categories.
995
 Instead, he draws attention to the fact 
that law and policy makers inevitably execute moral leadership in their decision 
making.
996
 Thus, if, as suggested, state neutrality is an unachievable or, indeed, an 
undesirable value stance, a clear challenge is presented to the legislature in making 
value judgments on what constitutes the sexual and relational good in society in the face 
of increasing moral plurality and uncertainty over the meaning and purpose of sexual 
behaviour. 
 
Where public policy discussions are dominated by the principle of autonomy, it is the 
law which inevitably enforces the socially defined parameters of acceptable sexual 
behaviour. According to Joseph Raz’s ‘perfectionist’ understanding of the principle of 
autonomy, it is the responsibility of government to ‘create morally valuable 
opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones’.997  However, in view of cultural moral 
plurality, Herman Di Dijn points to the ‘revolutionary idea’ within modern liberal 
democratic states that not only should all citizens be recognised as free and equal under 
the law, but that states ‘should recognize certain differences (‘group values’) as being 
legally equally valuable’.998 
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Notwithstanding the ongoing evolution of the legislative framework, it would appear 
that the law on sexual behaviour maintains an on-going two-fold responsibility within 
the public structure of governance: to secure and protect individual rights and freedoms, 
and agree and uphold legislatively and judicially defined moral parameters on sexual 
behaviour and diversity, arguably acting as the final arbiter of public sexual morality. In 
view of the moral vision of law, therefore, we should give particular note to the function 
of law as a public educator.
999
 Fitzjames Stephen, for example, in promoting a form of 
legal moralism,
1000
 argued that it was only through the constraints of the law, in addition 
to public opinion, that moral character was promoted: ‘Society has at its disposal two 
great instruments by which vice may be prevented and virtue promoted-namely, the law 
and public opinion; and the law is either criminal or civil’.1001 Nevertheless, at least 
from a theological perspective, we should also give note to the limited scope of this 
legislative morality. As Harries notes, while ‘good laws express a moral vision, they do 
not contain it. The moral vision goes wider and deeper and, for a Christian, is ultimately 
grounded in the wisdom of God’.1002  
 
In the absence of what is judged to be an ‘extremely poor’ standard of public debate on 
moral questions,
1003
 what is evident is that the law plays an increasingly central role in 
setting the parameters of what society judges to be the limits of sexual autonomy, in 
particular the criminal law, described by Fitzjames Stephen as ‘by far the most powerful 
and by far the roughest engine which society can use for any purpose’.1004 At the same 
time it would appear that the principle of autonomy continues to trump any threat of 
legal sanctions. For example, despite policy guidance pointing to the importance of 
young people recognising the law as a guide to sexual behaviour, it is evident that 
current NHS advice inadvertently undermines the role both of the law and public 
opinion. As such, the only view that is ultimately of any consequence when making 
decisions on sexual activity is the one that is self-actuated: ‘The only person who can 
tell you you’re ready – is you – not your partner, not your folks not your friends and 
ultimately not a policeman’.1005 
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Nevertheless, what continues to define and shape the moral parameters of the sexual 
behaviour of young people is a legally defined understanding and application of the 
principle of consent. Difficulty arises, however, in achieving not only a satisfactory 
definition of consent, but a sufficient means of assessing its validity. As Lori Gruen 
points out, there are two laws that she believes even the most ardent liberal would find 
acceptable: ‘laws that prohibit sexual activity between an adult and a child, and laws 
that prohibit sexual assault, rape, or non-consensual sex’.1006 However, as she concedes, 
even these laws are not free from controversy, for they require an understanding of who 
qualifies as a child and what constitutes the presence or absence of consent.  
 
4.4.1  Children and Legal Consent 
 
Consent has become an essential normative concept shaping the moral framework of 
SRE and surrounding discourse, as exemplified in Archard’s liberal approach to sex 
education, on which my critique is centred.
1007
 The principle of consent is evidenced 
within Government policy where, for example, in the Department of Health’s ambition 
for sexual health improvement in England, the moral prerequisite for any sexual contact 
is consent.
1008
 The recent supplementary guidance for SRE emphasised the lack of 
knowledge and understanding that young people currently have around consent and the 
basic legal facts, emphasising that teaching about consent was ‘central to learning about 
healthy, equal and safe relationships and choices’.1009 
 
In her own assessment of the moral discourse surrounding sexual morality and the 
increasing ambiguity over the meaning of sexual acts, Nancy Fisher suggests that the 
morality of a particular act is measured, not so much by the nature of the act itself, but 
in terms of who engages in it.
1010
 This observation appears to correspond with the moral 
judgements that are currently being made on the legality of children and young people 
engaging in sexual behaviour. Such judgments rest on the perceived vulnerability of the 
child, largely founded on the welfare principle and shaped by an assessment of the 
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limits of their decision-making capacities. In his discussion on the concept of consent, 
Alan Wertheimer notes: ‘Even if B’s consent is given completely willingly and even if 
there is no deception, B’s token of consent is morally transformative only if she has the 
requisite emotional and cognitive capacities’.1011 The cognitive maturity of the young 





On the basis of the welfare principle, Mill made his view on the moral responsibility of 
the liberal state towards children and young people quite clear: ‘Those who are still in a 
state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own 
actions as well as against external injury’.1013 However, in view of Mill’s belief in 
humanity as a progressive being, it might equally be argued that a previously-held 
understanding of competence has advanced and, indeed, that the capacity of young 
people to make and take responsibility for their choices continues to evolve. This is 
indicated in Archard’s assessment of autonomous choice and the ‘shifting line’ of 
capacity.
1014
 Recent developments in the sociological understanding of childhood and 
youth, it is claimed, have ‘profound implications’ for the legal limits of young people’s 
sexual behaviour.
1015
 Nevertheless, whatever the perceived advancement in 
understanding and competence, the core sentiment of Mill’s concern remains as a valid 
challenge to the application of liberalism, in particular where the legal limits should be 
drawn to secure protection of the young person and the welfare of society against the 
potential ‘harms’ of sexual behaviour, whatever they are judged to be. 
 
In tracing the historical meaning and application of consent, Matthew Waites suggests 
that ‘judgements of who is capable to give meaningful consent to a sexual act depends 
upon the kind of competence in ‘consenting’ which one might regard as relevant’.1016 
These have historically included the ability to act freely and rationally and, as he 
suggests, are also assessed on the basis of achieving the knowledge and emotional skills 
to handle situations, which he believes can to some extent be taught.
1017
 However, he 
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points to those who argue that social context must also be taken into account in 
assessing capacity, extending the possibility of competence to younger children.
1018
 
While a ‘useful proxy’, Wertheimer sees no reason why age need be a necessary 
indicator of competence, pointing instead to an assessment of an individual’s mental 
capacity to consent.
1019
 In assessing the competence of young people to give sexual 
consent, Waites sets out what, in his view, are key questions for public debate: ‘How do 
children/young people experience sex? Can children/young people give “consent” to 
sex? Do children/young people need protection from sex? And is the law an effective 
means to protect them?’1020 It is important to note that those who have argued for 
radical perspectives on sexuality note with disdain the influence of the law on the young 
and on these who seek to sexually engage with them: ‘The notion that sex per se is 
harmful to the young has been chiselled into extensive social and legal structures 
designed to insulate minors from sexual knowledge and experience’.1021 It is necessary, 
therefore, to understand and assess the rationale behind current legal limits on children 
and young people’s sexual behaviour, in order not only to identify the moral 
commitments that they seek to uphold, but to assess the philosophical rigour of these 
commitments. 
 
The law on sexual behaviour in England and Wales has undergone parliamentary 
scrutiny and review, culminating in the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A 
central theme of the review was the protective role that the criminal law should play in 
preventing the abuse of children. While the Home Office acknowledged sexual 
relationships to be the ‘most intimate and private part of life’, they nevertheless 
recognised the role of the criminal law in dealing with those relationships which are 
deemed ‘non-consensual, inappropriate or wrong’.1022  
 
In line with the moral mantra of preventing harm, a sexual offence is committed, 
according to the Act, where a sexual activity takes place without reasonable belief that 
the other person has consented. The Act states: ‘Whether a belief is reasonable is to be 
determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to 
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ascertain whether B consents’.1023 ‘Consent’ is defined as follows: ‘a person consents if 
he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’.1024 In terms 
of capacity, the Act specifically recognised vulnerable groups deserving of particular 
protection, including persons with a mental disorder, and children. Regarding the limits 
of capacity and the legal protection offered to children, the law deems that children 
under the age of thirteen do not have the capacity to consent to any form of sexual 
activity.
1025
 In such cases, the defendant’s claims of consent will prove irrelevant. In 
addition, an offence is committed against a child under 16 if the defendant did not 




In exploring the rationale for age of consent laws, Waites suggests that ‘the distinction 
between risk and harm is a crucial starting point’.1027 This echoes Wertheimer’s view 
that it is ‘easier to evaluate the expected benefits and harms of youthful sexual 
relationships and then reason backward to the competence to consent’.1028 As such, 
while conceding that no directly harmful consequences may occur (as is legally 
presumed in the case of a consenting adult), Waites recognises the increased 
vulnerability of young people, due to their ‘structurally disadvantaged position within 
the social hierarchy’, suggesting that there is a risk of harm arising from sexual 
behaviour on account of the unequal power relations which exist within the structure of 
adult-child relations.
1029
 This echoes Archard’s view that social relationships and the 
social context should play a role in determining the age of consent.
1030
 For Wertheimer, 
on the other hand, what is perceived as exploitative does not necessarily invalidate a 
consensual decision.
1031
 In addition, Waite acknowledges that his rationale does not 
give a definitive answer to the appropriate age of legal sexual activity, and, indeed, 
highlights a practical inconsistency in the application of its underlying principle. For, 
while the Act rightly seeks to protect those who are vulnerable to abuse, it appears there 
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is a limit to which the legal parameters are allowed to infringe on the moral autonomy 
of the young person, as evidenced in their right to consent to sexual health services.  
 
In response to the age limitations set down in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the 
Department of Health has made clear that the legislation does not affect the duty of care 
and confidentiality that a health professional owes to a ‘Gillick competent’ young 
person under 16, regarding reproductive services.
1032
 As such, Tom Beauchamp and 
James Childress note the ‘gatekeeping’ role that those within healthcare play in making 
competence judgements.
1033
 However, Waites highlights the problem with this 
inconsistency: ‘The difference in the state’s role between the two scenarios (legal 
prohibition of sexual activity v. provision of sexual health services) demonstrates that 
different principles are being applied, and raises the question of whether these are 
appropriate and well-founded’.1034 This continues to be a matter of legal and ethical 




Nevertheless, in responding to those who call for the de-criminalisation of young 
people’s sexual behaviour, Waites argues that having an age of consent enforces social 
norms on what is deemed appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, conveying a moral 
message to young people and wider society and protecting the collective interests and 
welfare of young people.
1036
 However, while presenting this position he, at the same 
time, proposes a reduction in the age of consent from 16 to 14, with a two-year ‘age-
span provision’,1037 in order to give legitimacy to young people engaging in sexual 
behaviour with their peers.
1038
 While we could assume that such a move would indeed 
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convey to young people and wider society a message around the moral legitimacy of 
young people engaging in sexual behaviour,
1039
 and would appease those who believe 
that young people under the current age of consent should have the right to choose when 
they are ready for sex,
1040
 it is unclear at the same time how such a move corresponds 
with his rationale for protecting young people from the risk of harm, without of course 
naively assuming that unequal power relations occur only at the level of ‘adult’ to 
‘child’ and not ‘peer’ to ‘peer’.  
 
Once again, the application of the harm principle without an underlying moral 
understanding or context for sexual behaviour proves inadequate. As Guy Brandon 
suggests, the application of consent by itself leads to a ‘narrow and unrealistic 
assessment of who is affected, whether in positive or negative ways. Consent needs to 
be a starting point, not the end point’.1041 Broader ethical questions concerning the value 
and worth that society places on the engagement of young people in sexual behaviour, 
therefore, extends beyond the remit of the criminal law and must be brought within the 
scope of a more comprehensive civic debate, shaping a more coherent public sexual 
ethic. 
 
4.4.2 Beyond Consent: The Legal Limits of Sexual Diversity 
 
A further role of the law on sexual behaviour is to establish parameters on morally 
acceptable sexual acts, establishing and upholding social norms. As such, a clear 
distinction is made on sexual behaviours which are deemed not only non-consensual 
and therefore abusive, but on those that are judged inappropriate or wrong; these include 
exposure, voyeurism, bestiality, necrophilia and incest.
1042
 Although Harris and others 
would conclude that such acts are not in themselves immoral, there continues to be a 
role for the criminal law in upholding a moral boundary on sexual diversity. Thus, in 
addition to the prevention of harm to others through non-consensual activity, it is 
evident that what Feinberg identifies as legal paternalism
1043
 and legal moralism
1044
 still 
operate within the existing system of criminal law.
1045
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In light of this, questions will inevitably arise over the application of the liberal 
principle of equality. For where equality is identified as a core theme of the Sexual 
Offences legislation, Jonathan Burnside questions why equal regard for individual 
sexual preference should extend only to heterosexual and homosexual behaviour, and 
not extend to other sexual practices. In response to his own rhetorical question, he notes 
that the principle of equality is positioned within a normative framework: ‘The Act’s 
vision of equality is necessarily founded on a series of moral distinctions’.1046 Is it, 
therefore, beyond the realm of possibility that, within our current moral understanding 
of sex, a future revision of Sexual Offences legislation may further dilute our current 
moral distinctions? Or, indeed, with future revisions, is the reverse not also possible? 
For, where sexual morality becomes a product of social construction, Nancy Fischer 
reminds us that ‘we should keep in mind that sexual practices that might be considered 
as being within the confines of acceptable moral behaviour today could be constructed 
to be morally corrupt in the future’.1047  
 
As such, the role of active civic debate on the boundaries of sexual diversity should not 
be underestimated. If Gruen is correct in her assumptions, legal moralists will only 
endorse the prohibition of behaviours which the public condemns.
1048
 In his discussion 
on objects, events or acts that a society deems abominable, Jeffrey Stout suggests that 
such decisions are made depending on the perceived threat they pose to the ‘established 
cosmological or social order’.1049 As such, within our current order, it would appear that 
acts are deemed abominable if they breach one’s social role within the socially 
legitimated purposes accorded to sexual activity.
1050
 For example, Stout suggests that 
bestiality calls into questions one’s social identity,1051 with particular moral significance 
placed in breaching the line between human and non-human.  
 
However, in identifying the inadequacy of our current public sexual ethic, in particular 
the ambiguity of the harm principle, as well as the incoherency of the naturalist premise 
on which it is founded, I suggest that, while not inevitable, a future shift in the moral 
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classification of sexual behaviours which presently are judged immoral and, therefore, 
illegal, is logically possible. For, indeed, there are those who argue that any 
classification of sexual acts, on account of their morality, is akin to racism.
1052
 In my 
own discussion, this raises particular concern for how such a public ethic shapes the 
moral content of SRE. For, where humanly constructed norms and principles evolve and 
change, sexually ‘immoral’ behaviours, no matter how culturally abhorrent, are rooted 
in moveable foundations. 
 
For example, while adult-child sexual relations remain socially and morally abhorrent, 
Primoratz suggests that if the immorality and illegality of paedophilia rests solely on the 
fact that harm is done to the child then, in his view, the ‘issues of its moral and legal 
standing are far from settled and await further philosophical and empirical 
investigation’.1053 He argues that there is inconclusive evidence either way in terms of 
the harm inflicted on the child, and the current legal prohibition of such sexual 
behaviour would instead appear simply to be the ‘most prudent and morally appropriate 
choice’.1054  
 
If in the future there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the harm (as notionally 
defined at the time) done to the child was not as severe as currently judged, would the 
moral quality of this sexual act change?
1055
 After all, historical and anthropological 
accounts of child abuse confirm that the understanding of child abuse is determined by 
the relevant cultural context.
1056
  On what ontological basis would we refute the 
assertion of Havelock Ellis that ‘every age or land has its own morality’?1057  It should 
not go unnoted that Kinsey and his colleagues argued ‘there are as yet insufficient data 
either in our own or in other studies, for reaching general conclusions on the 
significance of sexual contact between children and adults’.1058 On noting those children 
that were ‘upset or frightened by their contacts with adults’, Kinsey and his colleagues 
suggested that, ‘if a child were not culturally conditioned, it is doubtful if it would be 
disturbed by sexual approaches of the sort which had usually been involved in these 
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histories’.1059 Where no moral understanding is brought to bear on this type of sexual 
encounter, the danger exists that a social climate is created where such behaviour is 
deemed socially permissible and does not breach Stout’s cosmological or social order.  
 
In view of even the logical possibility of creating such a moral order, we should be wary 
of a world in which, as Grayling advocates, we are masters of our own destiny.
1060
 
Jacqueline Laing claims that if we want to maintain the notion that certain activities are 
‘timelessly unjust’, then we cannot view morality and law ‘i.e. that which binds the 
human conscience’, as simply a human construct. Judging on the basis of human 
experience and historical precedent, she concludes: ‘Both morality and law, properly 
understood, had better be more than that’.1061 Thus, in examining the role that criminal 
law plays in regulating sexual behaviour, its deficiency as the sole arbiter of public 
sexual morality and its limits in fostering civic virtue should not go unnoted. For, as 
John Gibbens suggests: ‘A civil society that referees the minimal rules necessary to 
uphold civil life and facilitates respect for and the right to diversity needs to be 
supplemented by a civil and sexual ethics’.1062  
 
While I shall argue that this is, indeed, a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a morally 
coherent and satisfactory public sexual ethic, what I have noted already is that the ethic 
that currently supplements the law is largely limited to the same single moral premise: a 
socially constructed understanding of that which maximises pleasure and minimises 
harm. In addition, the intellectual roots of moral judgements become increasingly 
difficult to justify as principles and laws are informed by the current norms in society, 
rather than an objective understanding of the intrinsic moral quality of sexual acts. As 
Burnside argues: ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003 points beyond itself to a loss within 
our social consciousness of how we understand the significance of sexual behaviour. 
This is something we are all caught up in because it affects all of us, both individually 
and collectively as a society’.1063  It is this collective loss of meaning which, Sire 
suggests, is the final outcome of nihilism: ‘The strands of epistemological, metaphysical 
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and ethical nihilism weave together to make a rope long enough and strong enough to 
hang a whole culture. The name of the rope is Loss of Meaning’.1064 
 
4.5 Conclusion: Incoherent and Inadequate Public Sexual Ethic 
 
In offering a glimpse of the ‘Moral Zeitgeist’, the purpose of doing so is to note that 
where public moral discourse increasingly defends the right to pursue self-constructed 
notions of the ‘good’ without any intrinsic understanding of the morality of sex, an 
inevitable consequence for the policy content and practice of SRE is that it follows suit. 
This includes, as Tatchell suggests, teaching young people that, within a socially 
defined understanding of ethical sex, in addition to orientation, the context is 
inconsequential: ‘regardless of whether they are married, cohabiting or living apart; 
regardless of whether they are into one-night-stands or committed relationships; and 
regardless of whether they have sex for love or sex for pleasure’.1065  
 
In addition, beyond the consequentialist interpretation of public and legal norms, Rivers 
warns of a new ‘political absolutism’ in which the state, through the power of the legal 
system, protects the individual’s self-constructed notion of dignity. He points to the 
debate over same sex marriage as an example of this ‘postmodern dignity’ at work, 
representing ‘a paradigm shift towards a denial of the “natural” in any normatively 
charged sense and to the universal mandate of the state to protect each individual in his 
or her vulnerable self-construction’.1066 In his assessment of the implication of a 
postmodern worldview on ethics, Sire notes: ‘Ethics, like knowledge, is a linguistic 
construct. Social good is whatever society takes it to be’.1067 If such is the case, it would 
appear that an even more urgent task is to re-awaken public moral discourse around a 
shared vision of relational and sexual civic virtue. As such, within a climate of increased 
moral agnosticism about moral norms and values with regards to sexual behaviour, 
there is an urgent need to understand and respond to young people’s ethical questions 
within a renewed moral vision of human flourishing.  
 
In light of this, I shall move on in Chapter 5 to present a moral framework which, I will 
argue, provides a more coherent and enriched vision of a sexually and relationally 
educated young person, a vision shaped by a theological virtue ethic. It not only 
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enriches liberal educational discourse, but re-invigorates a public sexual ethic which 
moves beyond a set of legal precepts. In what Wright notes to be the evidenced lurch 
between ‘deregulation’ and ‘reregulation’ in major areas of life, such as sexual activity, 
he highlights what he views to be the essential problem with this approach: ‘introducing 
new regulations doesn’t get to the heart of the problem’.1068 The heart of the problem, 
he suggests, is a character deficit, in which we are more concerned with what to do, or 
not to do, than how to do it: ‘Rules matter, it seems, but character matters more, and 
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Chapter 5  
A Theo-ethical Case for Virtue: A Constructive 
Approach 
 
5.1 Introduction: Presenting a Theological Virtue Ethic 
 
The moral vision of SRE, which informs policy and practice, is an inevitable reflection, 
not only of the moral commitments that are shaping our understanding of moral 
education within the current social order, but of a culturally-constructed understanding 
of sex and relationships within a corresponding account of human flourishing. Having 
focussed my critique on the implicit and explicit moral values and principles within the 
moral vision of SRE discourse, as reflected in Archard’s philosophical approach to sex 
education, I will, in this Chapter, build on the conclusions of previous Chapters and 
offer a constructive engagement with a vision of a sexually and relationally educated 
young person, as seen through a Christian theistic worldview lens,
1070
 in particular a 
theological virtue ethic. The end purpose of this thesis is to make the case for how such 
a vision might enrich the moral discourse of SRE policy. 
 
Dissolution of the normative link between sex and relationships, as discussed in Chapter 
4, strips sexual activity of any inherent moral value and, as a consequence, has 
impoverished our understanding of sexual personhood. Within our public sexual ethic, 
we are in danger of losing a relational language in which to speak about the context of 
sex that moves beyond the limited, socially constructed understanding of consent. 
Indeed, when it comes to speaking about relationships within wider policy discourse, 
John Aschcroft and Michael Schluter note an increased moral disorientation:   
Many people are willing to agree that long-term stable relationships are, in principle, a 
good thing. But when it comes to defining a ‘good’ relationship, or what kinds of 
relationship (if any) should be favoured by public policy, and whether things are getting 




In this final chapter I will present a theological virtue ethic as a means of enriching 
current moral discourse, re-introducing a moral language that engages with the 
relational good of sexual behaviour and human flourishing, a vision in which, as Volf 
suggests, the love of pleasure gives way to the pleasure of love.
1072
 Discovering the 
place of virtue in the moral life has contributed to a rich tradition of moral discourse 
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within the activities and purposes of moral education, in particular that which concerns 





In presenting a theological virtue ethic as a constructive discourse, it will be necessary 
to explore, and make the case for: first, why a virtue ethic is a justifiable ethical guide to 
the moral life, as compared to, for example, a consequentialist or deontological ethic; 
secondly, how and why the cultivation of virtue continues to present important insights 
into moral education; thirdly, how and why a virtue ethic might offer a moral language 
with which to enrich the moral framework of SRE. It introduces a moral language, we 
will suggest, that presents a more human approach to moral education and human 
flourishing, not overtly focussed on a young person’s capacity for moral reasoning, but 
offering a more embodied understanding of how directed loves and desires shape habits 




In addition, in engaging with a theological virtue ethic as a means of enriching moral 
discourse around SRE, it is important to highlight a couple of prerequisites that frame 
the conversation. First, as indicated in Chapter 1, I shall adopt what Cooling presents as 
a ‘transformationalist strategy’ in education, where Christian values, rather than being 
viewed as separatist, are welcomed as a means of enriching moral discourse and 
contributing to the common good in education. In light of this approach, and in view of 
modern accounts of the virtues within moral education, I will explore common ground 
with, in particular, the communitarian and neo-classicalist accounts of character 
formation, which Hunter suggests have emerged in direct challenge to the inadequacy of 





As such, while not seeking to present a theological virtue ethic as equivalent in meaning 
and practice to other virtue traditions,
1076
 I shall echo Stanley Hauerwas and Charles 
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Pinches in suggesting that the differences do not make ‘a conversation between 
Christian and ancient pagan or modern liberal accounts of the virtues impossible or 
irrelevant’.1077 Instead, the differences make the conversation ‘all the more necessary as 
well as interesting’.1078 Hauerwas also notes that the language of virtue or character 
‘might well be useful to most accounts of moral development’.1079 This discussion will 
therefore occupy a space between the neo-orthodox and the liberal groupings identified 




A second prerequisite to any public conversation on the place of virtue in the moral life 
is to recognise and accept that there will be fundamental differences in the ontological 
presuppositions brought to bear in the discussion. For example, Roberts points out that, 
within a classical virtue ethic, a virtue is a ‘realization of actualization of some aspect of 
human nature’,1081 whereas virtues, ascribed and understood within the Christian 
narrative, are formed in two ways: ‘a. as a response to grace; and b. as imitation of 
God’.1082 As Wright states: ‘Virtue, in the great philosophical tradition, has always said, 
“Become what you will be.” Christian virtue says, “What you will be is what you 
already are in Christ.”’.1083 
 
In view of these differences, and in embracing the constructive spirit that is inherent in a 
‘transformationalist’ approach to SRE, I will, at the same time, seek to be faithful to a 
theological account of human personhood and human sexuality, recognising that no 
virtue account is ‘ideologically neutral’,1084 and pointing out where modern accounts of 
virtue are incompatible with this vision. As long as the public square is open to civil and 
tolerant public engagement, inevitably a public judgement will be made on the ‘moral 
orientation’ of a Theological virtue ethic towards a public vision of human flourishing 
within SRE policy and practice as, indeed, should be the case with every other ‘moral 
orientation’ represented.  
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5.2 Virtue and the Moral Life  
 
It is evident within historic and contemporary theological discourse that the case has 
been made for why the virtues offer a particularly suitable framework within which to 
present a Christian understanding of the moral life.
1085
 Indeed, in reflecting on the role 
of Scripture in shaping the moral life, William Spohn suggests that the ethics of 





Arguably, the most recent prolific and detailed theological examination of a virtue ethic 
within the Protestant tradition has been undertaken by the theologian and ethicist, 
Stanley Hauerwas.
1087
 Hauerwas notes that every theological ethic adopts a metaphor in 
which an understanding of the nature of God and man’s moral experience is understood. 
He adopts virtue and character as his central metaphors.
1088
 This, he notes, does not 
‘exclude the language of command but only places it in a larger framework of moral 
experience’.1089 In accounting for the relationship between our beliefs and subsequent 
behaviour, Hauerwas states: ‘Our moral life is not comprised of beliefs plus decisions; 
our moral life is the process in which our convictions form our character to be 
truthful’.1090 Wells points out that, for Hauerwas, the efficient rather than the final cause 
of moral decisions is his primary concern and, as such, ‘the stuff of ethics lies further 
upstream in the formation of the agents who are to become the efficient causes’.1091 
However, this also leaves Hauerwas open to criticism that he fails to adequately 




The tradition of viewing the virtues as a means of developing a distinctly Christian 
understanding of the moral life can be traced back, in particular, to the significant 
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contribution made by Thomas Aquinas in the 13
th
 century in the Summa Theologica.
1093
 
In exploring his theory of morality, Porter notes that Aquinas’ theory of virtue differs 
from that of Hauerwas’, in that it is grounded in particular in a ‘general theory of 
goodness and the human good’.1094 For Aquinas, this good is ultimately found in life 
with God. An ongoing dependence on God’s grace, evident in Aquinas’ account of the 
virtues, is something, according to Nicholas Healy, which is missing in Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiocentric approach.
1095
 It is also, suggests D.J. O’Connor, what marks him out as 




Nevertheless, it is important to note that Christian virtues have been informed by, and 
developed in response to, other moral traditions, in particular, the Hellenistic tradition. 
Julia Annas suggests that the ‘theoretical structure’ that the ancient tradition of virtue 
ethics provides for an understanding of virtue as an ethical theory is unsurpassed, and 
offers the structure within which to examine all other theories that espouse to be a virtue 
ethic.
1097
 In offering an extended critique of the ethic of Aristotle and Aquinas, 
Hauerwas affirms this position: ‘Their thought, in spite of obvious difficulties and 
ambiguities, continues to be the most adequate systematic account of the nature of 
character in the history of ethics’.1098  
 
As such, Porter points to two formative sources for a Christian understanding of the 
virtues – the Hellenistic tradition and those presented in Scripture.1099 Indeed, as a 
precursor to his exploration of the New Testament Scriptural understanding of Christian 
virtue, Wright points out that it was the experience of early Christians that ‘in and 
through Jesus they had discovered both a totally different way of being human and a 
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way which scooped up the best that ancient wisdom had to offer and placed it in a 
framework where it could, at last, make sense’.1100 
 
5.2.1 A Theo-ethical Understanding of Virtue Ethics  
 
Despite more recent work by theologians such as Hauerwas, when it comes to the 
exploration of a theological virtue ethic, virtue theory is largely associated with a 
Catholic moral tradition and, as such, it is suggested remains a ‘neglected concept in 
protestant ethics’.1101 In particular, when it comes to educating for character, Arthur 
suggests that the Catholic Church ‘appears to have a clear, definite and intelligible 
theory of character formation which is strengthened by religious motive’.1102 Arguably, 
as discussed below, a Protestant approach is not so clearly understood and still lacks an 
adequate theological framework within which to construct a vision of educating in 
virtue. However, before exploring the implications of a virtue approach for moral 
education, it is important to identify key characteristics of this ethical theory, both 
through a theological and a philosophical lens. 
  
(a) The Moral Agent: Being vs. Doing 
 
In discussing a virtue approach to ethics, Hollinger offers a succinct definition: ‘The 
key issue is not What ought we to do? but rather What ought we to be? The kind of 
people we are as evidenced by our virtues, firmly implanted within, is the heart and 
essence of ethics’.1103 For Gushee and Stassen, it is a ‘fundamental error’ to distinguish 
between the importance of being and doing.
1104
 Nevertheless, a virtue ethic, in 
comparison to other ethical traditions, places particular importance on human agency; 
the morality of an action is measured more by the character and motivation of the moral 
agent than by a consequentialist judgement, or compliance with law and duty. As such, 
we are not suggesting that other ethical theories do not offer an account of the moral 
agent or of virtue and character. As a point of distinction, Carr, for example, notes that 
while other ethical theories i.e. those within a Kantian or utilitarian tradition, recognise 
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the importance of cultivating the virtues, their point of departure is not the moral agent, 
but the nature of the moral reasoning needed in order to be accorded status as a moral 
agent.
1105
 Therefore, while other moral traditions may have a theory of virtue, a moral 
theory, Michael Slote suggests, that treats virtue as just one aspect of that theory, does 




Therefore, in drawing distinctions between an act- and agent-centred ethic, and the 
problematic nature of the latter, Louden highlights at least two distinctions. First, when 
it comes to moral reasoning, while an act-centred ethic is concerned with devising a 
particular formula of rules to resolve moral dilemmas, an agent-centred ethic is more 
concerned with the long-term impact of choices on the agent’s character.1107 Preceding 
epistemological questions concerned with the content of moral reasoning, a virtue ethic 
identifies a reciprocal relationship between character and action. Secondly, concerning 





Regarding the self as moral agent, Hauerwas notes: ‘To attribute agency to a person is 
to assume that he is capable of changing the circumstances around himself’.1109 As Carr 
points out: 
one cannot understand what it is to engage in appropriate moral reasoning and 
deliberation apart from some grasp of what it is to be a moral agent – conceived in 





Not downplaying the role of ‘intentions, dispositions, and habits of the heart’, Hollinger 
notes that while character may inform our decisions, the decisions, in turn, inform our 
character.
1111
 As such, in understanding the human agent, Joseph Kotva suggests that a 
virtue theory is positioned between behaviourism and voluntarism:  
We are not, as the behaviourist account suggests, simply at the mercy of forces outside 
our control; we help form our own and each other’s character. We also are not, 
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contrary to the voluntarist account, free from the constraints of character. Past choices 
and actions influence the kind of person we become, and the kind of persons we become 




In addition, in recognising the inter-relatedness between being and doing, Annas 
highlights the fact that a virtue is concerned with the disposition to act for a reason: 
‘The exercise of the agent’s practical reasoning is thus essential to the way a virtue is 
both built up and exercised’.1113 According to the classical understanding, a virtuous 
agent, engaging their affective and intellectual nature, chooses to do the right thing for 
the right reason.
1114
 As Hauerwas points out, Aristotle recognised ‘an essential 
connection between the idea of man capable of action and his existence as a rational 
being’.1115 Aristotle’s moral agent discerns the end towards which reasoning is directed: 
‘Now the origin of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice, and the origin of 
choice is appetition and purposive reasoning’.1116 Accordingly, the reason which 
precedes moral judgement is informed by the virtues. As Geach states: ‘But if (and this 
is what I believe) all men can attain their last end, but only by right choices, then it is 
reasonable to suppose that the right choice must be guided be a right view of things’.1117 
 
On this account, reasoning and choice are not devoid of desire. Hauerwas points out that 
both Aristotle and Aquinas were ‘aware of the interdependence of reason and 
desire’,1118 thus integrating an understanding of the moral and intellectual virtues.1119 
Choice, therefore, is an intentional outcome of man’s rational and desiring self: ‘In 
choice man’s will receives its particular determination, for it is in choice that man is 
committed to act in the concrete , that in electing the act he elects to be a particular kind 
of man’.1120 This, according to Philippa Foot, distinguishes virtue from a skill or an art, 
for it is not a ‘mere capacity’, but must engage the agent’s will.1121 As such, even 
though intentions are not always realised, agency and action cannot be separated within 
an idea of character, in view of the agent’s self-determining nature and the embodied 
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nature of his actions: ‘Man’s very ability to engage the world, shaping it in accordance 
with his intentions and projects, determines who he is’.1122 This echoes Thielicke’s 
vision of sexual personhood, in which sexual behaviour is not viewed in isolation, but is 




Acquiring character through determined action, therefore, lies at the heart of what 
Hauerwas understands it to mean to have character.
1124
 Character is something that is 
not fixed or permanently determined, but accounts for the ‘continuing qualification of 
our agency’.1125 As Georg Henrik von Wright notes: ‘Because of the lack of an essential 
tie between a virtue and an act-category, the path of virtue is never laid out in advance. 
It is for the man of virtue to determine where it goes in the particular case’.1126 For 
Wright, as understood within a New Testament framework, ‘virtue is the result of 
thought and choice’.1127 Yet a philosophical and theological account recognise the 
impact of habitual virtuous behaviour on one’s long-term character, where virtuous acts 
are done, among other things, notes Aristotle, from a ‘fixed and permanent disposition’ 
(1105a 32).
1128
 As Wright states: ‘virtue is what happens when wise and courageous 
choices have become “second nature”’.1129  
 
Therefore, based on a progressive understanding of the moral self, Hauerwas notes that 
‘the ethics of character is concerned with the self’s duration, growth, and unity’,1130 and, 
within a theological account, accorded with the doctrine of sanctification. Of course, 
other moral theories of virtue ethics will not understand character formation within such 
a conceptual frame. Yet it remains a main task of virtue ethicists, Slote suggests, to give 
an account of how people should act, ‘giving a distinctively virtue-ethical account of the 
rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of human actions’.1131 
 
(b) Virtue Epistemology: A Community of Meaning 
 
Beyond the long-term impact of an agent’s choices on their character, Louden’s second 
distinctive feature of a virtue ethic is that, where the motivation of an act-centred ethic 
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is the concept of duty or the maximisation of utility, the motivation of a virtue theorist is 
the virtues themselves.
1132
 Accordingly, one ‘vice’ of the longer-term, virtue-centred 
approach, he suggests, is that it may lead to a ‘peculiar sort of moral backsliding’, due 




When it comes to envisioning the moral life through a theological lens, a biblical 
understanding of virtue is often equated, Hollinger suggests, with teachings concerning 
the disposition of ‘the heart’.1134 However, this, points out Stassen and Gushee, should 
be a holistic understanding of inner heart and outward action in relationship to God. As 
Hauerwas notes, a theological ethic of character is problematic for those who view 
command as central to ethics, reflecting a more general concern about the danger of 
ethics seeking to understand the Christian life apart from God’s grace.1135 
 
O’Donovan cautions against an understanding of the biblical teaching on the heart 
overlooking the place of moral action, substituting ‘agent-evaluation for act-
evaluation’.1136  Instead, he suggests, it is important to recognise the correlation between 
the two: ‘(a) the subject’s character must not be reduced to a function of his acts; (b) the 
subject’s acts must be allowed to disclose his character, which will make itself known 
only through them’.1137 On the first point, Hauerwas points to a similar conclusion 
drawn by Aristotle’s ethic, in that ‘the mere fact that a man performs certain acts does 
not mean that he is a man of good character’.1138 Additionally, Louden notes the fact 
that nobody is morally infallible, for ‘even the best person can make the wrong 
choices’.1139 Also, moral characters, he suggests, are vulnerable to change.1140 The 
second point is of particular importance for an understanding of virtue within the moral 
life, for in noting the ‘epistemological priority of act’, O’Donovan suggests that 
knowledge of a person’s character is important, not for deliberative moral reasoning, but 
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for the moral evaluation of an act.
1141
 Equally, Louden points out, ‘we cannot always 
know the moral value of a person’s character by assessing his or her actions’.1142  
 
O’Donovan’s view on the epistemological priority of act differs from, for example, 
Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian understanding of virtue where she advocates the 
epistemological priority of agent over act. In responding to the perceived weakness of a 
virtue ethic in providing specific moral guidance, she argues that moral rules and virtues 
both require an account of morality in order to guide moral decision and are, therefore, 
both open to the danger of relativism or moral scepticism.
1143
 Hursthouse’s virtue-
centred approach contends that an agent flourishes to the extent that they live a virtuous 
life and engage in virtuous activity.
1144
   
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, this leaves unanswered the criteria against which 
an evaluative account of their behaviour is given or, indeed, a guide as to what the 
moral agent should do or be. In exploring a virtue ethics approach to sexuality, Halwani 
questions whether there are sexual acts that a virtuous person would not engage in and, 
equally, whether there are acts, that stem from vice, that are deemed wrong.
1145
  Virtue-
based theories are open, Louden suggests, to the charge of ‘style over substance’ in 
terms of the ends to which they are directed.
1146
 He argues that a virtue ethic is 
‘particularly weak in the areas of casuistry and applied ethics’.1147 In addition, he points 
to the necessity of morally condemning some acts in view of their intolerable nature,
1148
 
arguing overall that acts, rather than agents, should sometimes be the locus of moral 
evaluation.
1149
 As Linville points out: ‘We should be able to say simply that rape and 
genocide are wrong because people ought neither to be raped nor exterminated’.1150 
This, of course, depends on an ethical theory being able to give an adequate ontological 
account of moral truth, including an account of personhood.  
 
In view of the narrative context within which a virtue ethic is understood, the 
community is given an elevated place and influence in shaping the meaning of the moral 
                                                 
1141
 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 215. 
1142
 Louden, ‘Some’, 211. 
1143
 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: OUP, 1999, 32-34. 
1144
 Slote, ‘Virtue’, 328. 
1145
 R. Halwani, ‘Ethics, Virtue’, A. Soble (ed.), Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia, 
Vol. 1: A-L, London: Greenwood Press, 2006, 279-285, 280. 
1146
 Louden, ‘Some’, 215. 
1147
 Louden, ‘Some’, 205. 
1148
 Louden, ‘Some’, 207, 208. 
1149
 Louden, ‘Some’, 210. 
1150
 Linville, ‘Moral’, 431. 
 179 
life and determining moral character. As I will continue to note, this is particularly 
exemplified within the theological ethic of Hauerwas.
1151
 All ethical theories, according 
to Hauerwas, are always narrative dependent, and attempts to find points of contact 
between different moral theories ‘inevitably result in a minimalistic ethic and often one 
which gives support to forms of cultural imperialism’.1152 In view of this, he argues that 
‘Christian ethics can never be a minimalistic ethic for everyone, but must presuppose a 
sanctified people wanting to live more faithful to God’s story’.1153 
 
However, Smith suggests that our liturgical existence as ‘imaginative, narrative 
animals’,1154 is part of our created nature and is, therefore, as applicable within a 
Christian understanding of formation as it is within secular accounts.
1155
  As embodied 
actors, we find meaning in the practices and habits which shape our world: ‘We live into 
the stories we’ve absorbed; we become characters in the drama that has captivated 
us’.1156 In correlation with much of the discussion in Chapter 4, it is of interest to note, 
therefore, the implications of Smith’s observations for an understanding of sexuality: 
‘Sexuality, then, is not just some animal response to stimuli embedded in biological 
organs; sexuality is a product of meaning’.1157 
  
Nevertheless, while narrative can give content and meaning to our existence, Hollinger 
questions whether it can provide a sufficient foundation for ethics. Instead, he suggests 
that we need both the ‘broad strokes’ of narrative and the ‘specific pointers’ of 
commands and principles.
1158
  He notes, in particular, a ‘transcendent reality’ beyond 
the context of community which can be known through the revelation of God in the 
‘written and incarnate Word’.1159 Therefore, when it comes to Christian sexual ethics, 
while he affirms the ‘foundation, motivation, and substance’ that narrative provides, he 
yet points to the fact that ‘principles are a significant part of divine revelation and show 
us the directions and boundaries our sexual lives ought to reflect’.1160 However, those 
who advocate a theological, virtue-centred approach to ethics do not dismiss the 
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authority of Scripture or the implications of the Incarnation for Christian ethics, but 
recognise that both provide the content and context which give form and meaning to 
community.
1161
 In addition, as Porter suggests, the language of virtue and the language 
of moral rules may indeed provide different roles within moral discourse, neither 




Therefore, in light of the multi-dimensional nature of character formation, Gushee and 
Stassen, as indicated in Chapter 1, suggest a move from talking of virtue ethics to 
‘holistic character ethics’,1163  presenting four dimensions of a character ethic which 
they advance as faithful to Jesus’ teaching and a broader biblical ethic: ‘our 
passions/loyalties, our perceptions, our way or reasoning and our basic convictions’.1164 
The first dimension appears to echo Smith’s anthropological presuppositions – that we 
are more than autonomous minds, but our passions and related loyalties to people, 
practice, and communities and ultimately to God, deeply shape our character. This 
reflects what van der Ven notes to be the inter-relational dynamic of character 
development: ‘Character does not unfold from within the person in isolation, but is 
called out through interaction with others in that situation, and through the grappling 
with tasks and challenges that are part of that situation’.1165 A holistic model, Gushee 
and Stassen suggest, avoids ethics deteriorating into ‘inward emigration’, overtly 





(c) The Telos of the Moral Agent and the Moral Life 
 
In conclusion, a virtue ethic gives particular attention to the teleological character and 
function of the individual and the moral life, as well as to the moral life of the 
community. Particularly evidenced in an Aristotelian ethic,
1167
 and arguably most 
fervently defended by MacIntyre in modern philosophical discourse,
1168
 the moral life is 
a trajectory towards the individual acting in accordance with the essential nature and 
function of a human being: ‘Within that teleological scheme there is fundamental 
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contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
essential-nature’.1169  
 
Annas highlights that virtues are character traits that must manifest a commitment to 
‘some ethical value’ such as justice, where the moral agent does not just perform actions 
that are judged to be just, but is disposed, engaging practical reasoning, to act 
accordingly.
1170
 Where different virtue theories will identify different values, what is 
central in a classical virtue ethic, suggest Annas, is that one’s actions are understood 
within a broader conception of the whole of life.
1171
 Thus, as Meilaender points out: ‘To 
see this is to understand why vision is likely to be a central theme in any ethic of virtue. 
Our virtues do not simply fit us for life; they help shape life’.1172 Relevant to our own 
discussion, Eilert Herms points out that making the connection between action and a 




Aristotle believed human action was directed towards ‘eudaimonia’, understood as 
‘happiness’ or ‘living well’.1174 He was not alone in defending this view of the moral 
life for, as Daniel Russell points out, all the major schools of philosophy in Ancient 
Greece were eudaimonists, understanding that all practical reason requires a final 
end,
1175
  and suggesting that this vision of the good life incorporates ‘human fulfilment 
and individual fulfilment’.1176 However, the difference in the understanding of 
‘eudaimonia’, both between ancient and modern ethics and between contemporary 
virtue theories has, as Slote suggests, signified a ‘fundamental divide’ in approaches.1177   
 
Nevertheless, it should at least be acknowledged that when it comes to understanding 
young people and their sexual behaviour, a vision of human flourishing which focusses 
solely on the absence of pregnancy or disease may invariably fall short, as, indeed, 
would a vision which gives undue attention to satisfying sexual impulses. For, as 
Scruton suggests, ‘health is the state in which I flourish as an animal; happiness is the 
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state in which I flourish as a person’.1178 In addition, understanding Aristotle’s vision of 
happiness, Scruton points out, does not amount to the ‘satisfaction of impulses, but to 
the fulfilment of the person’.1179 The achievement of happiness amounts to acting 
virtuously, deliberating rationally on what will achieve the ultimate good, with an 
individual’s reason informed by the virtues. As MacIntyre points out, ‘the virtues are 
precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve 
eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate his movement towards that telos’.1180 
Foot also notes the need for virtue in the life of the moral agent: ‘Human beings do not 
get on well without them. Nobody can get on well if he lacks courage, and does not 
have some measure of temperance and wisdom, while communities where justice and 
charity are lacking are apt to be wretched places to live’.1181 As such, beyond the 
individual, the community benefits. 
 
Of course, for this discussion it is important to make a distinction between a 
philosophically informed and theologically informed understanding of human telos. 
MacIntyre suggests that Aristotle’s scheme is ‘complicated and added to, but not 
essentially altered, when placed within a framework of theistic beliefs’.1182 For 
MacIntyre, one such addition is the concept of sin.
1183
  Indeed, he notes that ‘there is no 
word in the Greek of Aristotle’s age correctly translated ‘sin’, ‘repentance’, or 
‘charity’’.1184 However, as I shall explore later, the doctrine of sin fundamentally alters 
our theological understanding of human nature and the outworking of moral theory. In 
defence of a distinctly theological ethic of virtue, John Millbank, for example, argues 
that the ‘counter-history’, ‘counter-ethics’ and ‘counter-ontology’ of Christianity makes 
MacIntyre’s assertion refutable in its presumptions and presuppositions.1185 However, 
while the content of virtue and virtuous living is fundamentally altered, there is 
inevitable continuity in the conceptual framework of human telos, even if MacIntyre 
concedes that ‘only grace enables us to respond to and obey its precepts’.1186 
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For example, in discerning a theological understanding of human telos, Kotva highlights 
three points, on which he suggests, consensus has been reached: First, that the human 
good is embodied in the practice of virtue; secondly, that the embodied virtues are an 
inclusive part of the human good; and thirdly, that the human good is an individual and 
corporate activity.
1187
 On the third point, he highlights that the functional nature of 
moral growth inevitably involves others and, in addition, he argues for the 
interconnectedness of the human good: ‘The human telos is found in common projects, 
shared activities, and intimate relationships’.1188 Indeed, he points out that many virtues 
lose their function and purpose outside of social relationships.  
 
Essential for my own discussion is his observation concerning our social and relational 
nature, as understood within a virtue theory:  
virtue theory views us as creatures who fully flourish as individuals in relationships. 
The human telos, the best kind of life for humans, is one in which we become fully 




The definition of an ‘intrinsically worthwhile relationship’ will inevitably be shaped and 
determined by the moral community for, as discussed in Chapter 1 and as MacIntyre 
argues, there can be no neutral account of virtue. All virtues are determined by the 
moral narrative from which they arise. Gushee and Stassen point out that, for Kotva, 
this is an ethic grounded in biblical and theological understanding and convictions 
which view the moral end of the Christian life to that of being conformed into the image 
of Christ.
1190
 However, I shall later explore how our social nature and the corresponding 
virtues can be understood outside of the Christian life, yet remain faithful to a Christian 
understanding of personhood and the outworking of grace. In light of basic Christian 
ethical convictions, such as Christlikeness and justice, Gushee and Stassen, for example, 
note that a discussion within a secular context may not prove redundant: ‘The trick is to 
figure out how and where the way of Jesus can be normative for public ethics by 
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5.3 Cultivation of Virtue: The Place in Moral Education 
 
It is important, for this discussion, to develop a fuller understanding of a virtue ethics 
framework, an understanding which moves beyond simply discerning its implications 
for the moral life of the individual and the community, and recognises the inference for 
an account of moral education, in particular moral education in a pluralistic context. 
For, despite its historic credentials, to enter a discussion on character education is, 
according to Arthur, to ‘enter a minefield of conflicting definitions and ideologies’.1193  
 
Indeed, alongside a public defence for its existence,
1194
 from earliest Western 
philosophical discourse, the effectiveness of moral education has been questioned. As 
Meilaender points out, Plato’s reflections suggest that knowledge of the good was 
dependent upon the direction of one’s soul towards such an attainment: ‘The entire 
program of moral education which the Republic sketches can offer no guarantee that we 
will not, in the end, prefer to remain wilfully ignorant’.1195 However, this does not 
dissuade from the importance of imparting a moral vision or instructing moral 
conscience and, as Aristotle pointed out, the political community played an inevitable 
role in doing so.
1196
 Earliest accounts of ethical teaching and learning within the 
Christian church evidence the place the virtues occupied in the curriculum, interpreting, 
in particular, the Greek philosophical tradition in light of the Christian faith.
1197
   
 
In expounding a virtue approach to moral education, Carr and Steutel highlight many of 
the distinctions noted above in differentiating a virtue ethic from other ethical 
approaches. For example, they suggest a broad and narrow interpretation of a virtue 
approach:  
On the broad interpretation, a virtue ethics certainly requires us to provide an ethical 
justification of virtues – some account of their moral significance – but on a narrow 
interpretation, the ethics of virtue points to a justification of a particular kind: one which 





In comparison to other theories of moral education, a virtue approach advocates that 
moral education and engagement has an intrinsic, rather than just an extrinsic, benefit in 
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that life is enriched by the possession of virtues and young people are brought to 
appreciate the moral life for its own sake.
1199
 For example, in contrast to trait or 
character-utilitarianism, character traits are good, not in so far as they maximise utility, 
but for their own intrinsic merit and that they constitute a vision of human 
flourishing.
1200
 Carr highlights characteristics such as honesty, self-control and justice, 
as exemplified in the moral virtues, as dispositions which carry their own intrinsic 
value.
1201
 Yet, despite the presumed value of these traits, Carr and Steutel note ‘a 
surprising dearth’ in contemporary philosophical thinking on virtue theory.1202 
 
In addition, a virtue ethic moves moral education beyond the acquisition of knowledge 
and the ability to process cognitively to understanding the role motivation plays in 
appreciating and outworking moral principles.
1203
 In doing so, Carr and Steutel note that 
it seeks to present a more coherent picture of the interplay between ‘reason, affect and 
behaviour in virtuous conduct’.1204 Indeed, the interaction between judgement and 
action, suggests Roger Straughan, lies at the heart of morality and moral education.
1205
 
As such, there is a practical emphasis on the moral life and moral education which 
accentuates the acquisition and habitual exercise of practical wisdom and the relation of 
virtue to character.
1206
 MacIntyre notes Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of 
moral education, where ‘intellectual virtues are acquired through teaching, the virtues of 
character from habitual exercise’.1207 Carr and Steutel also point to the impact that 
another’s practice can have on us, and vice versa, emphasising the particular importance 
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In line with these observations, and drawing on the place of virtue in Aristotle’s moral 
philosophy, Carr highlights three key contributions that a virtue ethic can make to 
philosophical reflections on moral education. First, as mentioned above, it brings focus 
to the practical and habitual nature of the moral life and emphasises the need for 
practical training in the moral virtues, grounded in the exercise of temperance and self-
control;
1209
 secondly, it stresses the responsibility of parents, teachers and responsible 
adults in presenting examples of model conduct;
1210
 thirdly, full virtue is achieved when 





Nevertheless, in drawing on the elements of a virtue theory, as discussed above, and, in 
particular, exploring the philosophical logic and moral foundations of a virtue approach, 
our attention must turn to the implications of such an approach outworked in public 
policy. Discussion and deliberation inevitably emerges over whether it is in fact 
possible in a pluralist democracy to find a ‘unifying concept of a virtue’; as Halstead  
and McLaughlin note,  ‘whether some virtues are universal and fundamental with 
respect to their significance for human life or whether virtues in general are inherently 
relativistic and particularistic’.1212 In order to enrich moral discourse around SRE with a 
constructive language of virtue, these questions must invariably be addressed. 
 
5.3.1 The ‘Death of Character’ 
 
As explored in Chapter 3, the predominant place given to the process of moral enquiry, 
based on the assumptions presented within developmental psychology, have dominated 
the landscape of moral education.
1213





 critics, and the practical “character 
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education” pedagogies that have emerged as a consequence of both theories,1216 Hunter 
concludes that the alternative pedagogies have amounted more to political rhetoric than 
to a significant shift in educational approach: ‘At the end of the day, the dominant 
strategy of moral education is not challenged as much as it is repackaged’.1217 This 
critique is as much directed towards Protestant Christian pedagogies as others, where he 
claims ‘the moral imagination is framed more by the categories of psychology than 
either scripture or theology’.1218 In echoing Hunter’s criticism, Arthur notes: ‘It is both 
interesting and strange that some Protestant writers in the field are suspicious of 
Aristotle and not Piaget, and that they trust Kohlberg and not Aquinas’.1219 
 
In short, moral education, as a reflection of the dramatic shifts in moral culture, has 
deeply shifted in its institutional character and its normative presuppositions and 
distinctions, framed no longer by a shared civic virtue but by a perceived liberal 
neutrality. What has resulted, Hunter argues, is an incoherent moral philosophy which 
boils down to the promotion of personal preferences; without the binding influence of 
moral communities and creeds, what we are left with is ‘virtue on the cheap’.1220 In a 
similar tome, Hauerwas critiques a ‘moral development that is independent of content’, 
pointing out that the idea of moral development is ‘seductive’, on account of the fact 
that it presupposes an understanding of what accounts as moral.
1221
 He notes a failure 
within the Christian community to articulate concepts which give understanding to the 
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In addition, Halstead and McLaughlin echo Hunter’s concerns over contemporary 
approaches to character education, critiquing the ‘non-expansive’ nature of these 
approaches,
1223
 and warning that: 
in the absence of an overall and adequately sophisticated characterisation of the nature 
and structure of the virtues, and a specification of the ingredients of the sort of practical 
reasoning with which they must be inseparably connected, proponents of ‘character 
education’ are in danger of being left with a mere ‘bag of virtues’ for transmission.1224  
 
Thus, presented within an inadequate moral framework, the difficulty of addressing and 
seeking to resolve ‘questions of meaning, priority and coherence with respect to the 
virtues’ is very evident.1225 In concurring with these concerns, we are presented with a 
significant challenge for the future content of moral education and, in particular, 
character education. Concerning issues of particularity with regard to moral content and 
meaning, Hunter rightly suggests: ‘These moral matters simply cannot be addressed 
without getting into the practicalities of moral commitment and the traditions and 
communities that ground those commitments’.1226 As explored in Chapter 2, this reflects 
what for MacIntyre amounted to an ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ with regards to an 




In light of this challenge, Carr and Steutel suggest that one solution has been to 
incorporate a broad Aristotelian conception of moral formation within the existing 
liberal-principled framework: ‘The overall aim would be, in short, to have the liberal 
cake, but eat it communitarianly’.1228 As such, Halstead and McLaughlin point to 
‘expansive conceptions’ of character education, which seek to remedy the weakness in 
non-expansive accounts. With expansive conceptions: 
a fuller and more substantial account is offered of matters such as the nature and extent 
of its rationale, the qualities of character and virtue aimed at, and the role given to 




Yet they highlight the challenge that exists for expansive concepts of character 
education: on the one hand, outlining common values and virtues within a secular moral 
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education, which avoid the practical and philosophical weaknesses of non-expansive 




One suggested way of avoiding the pitfalls of both approaches is to educate for liberal 
democracy, with Halstead and McLaughlin highlighting key thinkers in progressing the 
argument for educating in ‘civic virtue’.1231  Educating according to the principles and 
virtues required for participation within a democratic society is, for example, for 
Gutmann, the primary purpose of public education.
1232
 This involves teaching the 
‘morality of association’ which incorporates such virtues as ‘empathy, trust, fairness, 
and benevolence’.1233 Recognising that no morally neutral account of sex education can 
be found, she affirms the democratic process in deciding on the legitimacy of teaching 




However, notwithstanding the value of the democratic process, there remains the same 
unanswered question concerning the ontological foundations of the possible virtues up 
for discussion. The nature, meaning and content of the virtues would appear to be self-
evident or, perhaps, the hope exists that they might become self-evident after 
democratic deliberation. Yet in Robert Nash’s call for a ‘moral conversation’, grounded 
in a critique of the authoritative ‘minsters of morality’ within character education in 
America, such questions are irrelevant: ‘I believe a nonfoundational, multifunctional, 
and nonexclusionary public moral language is a key in promoting reconciliation and 
eschewing division not just in a classroom, but in a democracy as well’.1235  
 
Adding to Gutmann’s dispositions for democratic deliberation and decision-making, 
Nash presents his ‘postmodern virtues’,1236 judged necessary for moral conversation. In 
view of his non-foundational position, he does so in the hope of avoiding accusations of 
being nihilistic or antireligious.
1237
 While his emphasis on the need for a moral 
conversation within a pluralist, secular democracy is admirable, there should remain not 
only a concern that ultimate questions concerning moral truth remain unanswered, but 
that they deliberately remain so. Even those virtues such as humility, faith, self-denial 
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and charity, which he acknowledges have religious or distinctly Christian foundations, 
can only have ‘functional utility’ if they are ‘“decoupled” from their religious roots and 
secularized’.1238 It is necessary, therefore, for virtues to stand on their own perceived 
merit. Nash refuses, suggests Arthur, to acknowledge that ‘all education rests on 
assumptions and beliefs and that a plurality of positions, including character education, 
can co-exist’.1239 
 
At the same time it is important to recognise, as Gutmann and Nash do, that it will be 
possible to find many common values and virtues in democratic society, values which 
are informed by, and continue to shape, the cultural narrative. In light of this, Halstead 
and McLaughlin note the overlap that exists between ‘non-expansive’ and ‘expansive’ 
conceptions of character education, with the latter enriching and expanding the 
former.
1240
 In advocating a communitarian approach to education, Arthur notes that a 
key issue for citizenship education in Britain is how it is balanced with personal, social 
and moral education.
1241
 For, at a philosophical level, the idea of any concept of 
citizenship being derived from a functional, rather than a foundational, basis is to 
undermine the necessity of having a reason for your position or a defence for the moral 
validity of that position. As demonstrated throughout, this has been a central critique of 
the current moral assumptions within SRE policy. Therefore, as Hunter concludes:  
Of good intentions there is no end. The commitment to do well by our children is 
serious and unflagging. In the end, however, while we desperately want the flower of 
morality to bloom and multiply, we have, at the same time, pulled the plant up out from 




Of course, as Arthur points out, while Hunter is not alone is his sociologically-shaped 
conclusions concerning the importance of cultural context in character formation and, as 
such, presents an important and valid argument, what he doesn’t offer is a solution to 
the problem: ‘Unfortunately, contemporary sociology of education provides few 
practical solutions for character educators’.1243 
 
Therefore, in presenting a constructive approach to SRE, informed by a theological 
virtue ethic, it is important to acknowledge the foundations upon which such an 
approach flourishes. For, while it may be regarded as a ‘sectarian’ position,1244 it offers 
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the community context necessary to give meaning to a vision of human flourishing, one 
where the virtues might be understood and cultivated. Indeed, it may bring the 
necessary spiritual dimension that gives meaning and purpose to sexuality which, as 




5.4 A Theological Pursuit of Common Virtue in Moral Education 
 
In addressing the inadequacy of the subjective, relativistic nature of the cognitive, 
developmental approach to moral education, one possible approach is the adoption of a 
neo-naturalist understanding of virtue, an approach to virtue ethics in moral education, 
identified by Carr, where ‘virtues are natural human dispositions conducive to 
objectively determinable goals of human flourishing’.1246 This suggests that there are 
common virtues across cultures and creeds which are objective, universal and, therefore, 
applicable to all, discernable through human reason and necessary to human flourishing. 
As Geach states, ‘men need virtues as bees need stings’.1247 This may at least be viewed 
as one response to the relativist danger presented by MacIntyre’s social constructivist 
position,
1248
 or an alternative virtue approach to the ‘non-foundational’ position, 
evidenced in accounts of civic virtue. Within theological discourse, such a position 
accords with a ‘natural law’ understanding of ethical theory.  
 
Porter points to the resurgence of thinking on natural law theory among Catholic and 
Reformed ethicists alike, in response to modern moral discourse.
1249
 In noting a 
previous reluctance among Christian ethicists and theologians to engage with this 
approach, she argues that if we ‘avoid talking about the moral significance of human 
nature, both theological ethics and the wider social discourse will be impoverished’.1250 
For my own discussion, it is of interest to note that in his account of the rediscovery of 
the natural law tradition in Reformed theological ethics, particularly since the 1990s, 
Stephen Grabill points out that it is viewed, in particular, as a resource for talking about 
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moral issues in the public square.
1251
 This is echoed in David VanDrunen’s exploration 
of the place of natural law in Reformed social thought, noting that ‘the fledgling 
renaissance of natural law and two kingdoms thinking among some Reformed writers 
today may provide a fresh and coherent contribution to wider discussions about 
Christianity and culture’.1252 J. Daryl Charles argues strongly that, without an 
affirmation of natural law in the public square, our apologetic bridge is lost: ‘We have 
consequently cut ourselves off at the knees in terms of developing a “public 
philosophy,” at the heart of which lie natural law and “common grace”’.1253 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to heed Stephen Pope’s challenge for contemporary moral 
discourse, that in deriving normative conclusions from the natural order, the notion of 
‘natural’ changes.1254 Indeed, as McGrath indicates, ‘nature’ is a culturally construed 
notion and, as a result, our Western Enlightenment tradition has mistakenly believed 
that rationality is ‘independent of culture and history’.1255 Therefore, in the 
philosophical process of deriving moral norms from nature, McGrath highlights the 
importance of understanding how nature is ‘seen’. Accordingly, ‘the Christian “sees” 
nature through a lens which is shaped by the fundamental themes of the Christian 
faith’.1256 This lens is independent of nature itself and we should not presuppose a 
uniform approach towards, or outcome of, such theological reflection.
1257
 When it 
comes to discerning God in nature within the Christian tradition, McGrath identifies 
three major approaches: ‘human reason, the ordering of the world, and the beauty of the 





This understanding stands in contrast to the contemporary scientific and evolutionary 
understanding of human nature and behaviour, where nature is judged to be 
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‘purposeless and amoral’.1260 This is not to say that the same moral norms and values, 
regarded as an intrinsic part of human nature and valuable to present-day culture, are 
not valued by representatives of both a theistic and naturalist worldview, merely that the 
ontological defence for their existence is fundamentally different. As Bryon Bangert 
observes: ‘A materialistic, deterministic view of nature and natural events, for example, 
is incompatible with nearly all theistic affirmations’.1261 As explored in Chapter 4, in 
contrast to natural law, ‘naturalism’ does not infer a morality that points to a 
transcendent reality but instead, as Pope points out, through the exercise of moral 
reasoning, humanly-constructed norms and values are established, applicable to a 




Therefore, in deriving moral conclusions on human nature through a theological lens, it 
is important to adopt an understanding of the relationship between God and his creation. 
This, for Gustafson, is the most important ‘base point’ in developing a theological 
ethic.
1263
 In particular, this involves developing an understanding of the relationship 
between God and creation, as understood within a wider understanding of God’s grace 
at work in all aspects of the natural order. For, as David Nicholls suggests, while it may 
be important to distinguish grace from the natural realm of ideas, the cross-
contamination is inevitable: ‘God’s Spirit is present in all authentic instances of the 
natural’.1264 For Porter, our understanding of human virtue is related to our doctrine of 
creation: 
if we take the doctrine of creation seriously - if we regard everything that exists, 
including ourselves, as creations of a good God - then it is problematic, at best, to claim 




Thus, an important question arises, relevant to our own discussion: ‘what kind of value 
should we ascribe to humanly attainable virtues, and by extension, to the moral life 
generally considered?’1266 This question raises at least two points which require greater 
exploration and clarity: How can human nature and the natural world be regarded as a 
source of moral knowledge, and how do we give a theological defence for human 
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reason having the capacity, not only to discern moral principles, but to do so in view of 
the corruption of human nature as a consequence of sin? These are important 
considerations if we are to give a theological defence for the pursuit of common virtue 
in moral education, in particular, SRE. 
 
5.4.1 Discerning Moral Truth in Nature: An Epistemological Defence 
 
As with the tradition of natural theology,
1267
 a natural-law understanding of human 
nature and the moral life has a rich theoretical tradition which extends beyond the realm 
of theological discourse. It was evident, Pope highlights, in Graeco/Roman 
philosophical thinking, and incorporated into an account of Christian ethics from the 
early church and Patristic period onwards.
1268
 Therefore, while strongly associated with 
theological ethics, in particular within a Catholic tradition, the language of natural law 
has also been associated with a long-established philosophical and political tradition. 
Charles Curran points to the fact that natural law ‘involves three distinct but 
overlapping considerations – the strictly theological, the philosophical and the legal’.1269 
In spite of the diversity of approaches, Pope suggest that ‘natural-law ethicists share a 
belief that there is such a thing as the human good, commensurate with human nature, 
however complex its manifestations and various its possible modes of fulfilment’.1270 
 
While recognising the rich tradition in which it has developed, observing natural 
theology and, in particular, natural-law theory through the lens of the Christian faith 
will narrow the frame in which this discussion is located. Pope identifies two central 
reasons why natural law is attractive to theological ethics: First, it affirms an objective, 
realist understanding of moral standards and, secondly, it affirms a morality that is 
universal in its scope.
1271
 In addition to these ethical claims, James Bretzke draws the 
distinction between the ontological and the epistemological premise of natural-law 
theory. While the ontological premise points to an objective moral order, the 
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epistemological premise claims that this can be discerned with the application of ‘right 
reason’.1272  As such, the capacity for human reason itself, ‘the height of human nature’, 
has been said to evidence God in nature.
1273
 In addition, within the order of creation, 
knowledge of God’s eternal law has been written on to human hearts by means of 
human conscience.
1274
 The implications for a Catholic approach to character education, 





This epistemological claim that the moral order can be discerned by human reason is 
based on what McGrath identifies as a main theme in a Christian approach to 
understanding the natural world: ‘The principle that humanity is created in the image of 
God, and thus endowed with some capacity to discern traces of God within or through 
nature’.1276 As such, this understanding of the imago Dei has shaped both Catholic and 
Protestant approaches to natural theology.
1277
 However, understood as an intuitionist 
approach to moral philosophy, it has received much criticism. For example, in critiquing 
Aquinas’ theory of natural law, O’Connor argues ‘we must have some set of axioms as 
our starting-point’.1278 In addition, if these ‘natural inclinations’, discerned by reason, 
were able to provide moral precepts by which to live, it is unclear why we ought to 
pursue them.
1279
 In tracing back the distinction between autonomous nature and grace to 
the ‘philosophic-theology’ of Aquinas, Frances Schaeffer argued that, as a result of this 
distinction, ‘nature began to ‘eat up’ grace’.1280 In his defence, Porter argues that the 
distinction Aquinas made between nature and grace in understanding human virtue was 
due to his belief that both were directed towards different ends, ‘naturally attainable 
happiness, and the supreme happiness of personal union with God’.1281 Rather than 
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eating up grace, she asserts, Aquinas repeatedly asserted that ‘grace does not destroy 
nature, but rather perfects it’.1282  
 
In understanding natural-law theory through the paradigm of the Christian faith, and 
thus within the ‘economy of salvation’, McGrath points out that nature and the human 
observer must also be understood within the narrative of the fall and the redemptive 
process initiated by the Incarnation.
1283
 As such, if our understanding of virtue is related 
to the doctrine of creation, then in viewing virtue through the lens of the Christian faith, 
it must also be reconciled with the doctrine of sin and the doctrine of salvation. 
Gustafson is also clear that the doctrine of sin cannot be overlooked. In his discussion 
on the appropriate understanding of God’s relation to man and the world, in particular 
the aspects of what he calls the ‘human fault’, Gustafson points out that the distortion 
and corruption that resulted extends beyond the moral: ‘The human fault keeps us from 
proper understanding of our proper relations by construing our trusts and loyalties, our 
loves and desires, our rational construing of the world, and our moral interests’.1284 
Nevertheless, while holding to an understanding of the depravity of human nature as a 
consequence of sin, it is acknowledged within natural law theory that human reason was 




Nevertheless, it is due to a ‘radically different understanding of grace’, Grabill notes, 
that Karl Barth, in his infamous rejection of natural theology and the natural law 
tradition, described as a ‘subtext’ to mainstream Protestant criticism of the tradition,1286 
took the position that Protestant and Catholic ethics stood in conflict with one another. 
As such, critics of natural theology have, in particular, questioned the reliability of 
human reason, having been corrupted by sin, in discerning moral truth. Barth pointed, 
not only to human reason as an unreliable source of moral knowledge,
1287
 but to the 
ontological supposition that our knowledge of God’s creation and of the Creator can 
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only be known through a Christological lens, as evidenced in Scripture.
1288
 McGrath 
notes: ‘Barth’s hostility towards natural theology thus rests on his fundamental belief 
that it undermines the necessity and uniqueness of God’s self-revelation’.1289 For this 
reason, Hauerwas points out that Barth didn’t offer an explanatory Christian account of 
God and His creation, for he ‘sought nothing other than to be a witness to God’s 
reconciling and redeeming work in Jesus Christ’.1290 
 
In his well-known response to Barth’s rejection of natural theology, Emil Brunner 
emphasised the distinction between Roman Catholic and Reformed thinking, suggesting 
that while the former makes no distinction between the objective and subjective concept 
of nature, maintaining the preservation of the imago Dei in a ‘unrefracted theologia 
naturalis’,1291 the later cannot view nature ‘unless Christ be taken into account’.1292 
Barth critiques Brunner’s assertion that, within Catholic doctrine, nature can stand as a 
moral order independent of grace.
1293
 Nevertheless, Brunner believed a ‘point of 
contact’ (Anknüpfungspunkt) between divine revelation and human nature offered a 
renewed vision of natural theology, a vision which was out-rightly rejected by Barth.
1294
 
In addition, where Brunner points to evidence of God’s ‘preserving grace’ within fallen 
creation, present, for example, in the function of the State,
1295
 Barth rejects any notion 
of ‘grace of creation or preservation’.1296 Yet Thielicke notes that Barth did 
acknowledge the necessary functioning of some form of natural law in civil society, and 
concurs that as such, it deserves some level of respect: ‘For in the secular sphere what 
can we put in place of natural law?’1297 
 
However, when it comes to discerning moral truth, objections to the natural law 
tradition continue to be raised, not least in its apparent stand over against the role and 
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authority of Scripture. For example, Burnside argues that drawing a distinction between 
‘divine law’ and ‘natural law’ creates an ‘epistemological problem’ by creating two 
distinct sources of moral knowledge, namely Scripture and nature.
1298
 However, while 
natural-law theory may be seen to dissuade from the place of Scriptural authority within 
a theological ethic, Porter argues for a more interconnected understanding, highlighting 
the practice within the medieval scholastic tradition of natural law which treated nature, 
reason and Scripture as ‘three mutually interpreting sources of moral norms’.1299 Also, 
in adopting an incarnational approach to natural theology, McGrath notes how God uses 
nature to reveal himself to humanity: ‘Revelation takes place in and through nature and 
history, not beyond them’.1300 Highlighting the natural theology expounded by Calvin, 
McGrath points to the Reformed belief in the full revelation of God mediated through 
Christ, which can only be known through Scripture, with nature ‘clarifying, confirming, 
and extending what may be known through the former’.1301  
 
Of course, over questions of how divine revelation informs a theological ethic, the role 
and place of Scripture as an authoritative source remains central. As Hauerwas states: 
‘We do not seek a philosophical truth separate from the book’s text’.1302 Indeed, an 
understanding of natural law is defended on the basis of Scripture. Susan E. Schreiner 
notes that Calvin, like his predecessors, ‘assumed the existence of natural law from 
Romans 2:14-15’,1303 in addition to it being evidenced in the Decalogue.1304 However, it 
is also understood that Scripture does not stand alone, but is complemented by nature 
and reason in mediating knowledge of God. For example, Grabill points out that, for 
Calvin, ‘his doctrine of the natural knowledge of God is founded on two principal 
sources: creation and the natural means by which God is known in Scripture’.1305  
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 In addition, it is suggested that moral conclusions are not so neatly derived from the 
Scriptural text. For example, in a comparative discussion of his ‘theocentric ethic’ 
positioned alongside Barth’s ethical claims, Gustafson suggests that Barth’s doctrine of 
Scripture assumes a coherency of the divine command that is not always self-evident:  
‘I find Barth’s singular Christological interpretation too simple and neat. The theology 
of the Bible backs and warrants more diversity in ethics than Barth permits’.1306 In a 
stark conclusion on the place of Scripture in the wider discussion on revelation and 
inspiration, Stephen Davis suggests that ‘the notion sometimes heard in Protestant 
circles that the ‘Bible alone’ is sufficient to accomplish God’s revelatory and salvific 
aims are quite mistaken’.1307 
  
5.4.2 A ‘Common Grace’ Understanding of Common Virtue 
 
Despite its critique, it should not be presumed that the Reformed tradition has been 
united in their rejection of the notion that God and His divine precepts can be discerned 
through the natural order, or that sin has corrupted all aspects of nature and reason. 
Indeed, Schreiner deems it ironic that natural law theory has derived so much critical 
attention, in view of the fact that it was uncontroversial in Calvin’s day.1308 As part of 
the theological endeavour to understand God’s relationship with His creation, in 
particular within cultural and political life, the doctrine of common grace has been 
articulated within Reformed theological discourse as a means of interpreting the ability 
of human reason to discern moral norms in the natural order. In particular, Abraham 
Kuyper is acclaimed for developing and expanding this Reformed doctrine into thinking 
on engagement in public life.
1309
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Kuyper appealed to Calvinist thinking in the development of his so-called ‘theology of 
culture’.1310 Peter Heslam notes that he used the term ‘neo-Calvinist’ to indicate that he 
was bringing Calvinist thinking up-to-date.
1311
 In particular, in initiating the ‘neo-
Calvinist’ movement, Mouw highlights how he drew on, and developed, the diverging 
strands of Calvinist thinking into a public theology.
1312
 Heslam suggests, that in 
explicating the doctrine of common grace, he was ‘making explicit an element that was 
implicit in Calvin’s thought’.1313 Further, Herman Kuiper affirms that the notion of 
common grace is evident in Reformed thinking and within Calvin’s writings: ‘He 
attributes to all men a certain love of truth, a certain knowledge of the principles which 
underlie civil order, and a disposition to cherish and preserve society’.1314 However, 
others, like VanDrunnen, suggest that Kuyper stands ‘ambiguously’ in the Reformed 
tradition of social thought,
1315
 nevertheless conceding that the influence of Kuyper on 
Reformed social thinking is undisputed: ‘Abraham Kuyper’s theological vision of 
cultural and political life is arguably the most thorough and complex ever constructed in 
the history of Reformed Christianity’.1316  
 
In exploring Kuyper’s doctrine, Vincent Bacote points to three definitive aspects: 
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(1) God is merciful and beneficent toward all humanity in the provision of life and 
various blessings; (2) all humans have a capacity for morality that manifest itself in 
actions of justice and virtue; and (3) because humans have the ability to reason and 
understand, the study of nature and history, persons and societies is possible and useful 




For Kuyper, nature and grace were inseparable: ‘You cannot see grace in all its riches if 
you do not perceive how its tiny roots and fibres everywhere penetrate into the joints 
and cracks of the life of nature’.1318 Kuyper distinguished this ‘life of nature’ as separate 
from the task of salvation.
1319
 He adopted, according to James Bratt, a constructivist 
theological approach, where ‘common grace was thus a theology of public 
responsibility, of Christians’ shared humanity with the rest of the world’.1320 As such, 
Kuyper believed that the divine image is reflected, not only in the individual, but in 
humanity as a whole, with our social nature creating the capacity for human 
development.
1321
 Therefore, common grace is at work in all spheres of society:  
every view that would confine God’s work to the small sector we might label “church 
life” must be set aside. There is beside the great work of God in special grace also that 




In making a distinction between special and common grace, Bacote notes the voices of 
concern,
1323
 the majority of which are in some way Christological.
1324
 However, in its 
defence, Bacote points out that Kuyper’s doctrine makes the link between nature and 
grace by maintaining the status of Christ as Creator and Re-Creator.
1325
 VanDrunen 
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points to the development of neo-Calvinist thinking in this direction, where creation is 
not so much being ‘preserved as it is’ but ‘God’s redeeming the creation order and 
moving it toward its eschatological goal of a new heavens and a new earth’.1326 In 
addition, a narrow Christological view, Bacote notes, overlooks the role of the Holy 
Spirit in common grace.
1327
 As Mouw suggests, ‘we need the Spirit’s guidance in our 
hearts and minds as we seek to identify traces of the Spirit’s work in the larger 
creation’.1328 
 
The following questions thus arise for my own discussion: Can a ‘common grace’ 
understanding of public morality accord, in particular, with the development of a 
constructive virtue ethic approach within moral education and SRE discourse? In taking 
account of the natural-law Reformed tradition, in both social thinking and theological 
ethics, can human and civic virtue be understood as God’s grace at work within the 
created order?  In particular, can a theological understanding of virtue be developed 




In noting Kuyper’s legacy for Christian ethics, Gene Haas suggests that his neo-
Calvinist position provides a valuable resource for interacting with a virtue ethic; the 
framework it provides for ethics means that it can ‘recognize and incorporate the 
important emphases found in virtue ethics at the same time that it exposes the problems 
and relativistic tendencies in this approach to ethics’.1330 Concerning the life of virtue, 
Brattt notes the distinction Kuyper makes in the ‘operations’ of common grace – one 
aimed at the interior and one at the exterior part of our existence.
1331
 Concerning the 
interior, Kuyper suggests that this is operative ‘wherever civic virtue, a sense of 
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domesticity, natural love, the practice of human virtue, the improvement of the public 
conscience, integrity, mutual loyalty among people, and a feeling for piety leaven 
life’.1332 As such, Mouw points to the larger work of the Holy Spirit, evidenced in 
Kuyper’s doctrine, in supplementing the salvific plans of God.1333   
 
Therefore, in understanding the place of virtue and ‘common grace’ within the 
Reformed tradition, it is helpful to note the distinction from a traditional Catholic ethic. 
In reconciling an account of the virtues and God’s grace within a natural law tradition, 
Aquinas made the distinction between those virtues that are acquired and discerned by 
reason in pursuit of the human good and those that are infused, given by God for union 
with Him and therefore necessary for salvation.
1334
 This was a shift from Patristic 
accounts of virtue, where ‘pagan’ virtues amount to pride and self-love because they 
weren’t informed by and directed towards God.1335 Calvin held to the Augustinian view 
that the ‘natural gifts’, including reason, had been corrupted by sin and, as such, Mouw 
notes that Calvin’s theology was highly critical of the unregenerate mind.1336 Yet at the 
same time Calvin believed that the unredeemed were not entirely devoid of the ability to 
discern moral knowledge.1337 As such, Grabill suggests Calvin’s ‘epistemological 
modifications to the realist theory of natural law’, in particular, attributing greater 
priority to the ‘the post-lapsarian conscience than to the pre-lapsarian reason’.1338 In a 
similar vein, Paul Sigmund suggests that Kuyperianism can still be distinguished from 
Catholic social thinking on natural law by the greater emphasis it places on the 




In responding to this perceived disjuncture in Calvin’s theology, Barth claimed that 
Calvin believed only in the ‘hypothetical possibility’ of a natural knowledge of God, 
rather than suggesting that it could ever be a reality: ‘One might call it an objective 
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possibility, created by God, but not a subjective possibility, open to man’.1340 Schreiner, 
however, points to the important distinction that Calvin made between the spiritual and 
the natural realm where the law of nature accords with Calvin’s second table of the 
law.
1341
 Regarding the spiritual realm, she notes, ‘Calvin was perfectly clear and 
consistent; his condemnation of our natural gifts as directed to God was unrelenting’.1342 
The knowledge of the natural law though the functioning of the conscience was to 
‘render man inexcusable’.1343  However, she notes that this distinction moves beyond an 
individual’s standing before God to their function in the world, moving from the ‘sphere 
of theological anthropology and epistemology to the sphere of providence’.1344 
 
Therefore, in noting the significance of Calvinist thinking for public theology, Bacote 
points, in particular, to Calvin’s understanding of the work of God’s grace to restrain 
sin, which includes the capacity of the individual to act morally:
1345
 
In every age there have been persons who, guided by nature, have striven toward virtue 
throughout life. I have nothing to say against them even if many lapses can be noted in 
their moral conduct. For they have by the very zeal of their honesty given proof that 
there was some purity in their nature…..These examples, accordingly, seem to warn us 
against adjudging man’s nature wholly corrupted, because some men have by its 
prompting not only excelled in remarkable deeds, but conducted themselves most 
honorably throughout life. But here it ought to occur to us to us that amid this 
corruption of nature there is some place for God’s grace; not such grace as to cleanse it, 




Thus, Calvin’s account of human nature evidences an understanding of the operation of 
common grace, an understanding of virtuous behaviour for the bridling of sin and the 
preservation of society. As Kuiper observes, such are the ‘divine gifts which are granted 
with a view to the preservation of society and that God rewards the unregenerate who 
cultivate virtue with many temporal blessings’.1347 In addition, Grabill notes that, 
according to Calvin’s explication of the natural knowledge of God: 
the human conscience continues to provide moral knowledge of moral precepts; the 
created order continues to reflect God’s wisdom, goodness, and power; and God 
continues to nourish civic virtues among the unregenerate.
1348
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Nevertheless, David Little suggests that the ‘deep ambivalence’ in Calvin’s accounts of 
nature, human reason and will has had a significant impact on the legacy of Calvin’s 
teaching.
1349
 Yet, notwithstanding questions over God’s preserving grace in nature, it is 
important to note that Calvin had an expressed view of ‘true virtue’, obtained through 
union with Christ and the process of sanctification.
1350
 As such, in recognising Kuyper’s 
common grace understanding of faith outworked in the public square, Max Stackhouse 
highlights the important distinction being made between common grace and salvific 
grace: ‘This grace does not bring salvation, but it invites the recognition of validity and 
excellence from many sources, and the relative capacity of all, including the “little 
people” and unbelievers, to contribute to the general welfare’.1351 As such, Christ’s 
redemption was not just about the salvation of individuals but the redemption of the 
whole of creation, and Kuyper’s common grace doctrine, points out Mouw, developed 
the notion that the ‘natural man’ can serve ‘God’s cultural goals’.1352  
 
In acknowledging that a theological understanding of common grace comes with a 
certain theological ‘messiness’,1353 Mouw proposes that it yet provides a means by 
which the Christian community can contribute to the well-being and flourishing of the 
community: ‘If God’s deep love for humanity persists even despite the effects of sin, 
then the theology of common grace is an important resource for our efforts as Christians 





Therefore, in seeking to develop a constructive approach to moral education, in 
particular, SRE, I support Herdt’s case in arguing against the false dichotomy between 
nature and grace, and presenting a more holistic model of the moral life:  
We can affirm the radical dependence of all human agency on divine sustenance while 
also insisting that the quality of that dependence is transformed when acknowledged 
and embraced. We can affirm the redemptive activity of the Word at work throughout 
created-but-fallen nature while also insisting that the quality of that redemptive activity 
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In addition, I affirm the intrinsic good of social relationships in understanding human 
telos and flourishing. This is re-iterated in Kotva’s understanding of the human good in 
terms of ‘intrinsically worthwhile relationships’, and the virtues that correspond with 
this.
1357
 In responding to the objection that a virtue ethic is overtly narcissistic, Kotva 
points to the implicit virtue assumptions that are made in act-centred theories, in that 
some level of self-reflection is necessary in order to ascertain the virtues that are 
required to achieve the end that is directed towards God and others.
1358
 Indeed, as he 
points out, many of the Christian virtues are intrinsically other-regarding.
1359
 In 
addition, a virtue ethic gives particular attention to the specific context which has given 





5.5 Naming the Virtues: The Moral Content of SRE 
 
When it comes to defining what a virtue is or is not, von Wright notes that disputes 
often concern a conceptual understanding of a virtue; for example, whether they are 
traits of character, concerned with mastering passions etc., or, indeed, additional to 
these conceptual questions, whether they are useful or not, ‘needed for protecting our 
welfare’.1361 For example, Hauerwas points to Plato’s account of virtue in the Republic 
as addressing the need for virtues to correspond with a political vision of human 
flourishing and the functioning of good society, naming the virtues of courage, 
temperance, wisdom and justice as central.
1362
 In addition, he notes that, despite echoing 
Plato’s political account of the virtues, Aristotle did not provide an account of key 
virtues, instead emphasising the importance of acquiring certain habits and achieving a 
mean between various extremes.
1363
 In addition, Hauerwas highlights a lack of any 
articulated virtues in the early church, suggesting that ‘Christians, especially in the early 
centuries, made no attempt to establish any one list of the virtues or to show why certain 
virtues were more fundamental or grounded in nature’.1364  
                                                 
1356
 Herdt, Putting, 97. 
1357
 Kotva, Christian, 22. 
1358
 Kotva, Christian, 145. 
1359
 Kotva, Christian, 152. 
1360
 Kotva, Christian, 146. 
1361
 von Wright, Varieties, 152. 
1362
 Hauerwas, Community, 121. 
1363
 Hauerwas, Community, 122; Hauerwas and Pinches, Christians, 20. 
1364
 Hauerwas, Community, 122. 
 207 
 
As already acknowledged, it was the work of Aquinas that presented a significant 
theological contribution to any discussion on virtue.
1365
 While his contribution to virtue 
discourse was indebted to the conceptual frame provided, in particular by an 
Aristotelian virtue ethic, it inevitably departed from it in terms of the definition and 
content of the virtues. For example, while Aquinas engaged the concepts of the cardinal 
virtues, an Aristotelian concept left no room for the virtue of humility, regarded as a 
vice within an Aristotelian social context.
1366
 As MacIntyre notes, ‘the New Testament 
of course differs from both Homer and Aristotle not only in the items included in its 
catalogue, but once again in its rank ordering of the virtues’.1367 Nevertheless, he 
suggests there is a synthesis evident in Aristotle and Aquinas’ accounts, in that a 
concept of ‘the good life for man’ precedes a concept of virtue.1368  
 
However, concern is expressed at this synthesis. For example, while recognising the 
usefulness of the language of virtue, Hauerwas and Pinches are, nevertheless, 
‘extremely cautious in appropriating pagan virtues from their pagan context’.1369 In 
adopting the language of virtue and Aristotle’s motif of journeying towards the good, 
they recognise that the narrative adopted, and the corresponding virtues, will inevitably 
differ from those of Aristotle and, indeed, all accounts that are not determined by a goal 




In expounding a Christian virtue ethic, Wright points out that what the New Testament 
presents is a different way of being human, pointing, in particular to Paul’s vision of 
virtue which is concerned with ‘being remade in God’s image’, in other words, 
‘becoming genuinely human’.1371 Roberts positions this vision of human flourishing 
within the Kingdom paradigm, pointing to Christian virtues as being ‘distinctly social or 
communal’ because they are related to membership of the Kingdom of God: ‘In the 
Christian picture the human being is not essentially a pleasure-seeker, but most 
fundamentally a child of God, a member of the kingdom’.1372 This Kingdom paradigm 
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determines the telos to which its members are educated and the virtues that arise. 
According to Wright:  
The Christian virtues, unlike the classical or cardinal virtues expounded by Aristotle 
and others, are designed to produce, not grand isolated heroes, leading a nation in 




However, it is important to note that even in identifying those virtues that not only 
belong to the Christian narrative, and accord with the telos of the moral agent as 
understood within the Christian tradition, there are a plurality of virtues that are 
accorded relevance and importance, specifically in line with their different roles and 
purposes. This accounts for the plurality of understandings of a theological account of a 
virtue ethic within the Christian tradition.
1374
 For example, in taking into account the 
Christian’s eschatological lens, Wells notes that this shapes Hauerwas’ understanding of 





In contrast, Aquinas did not dismiss the cardinal virtues expounded by Athens, but 
grounded them in an understanding of the natural ordering of creation and in the 
orientation of the four virtues towards the natural human good, under which all other 
virtues could be accounted for.
1376
 As such, the moral virtues shape the human person in 
such a way that they desire what is in accordance with their good.
1377
 The virtues of 
temperance and fortitude, for example, are primarily concerned with the moral agent’s 
well-being.
1378
 Moreover, the virtue of courage has value beyond the well-being of the 
individual moral agent, but ‘has a universal value for preserving the whole order of 
justice’.1379 Justice, Porter suggests, is the virtue by which Aquinas, in following 
Aristotle, explores the communal context of morality and understands the good of the 
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individual in relationship to the common good.
1380
 Foot points, in particular, to the 
corrective role that the virtue of justice plays in addressing the ‘deficiency of 
motivation’ to seek the good of others.1381  
 
Hauerwas notes that Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s understanding of the moral virtues in 
suggesting that a unity of the virtues was achieved through the exercise of prudence or 
moral wisdom.
1382
 In exhibiting his natural law understanding of the human person, 
delineated by their capacity for knowledge and will, all persons are equally capable of 
moral virtue.
1383
 Porter points out Aquinas’ ‘dual meaning’ of goodness, in that an act is 
good in view of its conformity to reason, and ‘also good in the sense of actualizing, and 
therefore perfecting, the powers of the agent, including passions, will, and intellect’.1384 
In accordance with his doctrine of creation, ‘capacity for rational self-direction is 
precisely the quality in virtue of which persons are said to be in the image of God’.1385 
Porter suggests that Aquinas takes account of virtue and gives it ‘order and normative 
force’ by locating it within a ‘wider metaphysical context’.1386 
 
However, in recognising the limits of the cardinal virtues in achieving the supreme 
human good due to the corruption of sin, Porter notes that it is the theological virtues, 
above all charity, which Aquinas believes will secure the inner unity of the virtues, and 
to which the cardinal virtues are directed.
1387
 The theological virtues are so called, 
according to Aquinas, ‘both because God is their object, inasmuch as they direct us 
rightly to him, and because they are infused in us by God alone; and because they are 
made known to us by divine Revelation contained in Sacred Scripture’.1388 In particular, 
charity unites us primarily in relationship with God and others. As Liz Carmichael 
notes: ‘As a theological virtue and gift of grace, caritas perfects natural love’.1389 
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However, the theological cannot operate without the other virtues.
1390
 Therefore, in 
identifying a third virtue framework, Aquinas notes that the cardinal virtues can be 
infused together with charity in directing one’s end towards a supernatural happiness 




In contrast, Hauerwas, while affirming the authority of Scripture and the narrative 
account therein,
1392
 is noted for failing to list specific dispositions.
1393
 He is, at the same 
time, critiqued for being too prescriptive, for example, where his view on pacifism is 
accused of leaving no place for ‘constructive Christian moral reflection’ between 
different interpretations of the Christian narrative.
1394
 Gushee and Stassen, on the other 
hand, offer a detailed overview of virtues they identify as associated with ‘Kingdom 
People’.1395 In addition, Wright presents a content-specific account of the theological 
virtues, supplementing these with the fruit of the Spirit.
1396
 In comparing an Aristotelian 
and Pauline account of the virtues, Wright suggest the former is ‘like a signpost 
pointing in more or less the right direction (though it will need some adjustment), but 
without a road that actually goes there. What we find in the New Testament is virtue 
reborn’.1397 
 
5.5.1 Christian Love: A Flourishing Virtue  
 
In light of the theological tradition of identifying specific virtues understood within the 
Christian narrative, I will identify virtues that accord with a Christian vision of 
personhood and dispositions that, I will argue, enrich the vision of a sexually and 
relationally educated young person. In particular, I shall situate my discussion of 
individual virtues within the framework of a discussion on the virtue of Christian love. 
This is on account of the dominant role it plays in the Christian narrative, and on the 
understanding that all other virtues are understood and perfected through its exercise.
1398
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It affirms Volf’s vision of Christian human flourishing, a vision in which the love of 




As evidenced in Chapter 4, there is a normative disjuncture between sex and love in 
modern philosophical accounts of both, an understanding which is also emerging in 
SRE discourse. For example, in offering an account of the philosophical exploration of 
love, Troy Jollimore points out: ‘The claim that sex without love has some value, even 
potentially significant value, is no longer thought wrong by very many (though some 
within certain religious traditions still reject it)’.1400 While love is not absent from 
policy discourse, as exemplified in the Coalition Government’s commitment that SRE 
should include ‘an understanding of the ways in which humans love each other’ while at 
the same time stressing the ‘importance of respecting individual autonomy’,1401 the 
vision of love that is presented is inherently problematic within a Christian worldview. 
Promoting a subjective understanding of love within a moral framework that gives 
precedence to an outcome which is predisposed to securing individual autonomy 
compromises a Christian vision of personhood. As Hauerwas notes, the goal of 
Christian behaviour is neither autonomy nor independence and, therefore, the Christian 
life ‘is substantively at odds with any account of morality that makes autonomy the 
necessary condition and/or goal of moral behavior’.1402   
 
Indeed, as MacIntyre points out: ‘Charity is not of course, from the biblical point of 
view, just one more virtue to be added to the list. Its inclusion alters the conception of 
the good for man in a radical way’.1403 In defence of his own socially constructed view 
of virtue, this is why, in particular, an understanding of how humans love each other is 
narrative-dependent and, indeed, why the content and meaning of a virtue like charity is 
comprehensible within one cultural context and not another. He notes, for example, that 
‘the story of the thief on the cross is unintelligible in Aristotelian terms. It is 
unintelligible precisely because charity is not a virtue for Aristotle’.1404 Therefore, in re-
echoing Smith’s philosophical anthropology, the narrative that shapes our 
understanding of love ultimately shapes our identity: ‘I cannot answer the question, 
what do I love? without (at least implicitly) answering the question, what story do I 
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believe?’1405 Consequentially, it is understandable why a Christian understanding of 
‘loving your neighbour as yourself’ along with ‘loving your enemies’ bewildered the 
atheistic Freud,
1406
 whereas within Lewis’s Christian worldview, in contrast, it was 
‘Divine Gift-love’ that made such love possible.1407 While acknowledging this 
narrative-dependence, the purpose of the constructive approach adopted in this thesis is 
to present a Christian vision of personhood as a resource for enriching SRE policy 
discourse.
1408
   
 
Of course, it would take multiple theses to even begin to touch on what has been 
understood by the virtue of love within Scripture and the Christian tradition.
1409
 As 
Craig A. Boyd notes: ‘Christian theologians from Augustine and Aquinas to Edwards 
and Wesley have consistently praised love as the singularly most important feature of 
the Christian life’.1410 Indeed, as a central norm of Christian ethics, it has had differing 
interpretations and applications,
1411
 including being accorded supreme value in ethical 
decision-making.
1412
 Wright points out that, even as a matter of linguistic interpretation, 
the word ‘love’ in the English language has multiple meanings, pointing to C.S. Lewis’ 
famous The Four Loves as one example of discussion on the multi-layered complexity 
of its nature.
1413
 However, within the New Testament context, Wright suggests that 
agape love, spoken of by Paul and the early Christians, ‘sets the bar as high as it can 
go’.1414 
 
Within theological ethics, Anders Nygren’s two-volume seminal work, Agape and 
Eros,
1415
 noted as a key text in shaping the field,
1416
 has been credited with initiating 
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significant scholarship on the notion of love.
1417
  While Nygren re-asserts that agape is 
the ‘fundamental motif’1418 with which to understand Christian love, affirmed in 
theological discourse as rooted in, and springing from, divine agape as exemplified in 
the sacrificial love of Christ,
1419
 he contends that it has been corrupted by an association 
with eros. He asserts that the two understandings of love, in effect, stand in diametric 
opposition to one another: ‘Eros and Agape are the characteristic expressions of two 
different attitudes to life, two fundamentally opposed types of religion and ethics’.1420 
However, in an exploration of how the virtue of Christian love might enrich SRE 
discourse, I will present a defence for how eros can be understood alongside agape, and 
how both can be enriched within an understanding of philia.  
 
(a) Agape and Eros 
 
In noting the different understandings of eros, I affirm Edward Collins Vacek’s view 
that ‘eros springs from and is directed to fulfilling the interests or development of the 
self’.1421 Disagreement arises over how this should be interpreted within a Christian 
ethic; for example, while Nygren rejects this self-centred pursuit, Vacek points in 
contrast to Aquinas, who affirmed love for one’s own good.1422 Therefore, while self-
love is regarded with suspicion in Reformed thinking, as reflected in Nygren’s thinking, 
Julie Mavity Maddalena notes that classical theologians, including Augustine and 
Aquinas, ‘posit that a proper love for self as God’s creation would lead to the 
glorification of and right relation with God’.1423 Self-love and self-flourishing, as 





Nevertheless, when it comes to a sexual ethic, Thielicke is critical of the excessive 
discourse within society on the ‘details of eros’, which, he notes, are outworked within 
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sex education.1425 Of course, it is important to note that eros and sexual activity are not 
mutually inclusive.
1426
 However, problems arise, Thielicke notes, when sexual 
behaviour is reduced to mere self-driven impulse and instinct. The long-term 
consequences for Thielicke are clear: 
For the farther we remove ourselves from the realm of the personal and the more we 
move into the realm of purely physical and psychic reactions the more we remove 





Thielicke’s critique echoes the transitory nature of Lewis’s ‘Need-love’: like ‘Need-
pleasure’, neither ‘last longer than the need’.1428 The challenge that Thielicke presents 
for a sexual ethic, therefore, is not to replace eros with agape, but to see the 
interconnection between them in a theologically informed anthropology. Unlike 
Nygren’s assessment, for Thielicke the two are not dialectically opposed, but intersect 
within the so-called ‘sexual community’.1429 What Nygren’s account overlooks, 
suggests Hollinger, is the ‘creation-ordered’ dimension of love.1430 In expounding the 
biblical teaching on agape and eros, he notes: ‘Love in the Bible is never so 
spiritualized that it cannot include sexual love, and a sexual love that involves the 
passions’.1431 In affirming that which is understood through natural revelation, sex can 
be appreciated as a natural gift for the demonstration and deepening of love by those 
outside of Christ.
1432
 As such, Jollimore points to secular philosophers who have 
understood the value of sexual love in agapic terms.
1433
   
However, in referring to Lewis’s discussion on the matter, Jollimore notes that eros is 
concerned not just with the satisfaction of desire, but with the particular person towards 
whom the desire is directed: ‘Unlike hunger (or horniness), which might be satisfied by 
any dish or roast beef (or any accommodating person), Eros attaches to one particular 
person, for whom there can be no substitute’.1434 Therefore, it is mistaken to deny the 
interpersonal aim of sexual desire, as recognised by Scruton, where love is the telos 
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towards which sexual desire is directed.
1435
 Nevertheless, Thielicke would point to the 
different motivations of agape and eros: ‘in eros the worth of the other person is the 
object; in agape the authentic being [Eigentlichkeit] of the other person is the 
object’,1436 an identity that transcends mere function.1437 
 
My current discussion has critiqued the current moral vision of the good in SRE 
discourse, a vision pre-disposed to the realization of a self-authenticated choice, towards 
a self-determined end, akin to Vacek’s description of eros. In noting the dominance of 
the pleasure discourse, we heed Lewis’ warning that the danger with the ‘god-like’ 
nature of eros is ‘not that the lovers will idolise each other but that they will idolise Eros 
himself’.1438 Eros, however, does not remain unchecked within moral discourse 
concerning the aims of sex education. Ben Spiecker and Jan Steutel, for example, 
advocate a virtue of ‘balanced caring’, which incorporates ‘emotions of benevolence’ 
towards another’s welfare.1439 As such, empathy is viewed as playing an important role 
in a young person’s emotional and moral development.1440  
 
The latest SRE policy advice for schools claims that ‘SRE lays the foundations for 
developing empathy and understanding between girls and boys, young men and young 
women’.1441 A failure of young people to demonstrate ‘affective-motivational’ qualities, 
such as respect and care, according to Spiecker and Steutel, indicates ‘possible 
stagnation in the child’s moral-sexual development’.1442 In his ‘ethic of caring’, Slote 
advocates a balance between ‘intimate caring’, ‘humanitarian caring’ and ‘self-
concern’.1443 However, beyond a socially constructed notion of consent, the 
development and outworking of empathy, and its implications for sexual behaviour, 
remain unstable. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is unclear on what basis the ‘harm 
principle’ can be justified on naturalist grounds beyond a socially constituted ideal. 
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In contrast, Thielicke notes that Christian agape is understood as ‘“existence-for-the-
other-person”’, where a person is ‘determined by his neighbour’; the implication for a 
sexual ethic is a ‘trend towards monogamy’.1444 Not only is personhood found in 
relation to others, Alistair McFadyen, for example, suggests that ‘genuine personhood is 
primarily derived from one’s fidelity and commitment to others’.1445 As such, sexual 
faithfulness challenges the ‘experiential satisfaction’ that Volf warns currently shapes 
our vision of flourishing.  
 
Within a Biblical sexual ethic, this existence-for-the-other is understood within the 
permanent, monogamous relationship of marriage.
1446
 In exploring this commitment, 
Hollinger suggests that love needs ‘definition and a conviction that sexual love goes 
hand in hand with one-flesh consummation and a context of procreation’.1447 The 
context and commitment of marriage, he suggests, avoids passion turning into ‘self-
serving objectification of the other person, using the other as a means for one’s own 
selfish ends’.1448 The vision of human flourishing within the Christian tradition, 
therefore, points to the fact that the sexual act signifies ‘a permanent and exclusive type 
of relationship’.1449  
 
A Christian vision of the moral good of sexual behaviour would argue for the 
reinstatement of the normative link between sex and love within SRE discourse, in 
particular, between eros and agape, directed towards the moral end of marriage.
1450
 
Sexual faithfulness becomes a content- and context-specific aspect of the theological 
virtue of love. Williams notes that it takes time for this ‘mutual recognition that my 
partner and I are not simply passive instruments to each other’.1451 The more time spent, 
he suggests, the greater the element of risk in exposing oneself to being formed by the 
other: ‘properly understood, sexual faithfulness is not an avoidance of risk, but the 
creation of a context in which grace can abound because there is a commitment not to 
run away from the perception of another’.1452 This echoes Lewis’s assertion that ‘to love 
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at all is to be vulnerable’.1453 This moves SRE discourse and the framing public sexual 
ethic beyond a socially constructed understanding of consent, towards a transcendent 
narrative of commitment and fidelity that contains within it no script for a mere casual, 




In addition, Vacek presents a case for why agape and eros, while both having a place in 
the Christian life and distinct in their own right, are incomplete without philia, 
described as ‘mutual love’ - a love that does not work ‘for the other’, nor one that lives 
‘from others’, but ‘a love that means being with others’.1454 
 
In comparison to the ancient world, Meilaender’s theological ethic on friendship points 
to a dearth of Christian reflection on the subject.
1455
 Lewis directs a similar critique at 
modernity: ‘To the Ancients, Friendship seemed the happiest and most fully human of 
all loves; the crown of life and the school of virtue. The modern world, in comparison 
ignores it’.1456 Herdt notes that an Aristotelian vision of friendship is where the virtues, 
as excellences of the individual, are viewed in terms of their contribution to the 
common good,
1457
 instituting the political nature of friendship.
1458
 In contrast, 
MacIntyre suggests that in our modern world of liberal individualism, ‘“Friendship” has 
become for the most part the name of the type of emotional state rather than of a type of 
social and political relationship’.1459 However, Ray Pahl, in his socio-historical account 
of the development of friendship, is hesitant to draw any normative assumptions, 
recognising instead the importance of the social and cultural context in shaping our 
understanding.
1460
 Viewed through the lens of a theological ethic, Meilaender is 
nevertheless critical of the idea of civic friendship, as it points to a different form of 
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human community in which the boundaries of love are limited: ‘We do not receive our 
life and being, finally, from the political community’.1461  
 
In his own reflection, Meilaender offers an exploration of what he suggests to be the 
‘central tension’ between agape and philia.1462 This, he denotes, to be the understanding 
of friendship as ‘preferential love’, with the related problems of reciprocity and fidelity 
in friendship.
1463
 In particular, in viewing friendship as reciprocal love he notes the 
tension between ‘wishing the other well for the other’s sake and desiring union with the 
other’.1464 This desire for the other, he points out, is a ‘desire to enjoy the friend, not the 
pleasure which accompanies the presence of the friend’.1465 However, by their very 
nature, preferential and reciprocal love ‘must be subject to change’, which would appear 
to make them incompatible with the faithful love of Christian friendship.
1466
 Yet 
Meilaender notes, ‘a love which lacks these marks of philia – its deep intimacy, 
mutuality, and preference – seems too impersonal and cold to satisfy the needs of our 
nature’.1467 
 
This echoes the criticism directed against the ‘equal regard’ of Gene Outka’s agape 
love, the ‘independent and unalterable’ regard for one’s neighbour,1468 where such an 
account, according to Gushee and Stassen, seems too ‘abstract’ and ‘incomplete’, failing 
to give enough importance to the moral obligations towards family and those closest to 
us.
1469
 In contrast, Meilaender suggests that ‘friendship, with its warmth and mutuality, 
should be the internal fruition of agape’.1470  
 
In justifying the preferential nature of friendship love, responding in particular to its 
rejection by Nygren and Søren Kierkegaard, Paul Wadell highlights the importance in 
understanding philia within the Christian narrative, in particular as the context in which 
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Christian love is learnt.
1471
 Consistent with this, Carmichael places friendship at the 
heart of agape love: 
The love of friendship…is love that sets people free to be and to become in their own 
individual uniqueness, and which is essentially directed towards, hopes for and invites, 





Alongside agape, philia also enriches our understanding of eros. Critiquing the 
dominance of eros at the expense of philia within the church, Kenneth Leech notes: 
‘The obsession with anatomy and genitalia has made many Christians timid about deep, 
passionate and committed friendships, and this has had a detrimental effect on the 
whole area of solidarity and communion’.1473  Outside of the church, an ‘ambiguity’ in 
the relationship between sex and friendship is also noted.
1474
  Neera Badhwar suggests 
that Freud, in particular, diminished friendship and other forms of “higher love” as 
merely ‘aim-inhibited’ forms of eros, the product of a repressed sexual instinct.1475  
However, in arguing for the appropriate relation between philia and eros, James 
McEvoy, for example, suggests that friendship within marriage, ‘loving the other for the 
goodness of character that is his or hers, teaches eros a restraint, an exclusiveness and a 
fidelity, that belong to the full human accomplishment of living’.1476  All three aspects 
of love come together in a shared life, one mark of which, notes Vacek, is the dialogue 
and interaction between free people: ‘A true encounter is always with someone whom 
we cannot control’.1477 Friendship, as Lewis states, ‘is a relation between men at their 
highest level of individuality’.1478 In each philia encounter, notes Vacek, we realize a 
different aspect of one’s personal self in a process of ‘mutual self-disclosure’,1479 a 
process in which we transcend our own individual needs and desires for the good of the 
special relationship. In light of this, Kotva suggests that we become fully individuated 
and fully flourish in the midst of ‘intrinsically worthwhile relationships’.1480  
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This thesis allows only a brief exploration of eros, agape and philia, their 
distinctiveness and relatedness; therefore, this discussion can offer only an initial 
reflection on the multi-faceted nature of the virtue of love and the mutuality that is 
inherent within a Christian understanding of living in community.  Suffice to say, in the 
face of a culture overtly focussed on eros, a Christian contribution to SRE discourse 
would introduce an understanding of these multi-layered facets, in order to enrich a 
vision of moral education and human flourishing, moving beyond a policy discourse of 
perceived ‘neutrality’, towards a relational narrative on which to build a vision of a 
sexually and relationally educated young person.
1481
 Ultimately, within a Christian 
narrative, friendship with God lies at the heart of that vision. 
 
5.5.2 Chastity: An Enriching Virtue 
 
In addition to the place of Christian love as a flourishing virtue, I shall also identify the 
virtue of chastity as an enriching virtue within a vision of Christian personhood. This is 
the virtue that Lewis pointed to as denoting a Christian morality of sex.
1482
 This speaks 
to, in particular, the negative press that ‘abstinence’ receives in current SRE discourse, 
and responds to the judgment that there exists a void in policy in articulating why 
delaying sex might be a good thing. It also confronts the cultural narrative that promotes 
an unbounded pursuit of sexual pleasure or, as Lewis noted, the ‘propaganda in favour 
of unchastity’.1483   
 
Chastity, Carr suggests, is one virtue that is distinct to sexual activity.
1484
 In his account 
of abstinence in relation to sexual activity, he draws an insightful distinction between 
the concepts of abstinence, celibacy, chastity, and virginity, presenting the possibility, 
for example, ‘that one might be chaste in the absence of celibacy or virginity’.1485  In 
particular, he suggests that a distinction might be made between ‘religious and secular 
forms of abstention’ in view of the different understandings of the concept of chastity: 
‘What mainly seems to distinguish consecrated celibacy from secular celibacy 
(aesthetically or pragmatically motivated avoidance of sexual relations) is a 
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commitment of abstention as a moral or spiritual ideal of human growth’.1486 However, 
‘consecrated celibates’, he notes, are committed to more than just sexual abstinence, but 
to ‘the cultivation of certain attitudes toward sexual life - a certain purity of heart of 
mind’.1487  
 
Even within our sex-saturated culture, abstention from sexual activity is not such a 
strange phenomenon. For as Lewis points out, ‘every sane and civilised man must have 
some set of principles by which he chooses to reject some of his desires and to permit 
others’.1488 As noted throughout, it is the end to which sexual activity is directed which 
will inevitably determine such principles and choices. Temperance, in particular, has 
long been associated with the need to regulate, control and direct the sexual appetite.
1489
 
As such, in adopting an Aristotelian ‘doctrine of the mean’,1490 Scruton suggests that 
‘education is directed towards the special kind of temperance which shows itself, 
sometimes as chastity, sometimes as fidelity, sometimes as passionate desire, according 
to the ‘right judgement’ of the subject’.1491 
 
Therefore, when it comes to educating for character, Van der Ven notes that the 
passions must be given their ‘proper place’.1492 This involves the rejection of the idea of 
‘suppressing, controlling, and neutralizing’ them, pointing instead to their ‘ordering and 
processing’.1493 As such, education should be directed towards the complementary 
process of living according to reason and passions, where rational engagement is 
directed towards the processing of emotions towards the vision of the moral good.
1494
 
This has included, within modern philosophical discourse, a defence for the 
compatibility of temperance with casual sex and promiscuity, with the qualification that 
such desires exclude ‘wrong-making features’.1495  
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In light of this, Carr notes chastity to be distinct from the other virtues. For however 
self-controlled and temperate a moral agent might be, it is their attitude, values, or 
feelings which mark them out as distinctive.
1496
 He states:  
The key difference between the chaste and the sexually continent is that the former do 
not entertain such inclinations as viable or honourable prospects; they regard lustful, 
adulterous or promiscuous promptings as unworthy and demeaning and are therefore 




Such ‘unworthy’ and ‘demeaning’ attitudes and feelings, however, may be viewed as 
hang-ups from our ‘anti-sex’ tradition and therefore no longer understood or embraced 
as part of our social narrative.
1498
 As Lewis noted, ‘chastity is the most unpopular of the 
Christian virtues’.1499 Indeed, Robert Adams suggests that the virtue of chastity is no 
longer regarded as an ‘honourable quality’.1500 As such, in recognising chastity as 
‘deeply political’,1501 Jenny Taylor notes that it is ‘not just invalid as an ideal, but has 
effectively dropped out of the lexicon because few understand its wider social 
meaning’.1502 This is due, she suggests, to a loss of connection between sexuality and 
spirituality, a loss which she bemoans is also evident in the church.
1503
 Indeed, as 
Wright has argued, this is consequential of a wider neglect in the understanding of 
virtue: ‘Do you think, as a “normal” young person growing up in today’s sex-soaked 
Western world, that you could attain chastity of heart, mind, and body just through 
praying one prayer about it?’1504 
 
However, chastity is also denounced for the perceived damaging control it has on 
natural instinct. In noting how chastity has been associated with various forms of 
‘political or psychological control’, Carr highlights, in particular, how the denial of 
sexual instinct has been associated with psychological damage.
1505
 Freud, in his 
assessment of sexual instinct, observed: ‘Experience shows that that the majority of the 
people who make up our society are constitutionally unfit to face the task of 
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abstinence’.1506 He noted, in particular, the challenge faced ‘during the period of ardent 
and vigorous youth’.1507 As explored earlier, this has significantly shaped the master 
narrative in which SRE policy has been shaped.
1508
 However, Lewis draws attention to 
the difference between ‘repressed’ sex, as understood within psychology, and 
‘suppressed’ sex, a conscious restraint, where the second leads to an intimate 
understanding of one’s sexuality. He concludes: ‘Virtue - even attempted virtue - brings 
light; indulgence brings fog’.1509 In addition, Anscombe highlights how unrestrained 
sexual instinct provides a poor barometer of moral character: ‘The idea lacks any 
foundation, that the people who are bent upon and who get a lot of sexual enjoyment are 
more gentle, merciful and kind than those who live in voluntary continence’.1510 Once 
again, we see the inadequacy of a naturalist worldview in drawing moral norms from 
human observations and experience.  
 
In view of the nature of chastity in influencing the attitudes, values and feelings of the 
agent with regard to their sexual behaviour, we once again shift our understanding of 
human sexuality beyond the mere biological towards a thinking, feeling and willing 
understanding of our personhood. In viewing chastity as a ‘form of the virtue of 
faithfulness’, which we noted earlier is inherent to an understanding of Christian love, 
Hauerwas notes that it is as equitable to married life as to the single life.
1511
 Indeed, 
more widely understood within secular, liberal discourse, Carr suggests that chastity, 
‘broadly conceived as decent and honourable self- and other-regarding sexual 
association’ might be viewed by educationalists as ‘part of the rich tapestry of any 
flourishing moral life’.1512 Therefore, in re-engaging with the interpersonal nature of 
sex, Scruton suggests ‘it becomes not foolish but admirable to ignore the promptings of 
a desire that brings no intimacy or fulfilment’.1513 This challenges SRE discourse to 
identify a moral language that gives young people, not only a moral reason to say ‘no’ 
to sex, but also a moral vision of the ideal context in which to say ‘yes’, a vision which 
cannot be derived from experience or instinct.  
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In conclusion, in identifying Christian love and chastity as two virtues which are 
distinct but yet intertwined within the Christian moral narrative of sex, we begin to 
reconstruct a moral framework that gives meaning and dignity to the moral agent and 
their sexual personhood. We also introduce a framework within which it is possible to 
place other virtues. For example, the virtue of courage can be seen to engage the moral 
agent in making moral decisions that move them towards a vision of human flourishing 
in which their dignity as decision-makers is enhanced. As Wells suggests: ‘Freedom 
means being able to go from saying “it happened” to “I did it”. If people are able to face 
their lives without illusion or deception, they need courage’.1514 In expounding on the 
‘unity of the virtues’ in Aquinas’ theory, Porter notes that prudence is also needed, 
alongside temperance, courage and justice, to ground and direct actions and reactions 
towards a vision of the human good.
1515
 Therefore, if as the Coalition Government 
asserts, the moral end of SRE is ‘wise and informed choices’, a critical awareness of the 
moral good is necessary alongside the place of moral character in achieving it. As such, 
to have moral character, suggests Roberts, is to be a person of integrity, which means 
‘to be, and to be able to remain, a moral entity – that is, a person in the fullest and 
deepest sense’.1516  
 
While it is beyond my remit to explore the depth and implications of each of these 
virtues for moral education, I affirm that a vision of SRE that integrates the biological 
with a vision of the moral and spiritual is, therefore, one in which the moral character of 
the agent, and corresponding virtues, is understood within a wider understanding of 
sexual personhood. As an integral part of the moral framework of SRE, a theological 
virtue ethic not only provides a coherent vision of the moral agent as an embodied 
learner, but provides a moral narrative from which to derive virtues that are directed 
towards a coherent vision of human flourishing, a vision shaped by love of God and 
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6.1 A Case for Reconstruction 
 
This thesis has presented a theo-ethical case for the moral reconstruction of SRE policy 
discourse in England. In setting out an argument for why the current moral framework 
is incoherent and inadequate, this thesis has critiqued, in particular, the liberal position 
of ‘informed choice’, exemplified by David Archard. This is an approach which 
advocates providing young people with the maximum amount of information around 
their sexual choices, by which it is presumed they are able to make free, autonomous 
choices. In addition, Archard’s position defends as morally legitimate, sexual behaviour 




However, while such a position seeks to affirm a ‘neutral’ approach to policy content, 
through a closer examination of policy content in Chapter 3, and an exploration in 
Chapter 4 of the current moral norms on sexual behaviour that it advocates, I have 
demonstrated that a morally neutral approach towards SRE is an impossibility. 
Invariably, a vision of human flourishing, informed by an underlying worldview 
commitment, shapes policy content. Consequentially, moral education, which runs to 
the heart of SRE, is thus a reflection of moral norms and values of a particular culture at 
any one time. Indeed, it should be noted that while this case is presented from a 
Christian theistic worldview position, the insufficiency of the current moral landscape 
for moral instruction is also felt by those from an opposing worldview position. For 
example, the atheist Alain de Botton notes that ‘in a world obsessed with freedom, there 
are few voices left that ever dare to exhort us to act well’.1518  
 
To presume that a young person can reason through and shape their own moral choices 
and identity, independent of an over-arching cultural moral narrative of sex and 
relationships and the social values therein, is one of the central critiques of this thesis. In 
affirming the Christian anthropological vision of the human learner, as presented by 
Smith and others, we view the young person beyond their rational, cognitive faculties 
and, in addition, recognise their embodied, relational nature.
1519
 Consequentially, I have 
argued that the current vision in SRE discourse is inadequate, an asocial vision which 
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fails to appreciate that human nature is shaped by the vision and practices of the 
surrounding cultural narrative. This is central to a virtue-centred understanding of the 
moral agent and the narrative of the community that gives shape and meaning to one’s 
moral identity. In addition, I have argued that the current moral vision of SRE presents 
an inadequate account of moral knowledge and moral truth, with which to shape a 
robust moral framework for education. Moreover, the norms and values which shape the 
current public sexual ethic, as viewed through a theological lens, present an incoherent 
and inadequate moral foundation from which to shape SRE policy and practice. 
 
However, in adopting a constructive approach to public engagement, the end goal of 
this theo-ethical critique has been, not just to deconstruct the existing metanarrative, but 
to sketch an alternative moral narrative within which to shape a vision of a sexually and 
relationally educated young person. In affirming a ‘transformationalist strategy’ towards 
Christian engagement in education,
1520
 I have sought, therefore, to present a Christian 
understanding of human flourishing that might contribute towards the common good of 
SRE. In presenting a vision of human flourishing that has, at its heart, the love of God 
and love of neighbour, I have explored the virtues that correspond with a Christian 
vision of moral formation, acting as a counter to the narrative of liberal individualism 
and epistemological agnosticism which currently shapes moral education. In doing so I 
identify how common virtue can be understood within a theological approach to public 
engagement. An understanding and engagement with virtue, I have argued, is a 
neglected yet necessary task of moral education for, as Meilaender suggests, 
‘communities that seek simply to remain “open” and that do not inculcate virtuous 
habits of behaviour will utterly fail at the task of moral education’.1521 I have presented, 
and briefly expounded, the virtues of Christian love and chastity, dispositions which, I 
have suggested, can enrich the moral discourse of SRE. 
 
6.1.1 Public Receptivity of a Case for Reconstruction 
 
In presenting a case for the moral reconstruction of SRE policy discourse, I do not of 
course presume that our case is the only one, particularly in the arena of educational and 
political philosophy, as I have acknowledged throughout. Nor do I assert that this 
counter narrative is the only possible alternative within a theological ethic.  
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However, an end goal of this thesis is to add weight to those voices that have already 
perceived the inadequacies of the current moral framework of SRE policy, and to re-
invigorate discussion around the current norms shaping policy content. For, where it is 
increasingly presumed that SRE is a right and entitlement of the young person, and 
where it is argued that we should abandon moral reasoning over content in favour of 
directly responding to the needs of young people, the words of Sandel should be 
heeded: ‘A politics emptied of substantive moral engagement makes for an 
impoverished civic life. It is also an open invitation to narrow, intolerant moralisms. 
Fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread’.1522  
 
In addition, the presumption that a religious voice is any less valid or rational within 
policy reasoning and formulation than, say, a naturalistic worldview position is also a 
flawed position that must be challenged.
1523
 Therefore, in view of current discourse 
around SRE, openness to engaging with all faith-based voices within the policy 
community should be re-affirmed. This can not only strengthen the democratic process, 
but can enhance philosophical engagement over policy content, in particular, the moral 
values and norms that inform and shape policy and practice. For, if we are to achieve a 
robust moral framework for SRE, we must, at the very least, uphold a process in which 
all voices are required to present their moral workings. 
 
Nevertheless, in advocating this central line of argument, it should be acknowledged 
that such a process will require political effort, and significant goodwill from those 
within the policy community. A reinvigorated discussion around the current moral 
framework of SRE in England, a discussion in which opposing voices can engage in a 
spirit of tolerance and respect, may perhaps be judged too costly a process when 
compared with the possibility of making politically expedient policy decisions within 
the current system.  
 
Many of the cultural barriers and pre-conceived positions concerning the contribution of 
a Christian worldview to educational and political discourse must first be overcome. 
Indeed, the theological critique of our public sexual ethic and its underlying 
presuppositions, as evidenced in policy discourse, and the wider cultural questions that 
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this discussion raises, may well add to the unpalatability of a Christian worldview 
within the present policy community. In addition, enriching the vision of a sexually and 
relationally educated young person through a theological virtue ethic may be only one 
among other theological approaches presented in the policy community. Therefore, the 
task of reconstruction as presented in this discussion should not be underestimated. This 
should not deter, however, from strongly advocating for discussions concerned with 
expounding moral truth in SRE discourse. 
 
6.2 Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Due to the complex nature of the ideas and values that shape the moral environment in 
which public policy is formulated, and the normative ethical theories and principles at 
work within policy discourse, the purpose of this thesis has been to identify some of the 
philosophical principles at work within the current moral framework of SRE, and to 
present a theo-ethical case for why these principles and the emerging norms on sexual 
behaviour are inadequate. In articulating my theological approach to public engagement, 
and in giving an overview of the moral and spiritual content of SRE policy discourse, I 
identified and expounded on what I regard as the fundamental flaws in the current moral 
framework.  
 
As a result of the approach adopted, various philosophical discourses were inevitably 
briefly engaged with in Chapter 3 and 4. However, their omission would have failed to 
give a comprehensive and descriptive picture of the normative conclusions being drawn 
within the liberal approach to SRE policy discourse discussed. In addition, the 
significant scope given to the critical rather than constructive task of this thesis was on 
account of the need to adequately identify and critique the liberal values at work in 
policy discourse. 
 
In critiquing the underlying worldview commitment of naturalism, evident in policy 
discourse, and the liberal values shaping our public sexual ethic, the discussion in 
Chapter 4 not only added to the original contribution that this thesis presents, but 
strengthened the argument for the incoherence and inadequacy of the existing moral 
framework. In addition to an account of the existing moral framework, the counter 
narrative presented in Chapter 5 sketched the contours of a theological virtue ethic as an 
alternative moral framework and language, concluding by identifying specific virtues 
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that could inform and enrich the vision of a sexually and relationally educated young 
person.  
 
A re-engagement with the moral discourse surrounding SRE policy, and the 
presentation of a virtue theory approach to SRE, in particular, the pursuit of common 
virtues in public policy, naturally has implications for all stakeholders concerned. In 
adopting a virtue theory approach, politicians and policy makers resolve to move 
towards presenting a more coherent and adequate moral vision of a sexually and 
relationally educated young person. Into this discussion, religious groups have an 
opportunity to articulate the virtues which correspond to a vision of human flourishing 
within their moral tradition. In addition, parents and teachers are reminded of the 
important role that they play in modelling good conduct, and young people are taught to 
examine their moral judgements and consequent actions, exploring the virtues that 
inform and shape their moral habits around sex and relationships. This is done, not 
dependent on abstract or self-directed moral knowledge, but in view of an articulated 
moral vision that has undergone rigorous philosophical scrutiny. 
 
In light of the discussion initiated in this thesis, the potential avenues for future research 
are numerous, with a few possibilities identified below: 
 
1. A more detailed exploration and critique of the engagement and contribution of 
faith communities to the current SRE policy community, in particular, the 
contribution of those who identify as speaking on behalf of the Christian 
community within the SEF. This would not only present a more detailed picture 
of the receptivity of the policy process to different moral positions, but would 
enable further critique of the theological approach to public engagement 
currently being adopted by different individuals and groups. It would also create 
opportunity for a theological critique of the content of that engagement.  
 
2. A more detailed theological critique of any one of the philosophical discourses 
or ethical theories identified in relation to SRE discourse, or further engagement 
with any one proponent therein, would develop and deepen the discussion 
initiated in this thesis.  
 
3. Building on the constructive approach initiated in this discussion, further 
reflection on the implications of a theological virtue ethic for SRE discourse 
and how it might shape policy, curriculum and practice in the classroom, is ripe 
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for further exploration and discussion. For example, while identifying and 
sketching Christian love and chastity as two virtues which could enrich the 
moral language and vision of human flourishing within SRE, further critical 
reflection on the acquisition of these virtues, in addition to expanding 
discussion around the inclusion of other virtues, for example, justice, could 
enhance a Christian contribution to the vision of moral education and human 
flourishing within SRE discourse. 
 
The onus is now on the critic to scrutinize the moral validity of this, and future pieces of 
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